Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 39-06, Section: A, page: 3630. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1978.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 40-02, Section: A, page: 0907. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1978.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 35-08, Section: A, page: 5463. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1974.

Heidegger calls his philosophy a “science of being” (BPP 11). The intersecting phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical, existential, and anthropological themes of Being and Time, as well as Heidegger’s many influences, make the task of determining the subject matter and method of this science a difficult one. This dissertation defends two main theses. First, Heidegger is a metaphysical realist. He intends his inquiry into being to “carve reality at the joints.” This is an unpopular reading, so I devote a large portion of the dissertation to criticizing competing non-metaphysical and anti-realist interpretations. Second, Being and Time and surrounding works combine the many philosophical threads mentioned above into a unified, coherent, and original whole. In Chapter 1 I offer an interpretation of the subject matter of Heidegger’s science and criticize a competing style of interpretation, the “meaning interpretation.” In Chapter 2 I offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s method and criticize interpreters who claim that Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology is inconsistent with his scientific aspirations. In Chapter 3 I attempt to resolve two puzzles about Husserl and Heidegger’s conceptions of scientific philosophy. In Chapter 4 I offer a realist account of Heidegger’s debt to Kant, contrasting it with an influential reading of Heidegger as a “temporal idealist.” In Chapter 5 I examine Heidegger’s turn to anthropological and biological themes after Being and Time and reject interpretations on which this turn undermines the science of being. / 2021-02-27T00:00:00Z

<p>Reliabilism, at its most general, is the claim that a belief has some positive epistemic status (typically justification or knowledge) only if it was formed by a reliable belief-forming process or mechanism. One important problem facing reliabilism is the Generality Problem. The Generality Problem arises because reliability is generally taken to be a property of a type of mechanism or process, and a given token process belongs to as many different types as it has properties. The Generality Problem consists of the task of specifying in a principled manner which of the multitude of types a given belief-forming token-process belongs to is the one whose reliability is relevant to the epistemic project.</p><p> In this dissertation, I will propose a solution to the Generality Problem. My proposed solution is based on a model of skill-learning which I have developed based on the theories of motor-learning provided by John A. Adams and Richard A. Schmidt, and a theory of cognitive architecture (which focuses on cognitive skills) provided by John R. Anderson. This model is most directly applicable to cases where beliefs are formed by acquired cognitive skills, but it can easily be extended to apply to cases involving innate cognitive instincts, and, with some degree of difficulty, to cases involving belief formation through a process of deliberation.</p><p> I will develop my proposed solution to the Generality Problem in two stages. In the first stage, I will propose a &ldquo;rough draft&rdquo; version of the solution. According to this rough draft version, the mechanism type that is relevant to the epistemic project is a mechanism&rsquo;s <i> activation type</i>. A belief-forming mechanism of a given activation type consists of an <i>activation mechanism</i> which is responsible for activating &lsquo;a&rsquo; belief-forming program that is stored at a certain address. This belief-forming program is, at least typically, acted on by learning, selection, and/or maintenance mechanisms, which constrain the degree and manner of how the program can vary from time-slice to time-slice and from world to world. Any belief-forming program (or version of the same program) that is activated by the same activation mechanism belongs to the same activation type.</p><p> This rough draft solution is incomplete in two ways. First, it provides no way of specifying the epistemically relevant type a given activation mechanism belongs to. Secondly, it provides no obvious reason to think that this type, out of the multitude that a given belief-forming process-token or mechanism-token belong to, is relevant to the epistemic project.</p><p> These two issues are addressed by a more refined version of my proposed solution, which claims that the type a belief-forming mechanism belongs to which is relevant to the epistemic project is its <i>extended activation type</i>. This type is also identified on the basis of the activation mechanism, but this proposed solution recognizes that the epistemically relevant type of the activation mechanism itself can be specified by some underlying adaptive mechanism (a learning, selection, developmental, maintenance, etc. mechanism). This mechanism&rsquo;s type, in turn, is specified by some further underlying adaptive mechanism. This regress can be non-problematically terminated by such adaptive mechanisms as evolution by natural selection or a certain kind of Intelligent Design. The reliability of this type is plausibly linked to the epistemic project, since it incorporates the entire flow of information that went into shaping the belief-forming skill, including information that is not reflectively accessible by the subject.</p><p> This proposed solution provides some traction for solving two other problems that confront reliabilism: the New Evil Demon Problem and the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem. In the course of this dissertation, I will use my proposed solution to the Generality Problem to provide solutions to two versions of the New Evil Demon Problem, and to provide partial solutions to cases involving a third version of the New Evil Demon Problem. I will also use my proposed solution to the Generality Problem to provide solutions to several Strange and Fleeting Process problem cases. The basic strategy I will use to solve these Strange and Fleeting Process problem cases is that the belief-forming processes involved in these cases tend to belong to a &lsquo;common-sense&rsquo; type which is reliable, but to an extended activation type that is unreliable. </p><p>

This thesis makes the philosophical case for an engaged and active African perspective in science studies. The African dimension has been largely absent in an actively increasing research area of science and society, an applied area where philosophy and other disciplinary interests intersect. To be able to do this demands the need to revisit what constitutes an African intellectual tradition. Indeed, a core aspect of the African identity whose epistemic worth and relevance have been denigrated, ignored and dismissed on the basis of ideal standards of reason and rationality set up by the privileging of Western intellectual tradition as typified by modern Western science. Efforts and interventions to advance science development in the African context (Nigeria) have not been successful as a result of the contextual inattention that characterises the approach prevalent today-one based on a justificationist epistemology and methodology. Therefore, I argue that a non-justificationist conceptualisation of reason and rationality-seen as being open to criticism and which takes seriously the results of critical exchanges as advanced in Karl Popper-is more appropriate to the science situation in Nigeria. This exploration helps not only to vitiate cultural tensions but also able to create a new basis for interaction between African and Western knowledge traditions. Of particular interest in Popper's philosophy-but too often ignored in the literature-is the strong connection between his epistemology of science and his political thought. In pointing out key epistemic principles that flow from Popper's epistemology to his politics, I aim to provide a more robust account of the problem of science advancement in Africa than other approaches. These may be characterized as 'colonialist', seeing the answer as lying in the imposition of Western science and its values, and 'traditionalist', that resist this by championing indigenous knowledge and value systems. Positioning my account between these alternatives, Popper's philosophy is deployed as a framework within which a dialogue between two seemingly incompatible cultures becomes possible. Popper's emphasis on epistemic virtues of openness and humility, underlined by fallibilism and critical rationalism, allows the development of a new model of rationality that is neither absolute nor relative but pluralistic. Thus, although the primary focus is the development of an African science culture, the thesis demands a reappraisal by Western science of its own dispositions and outlook. This Popperian way of reconceptualising rationality and accompanying epistemic attitudes makes decoupling the entrenched entanglement embodied by prevailing popular models of science less problematic and so makes way for a new approach to science in an African context, where ownership and responsibility can be initiated on a dialogical basis. Such a model does not exclude, devalue, denigrate, oppress, or disrespect. In this way, the global image of science can be recalibrated in a manner that is characteristically ecumenical, authentically pluriversal, truly open, and genuinely decolonised, with each knowledge tradition better disposed to offer its modest contributions to the common pot of science, as all of humanity strives to sort the challenges of development world over.

Kant once said that the "whole field of philosophy" is guided by the fundamental question, "What is the human being?" Kant himself, and even more so his Idealist successors, addressed this question by offering transcendental theories of human subjectivity. My dissertation explores the philosophical development of the Kantian and post-Kantian theories of subjectivity and their relationship to the often neglected theory of selfhood in Heidegger's Being and Time. After examining the issues in Kant's theory which were decisive motivating factors for the post-Kantian Idealists--namely the metaphysical status of the apperceptive I and the unity of reason--I explore Fichte's metaphysics of subjectivity and his attempt to demonstrate the unity and self-sufficiency of reason. Finally, I argue that the early Heidegger's theory of finite human existence is best understood as an extension of and corrective to the classical Idealist tradition. I attempt to cash out two of Heidegger's claims: (1) that his own "fundamental ontology" is pre-figured by Kant's theory of subjectivity, and (2) that the crucial insights in his reading of Kant share much with the Idealists but also "move in the opposite direction" from them. I argue that Heidegger's theory of selfhood gives an account of the sui generis features of human existence which unifies our theoretical and practical activities while avoiding the stronger Idealist claims regarding the self-sufficiency and self-legitimacy of reason.

This dissertation investigates the status of reflection in Hegel's account of modern ethical life. I ask, on the one hand, why Hegel places so much significance on unreflective attitudes, and on the other, which forms of reflection remain compatible with what he calls the habit of the ethical. This question exposes crucial commitments underlying Hegel's project in the Philosophy of Right and interrogates the flexibility of his account and its openness to normative change. Yet my inquiry also has broader implications for the nature of social criticism. I argue that even reflection of the overtly critical variety emerges from and remains indebted to our habitual comportment and that this is why it must retain a valued place in ethical life.

My dissertation offers a critique of the concept of authenticity that Martin Heidegger develops in Being and Time. The concept of authenticity has been critiqued for many reasons--mainly for political, moral, and ideological reasons. My dissertation develops, on the other hand, a conceptual critique: I argue that the concept of authenticity is a paradoxical concept. I argue, more precisely, that it is paradoxical, as the concept of authenticity proposes, for a person to confront, transparently and determinedly, his or her own death, while, at the same time, being able to be an individual--understanding him or herself as an individual, and making autonomous choices. In offering this critique, I provide interpretations of some of the basic concepts in Being and Time that break from conventional interpretations or are new. For example, I interpret the concept of inauthenticity from the perspective of the psychoanalytic idea of mania. Ultimately, however, I provide philosophical, or conceptual reasons to resist a concept with clearly problematic moral and political implications.

My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the distinction between actions and mere events. Actions, I argue, have a uniquely active component that distinguishes them from mere events and which can be explained in terms of effort. Effort has several features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to activate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story of action, I apply my account to situations in which an agent displays strength of will, such as when one struggles to perform an action while overcoming a persistent urge to do otherwise. I conclude by offering an explanation of mental action that demonstrates the extent of our powers of agency within the domain of the mental.