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I develop a novel semantic theory for modals that has important consequences for contemporary work in epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. My theory replaces the dominant view about semantics--that our best theory of meaning should ascribe truth-conditions to modalized sentences--with a non-truth-conditional yet fully compositional semantics for modals. Its contributions to current debates in analytic philosophy include an explanation of the possibility of modal disagreement that avoids relativism, a solution to the paradoxes about conditional obligations (including the gentle murder paradox), and new impulses for a generalized solution to the Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivism. / text

The topic of the thesis are moral judgments which are articulated in language by claims or speech-acts like, for example, “One ought to keep one’s promises” or “It is good to respect the beauty of nature”. According to the philosophical literature on moral judgments, they have two distinctive features. They are objective and practical: They purport to be correct in an objective sense and they tend to motivate us to act in certain ways. In light of these two features, I discuss the two most prominent accounts in the philosophical literature on moral judgments: cognitivism and noncognitivism. Cognitivism takes moral judgments to be acts of theoretical knowledge with a special normative content. Noncognitivism takes moral judgments to be desire-like acts of the mind. In part I., I argue that cognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality since it spoils the practical character of such judgments. In part II., I argue that noncognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality because it makes the objectivity of moral claims mysterious. In part III. of the thesis, I then aim at developing an alternative to cognitivism and noncognitivism that overcomes their shortcomings but also saves their insights. I call this alternative account 'practical cognitivism'. The core claim of practical cognitivism is that moral judgments are acts of a sui generis power for practical knowledge or cognition. The bulk of part III. is about developing this claim and showing that it allows us to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality. I end the thesis by responding to some objections that might be raised against practical cognitivism.:1. Approaching my topic: moral judgments 1 1.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ................... 5 1.2. The practicality of moral judgments................... 9 1.3. The task, the problem .......................... 11 1.4. Outlook .................................. 16 I. Cognitivism 21 2. Introduction 21 3. Cognitivism: the basics 22 3.1. Ordinary descriptive beliefs ....................... 22 3.2. Moral beliefs................................ 28 3.3. Scanlon’s and Smith’s cognitivism.................... 31 4. Cognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 35 5. Cognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 38 5.1. Attempt#1:Externalism ........................ 40 5.2. Attempt #2: The rationality-based account of practicality . . . . . . 44 5.3. Attempt#3: Volitionalism........................ 55 6. Conclusion 63 II. Noncognitivism 67 7. Introduction 67 8. Noncognitivism: the basics 69 8.1. Nondescriptivism ............................. 69 8.2. Intrinsic practicality ........................... 71 8.3. The desire-like account of intrinsic practicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 8.4. A standard of internal consistency.................... 79 8.5. Expressing vs. reporting ......................... 85 9. Noncognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 88 10.Noncognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 90 10.1. Noncognitivism vs. speakersubjectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 10.2. Attempt #1: Horgan and Timmons................... 96 10.3. Attempt #2: Blackburn ......................... 99 10.4. Attempt #3: Gibbard ..........................103 11. Conclusion 112 III. Practical Cognitivism 115 12. Introduction 115 12.1. Diagnosis .................................115 12.2. Practical cognitivism ...........................125 13. The generic concept of form 130 13.1. Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 13.2. Applying the generic concept of form to moral judgments . . . . . . . 136 14.The practical character of practical knowledge 138 15.The cognitive character of practical knowledge 145 15.1. Universal validity as a feature of theoretical knowledge . . . . . . . . 146 15.2. Universal validity as a feature of practical knowledge . . . . . . . . . 148 16. The self-conscious character of practical knowledge 153 17. Moral judgments as acts of practical knowledge 160 17.1. Self-conscious practicality ........................161 17.2. Self-conscious validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 1 7.3. Self-conscious practical validity .....................167 18. Excursus: Thompson’s (Neo)Aristotelian practical cognitivism 172 19.The objectivity and intrinsic practicality of moral judgments 179 19.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ...................180 19.2.The intrinsic practicality of moral judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 19.3. Shared willing, public reasons and practical knowledge of the good . . 191 20.Conclusion 196 21.Objections 198 21.1. Moral error and practical irrationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 21.2. The formalism objection .........................208 22. Acknowledgement 219 References 220