This thesis integrates archaeological survey, aerial photographs and historical documents to undertake the first analysis of the conflict landscapes and military history of some of the most important German logistics facilities in northern France during the Battle of Normandy in 1944. Post-war survival of features has been remarkably good in this forested setting and this likely constitutes one of the best- preserved and most extensive examples of a non-hardened WWII archaeological landscape yet documented in northwest Europe. Over 900 discrete archaeological earthworks have been mapped and interpreted with the aid of primary source material from both Allied and German archives to characterise munitions, fuel and rations depots in the Forêt Domaniale des Andaines around Bagnoles-de-l’Orne, Orne Département, Basse-Normandie. These landscapes also preserve bomb craters associated with air raids on the facilities by the US Ninth Air Force and these have been mapped and analysed to show that despite 46 separate attacks by over 1000 aircraft, and the dropping in excess of 1100 tons of bombs in the forest during the spring and summer of 1944, the depots continued to function and to support German Army operations until the area was occupied by American forces in August 1944. In some areas of the forest it has been possible to link discrete arrays of bomb craters to individual air raids and even specific flights of aircraft. This work is yielding new perspectives on the character and operation of fixed depots in the German logistics system in Normandy both before and during the battles of 1944, while also permitting a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Allied intelligence gathering, targeting and bombing operations against forest-based supply facilities. In doing so it is making a unique contribution to the newly-emerging record of WWII conflict archaeology to be found in the forests of northwest Europe.

During World War II, the United States Army employed a new weapon on the battlefield in an attempt to defeat German armor tactics: the tank destroyer. Tank Destroyer Force was created to stem the tide of German armored attacks and form an opening for American tanks to make their own counter-attacks. Since the end of the war, tank destroyer battalions have been regarded as a failed experiment, despite the evidence that they effectively did their jobs. The negative feedback in the immediate post-war period lead to the dissolution of the Tank Destroyer Force. Many of the studies of tank destroyers focus on the doctrine they followed and the faults in it. However, most of the studies do not look at the successful application of tank destroyer doctrine in the field by tank destroyer battalions. This paper will examine operations of the 773rd Tank Destroyer Battalion and its application of tank destroyer doctrine during the Battle of Chambois from August 17-21, 1944, for which it won a Presidential Unit Citation.

During the Second World War, training was the Canadian Army’s longest sustained activity. Aside from isolated engagements at Hong Kong and Dieppe, the Canadians did not fight in a protracted campaign until the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The years that Canadian infantry units spent training in the United Kingdom were formative in the history of the Canadian Army. Despite what much of the historical literature has suggested, training succeeded in making the Canadian infantry capable of succeeding in battle against German forces. Canadian infantry training showed a definite progression towards professionalism and away from a pervasive prewar mentality that the infantry was a largely unskilled arm and that training infantrymen did not require special expertise. From 1939 to 1941, Canadian infantry training suffered from problems ranging from equipment shortages to poor senior leadership. In late 1941, the Canadians were introduced to a new method of training called “battle drill,” which broke tactical manoeuvres into simple movements, encouraged initiative among junior leaders, and greatly boosted the men’s morale. The Canadians participated in numerous military exercises of varying sizes that exposed problems with their senior leadership. The replacement of unsuitable officers greatly enhanced the fighting potential of Canadian units and formations. As time went on, infantry training became more rigorous and realistic, and tactical concepts became increasingly sophisticated. By the time of the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, infantry training was intense, suited to units’ assigned tasks, and highly technical, which belied the false prewar assumption that the infantry was an unskilled arm. By the time Canadian divisions entered battle, they were as prepared as they would ever be. The exception to this was the training of the overseas reinforcement units, which reached an acceptable standard only in the last months of the war. This study ultimately represents a substantial contribution to understanding the history of the Canadian Army and its role in the Second World War.

War news and public relations (PR) was a critical consideration for the Canadian Army during the Second World War. The Canadian Army developed its PR apparatus from nothing to an efficient publicity machine by war’s end, despite a series of growing pains. Canadian Military Headquarters in London appointed the first PR Officer, William Abel, in January 1940. PR services overseas grew along with the size of the army. The early days were marked by lack of coordination and often jurisdictional and personality conflicts between Abel and the other PR Officers and organizations. The 19 August 1942 Dieppe raid was the low point for both the accuracy of war news and Canadian PR involvement because Lord Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters minimized Canadian PR’s involvement in planning. This resulted in early portrayals of the raid as successful and the British censored a more honest explanation by the Canadian Army. The Sicilian and Italian campaigns provided a learning experience for the PR units. In Sicily, the news coverage of the Canadians was a public success, but PR had trouble with their allies in gaining national recognition and representation. Additionally, the question of correspondents’ priorities and delays getting to the front and transportation difficulties angered the press. Many of these problems continued in Italy until the appointment of Richard Malone, who enjoyed support from the politicians, press, and military. Applying the Mediterranean experience and participating in Allied publicity planning contributed to the excellence of Canadian PR during the Northwest Europe Campaign. PR maintained the confidence of the press while still controlling the correspondents. The army also largely overcame the temptation to censor bad news although this sometimes embarrassed Ottawa. Allied regulations sanitized war news preventing the reporting of the more disturbing aspects of war. Through censorship, the army exercised a great deal of control over the news media, yet this hegemony was incomplete because of need to keep the press friendly. Although a large sceptical minority remained, most Canadians considered their war news to be accurate. In sum, Canadian Army PR was generally successful, portraying the army positively and attracting media coverage.