Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Gates, William. Second Reader: Doyle, Richard. "December 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 2, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): NATO, Defense Planning, Industrial Production, Economics, Burden Sharing, Defense Industries, Sharing, Costs, Military Forces (Foreign), Military Forces (United States), Military Equipment, Mathematical Models, Military Reserves, Industrial Capacity. Author(s) subject terms: Burden-sharing, NATO. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-80). Also available in print.

Under what conditions and for what reasons do American leaders seek the endorsement of relevant international organizations (IOs) such as the UN or NATO for prospective military interventions? My central hypothesis is that U.S. government efforts to obtain IO approval for prospective interventions are frequently the result of significant bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials--with the top military brass and war veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront--who highlight its potential downsides and long-term costs, on the other. The military leaders--the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff in Washington--are generally skeptical of humanitarian and other "idealist" interventions that aim to change the domestic politics of foreign countries; they naturally tend to consider all the potential downsides of intervention, given their operational focus; and they usually worry more than activist civilian policy officials about public and congressional support for protracted engagements. Assuming that the military leaders are not merely stooges of the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to altogether resist a prospective intervention, when they believe that no vital American interests are at stake and fear an open-ended deployment of U.S. troops. Given the military's professional expertise and their standing in American society, they come close to holding a de facto veto over prospective interventions they clearly oppose. I hypothesize that confronted with such great initial reluctance or opposition on the part of the military brass, civilian advocates of intervention from other government agencies will seek inter alia to obtain an advance endorsement from relevant IOs, so as to lock in international support and thereby reassure the military and their bureaucratic allies that the long-term costs to the United States in terms of postwar peacekeeping and stabilization will be limited. That, in turn, can be expected to help forge a winning bureaucratic coalition in Washington and persuade the president to authorize military action. United States multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy resultant--the outcome of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining--and it may not actually reflect the initial preferences of any particular government agency or senior official.

Since the end of the Cold War, political and geographical realities have changed considerably. One such reality was the balance of power between East and West, which was especially visible in Europe. The contest between rivals, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was over. Ultimately, NATO found itself the pre-eminent security organisation in Europe. The new post-cold war environment forced questions about the appropriate role for NATO. However, that changed with both the process of NATO expansion into former Warsaw pact countries and the ethnic conflicts throughout the former Yugoslavia. NATO found a new purpose during the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia as ‘peace-enforcer’ in the Balkan region. The focus of this thesis is NATO’s role in peace-enforcement in the former Yugoslavia. It examines how NATO dealt with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Specifically, how NATO managed to re-establish its relevance as a security organisation. NATO’s military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were crucial in securing the end of hostilities in both those regions. NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) all played significant roles in subsequent peace-enforcement and peace-building roles in the region by suppressing violence through power projection and institution building. In 2001, NATO undertook a third operation in the Balkans, that time of a more limited nature, disarming ethnic Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO’s presence there also encouraged stability. This thesis argues that, ultimately, NATO maintained its relevance by the establishing a new role for itself after the Cold War through Eastward expansion and in suppressing ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Both these roles have been successful. The decisive interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM forced the belligerents to stop fighting. NATO’s subsequent enforcement of the peace has stopped each conflict from flaring up again. With NATO membership now including most of Europe, it remains the only viable security organisation on the continent. NATO’s effectiveness as a security organisation was demonstrated with its ability to end the conflict in the Balkans and providing a stable environment for the people of the region. This intervention was crucial to the definition of a new role for NATO in the post-Cold War world. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1320482 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics 2008

Canada consistently balances competing inclinations for proximity and distance with the United States. Yet the extant literature on Canadian foreign policy has rarely focused on this particular behaviour trait or readily accepted that such an ambiguous stance is actually underpinned by a strategic logic, let alone the crux of a purported grand strategy. And the few that that are open to the notion of a Canadian grand strategy often overlook the domestic decision-making determinants of behaviour, are largely empirical-descriptive in content, or are chronologically limited to either the early Cold War or a few key foreign policy episodes. This dissertation rectifies these shortcomings by providing a theoretical-explanatory and empirically-informed account of Canada’s post-war grand strategy, in which its domestic origins, strategic policies, and cultural predispositions are all carefully explored. It does so by applying the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour, which combines strategic cultural factors that guide policy-makers on security matters with cybernetic policy processes, through which beliefs, inclinations, and policy choices are standardized and regularized as distinct doctrines across a range of foreign, defence, and security policies. It tests this model on two key cases of Canadian grand strategy in the post-war period: (1) Canada’s policy responses to American preferences on strategic (air and missile) defence over some six decades, and (2) its policy responses to US – and to a lesser extent British – strategic preferences on NATO defence strategy during the Cold War. The findings reveal that Canada’s strategic policies fluctuated between the two Standing Operational Doctrines in its policy repertoire: continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism. These two doctrines span the range of feasible policy options – the “goldilocks zone” – required to ensure that any trade-offs between security and sovereignty, as the central values being pursued in the cybernetic process, are minimized. It is for this reason that Canada’s strategic behaviour has a high degree of policy continuity, patterned consistency, and is best described as the goldilocks grand strategy.

Univ., Habil.-Schr.--Darmstadt. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 290 - 308) and index.

Zugl.: Frankfurt am Main, Univ., Diss. / Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universität Frankfurt am Main. Includes bibliographical references and index.

No description available.

Orientador: Sebastião Carlos Velasco e Cruz / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T05:03:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Amusquivar_ErikaLaurinda_M.pdf: 4351366 bytes, checksum: effd17d80563de85a9c3d69455dbfe3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: Esta dissertação de mestrado, intitulada O papel da política de segurança dos Estados Unidos no Sistema Internacional no pós-Guerra Fria, busca analisar a postura dos Estados Unidos em promover políticas militaristas ao instalar bases militares ao redor do mundo a partir do final do século XX e início do século XXI. Deriva-se dessa discussão dois debates. O primeiro - debate interno - foca na consecução da política de segurança dos Estados Unidos recomendado pelo think tank neoconservador PNAC (Project for the New American Century) por meio da consolidação do sistema de alianças militares entre Estados Unidos e da Europa - a Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte - OTAN. Essa política seria um ferramental estratégico para a manutenção da hegemonia estadunidense que, após os ataques terroristas de 11 de Setembro aos Estados Unidos, se incorporaria nos documentos oficiais de política de segurança do país. O segundo debate - externo - discorre sobre a insuficiência desse projeto ao criticar o modelo de política de segurança adotado. Partindo da premissa que essas políticas estiveram na contramão do que se apostava ao final dos anos 90, essa crítica se pauta na análise da mudança na política de segurança estadunidense, que não se sustentaria no novo século. Por isso o segundo debate contempla outros fatores primordiais desconsiderados pelo projeto neoconservador. Ressalta-se que o objeto referente à concretização da política de segurança do PNAC para o sistema de alianças da OTAN envolve um debate complexo - Império, imperialismo, militarismo - que não será abordado aqui senão tangencialmente, na medida em que o tratamento do nosso objeto o exigir. Isto porque são temas teoricamente densos, que exigiriam um estudo de outra envergadura / Abstract: This Master's Degree thesis, entitled The role of the Security Policy of the United States in the International System following the Cold War, seeks to analyze the posture of the United States in promoting militaristic policies to install military bases around the world from the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. From this discussion, two debates are derived. The first - the internal debate - focuses on achieving the security policy of the United States recommended by the neoconservative think thank PNAC (Project for the New American Century) by consolidating the system of military alliances between the United States and Europe - North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO. This Policy would be a strategic tool for the maintenance of the U.S. Hegemony that, after the September 11th terrorist attacks to the United States, would be incorporated in the official documents of the country's security policy. The second debate - external - stems from the failure of this project to criticize the security policy adopted. Assuming that these policies were contrary to the ideals supported by the late '90s, this critique is guided in the analysis of change in the U.S. security policy, which is not sustained in the new century. Therefore, the second debate addresses other key factors not considered by the neoconservative project. It is noteworthy that the object which relates to the implementation of the security policy of the PNAC for the alliance system of NATO involves a complex debate - Empire, Imperialism, Militarism - which will not be discussed, but tangentially, to the extent that the treatment of our object requires. The reason being that it involves theoretically dense issues, which would require a study of another magnitude / Mestrado / Relações Internacionais / Mestre em Ciência Política

Diploma thesis "NATO in the fight against terrorism and the formation of collective identity" deals with the impact of the threat of international terrorism on collective identity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The September 11th terrorist attacks on the US soil constitute a milestone in the history of NATO. The article 5 of Washington treaty was invocated for the first time. The main argument of the thesis states that, despite disagreements among allies about the role of the Alliance in the fight against terrorism after the September 11th , NATO was capable of reinforcing its collective identity and reformulating its purpose. The main goal of the thesis is to define a relationship between the perception of the threat of terrorism within NATO and collective identity of NATO, on the basis of arguments of social constructivism and with constructivist methodology. Discourse analysis of key NATO documents confirms the impact of September 11th on the transformation of strategic consideration of the Alliance, which has led to initiation of several efforts to fight terrorism. Outcomes of discourse analysis of United States, United Kingdom, France, Czech Republic and Poland reveal that terrorism has reinforced collective identity among NATO member states and has become a new threat for Alliance...

Changing environment of international relations, changing conflicts character, and new threats and risks influence North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its role in international system. Clear structure of international system ended with end of bipolar division of Cold War. Unclear political equilibrium brought the question of future of NATO. Political concept that was used during Cold war was not sufficient and the Alliance stated again in front of transformation needs. Also during the Cold War the role of national security had been changing. Subject of this research is character of transformation of NATO and its adherence to theoretical premises of neoliberal institutionalism. International institutions are often subject of research in international relations. This thesis reacts on the deficiency of interest about changes and survival of institutions in literature. The thesis works with the theory of Robert O. Keohane that is rooted in the end of the Cold War but has been modified by further author's works. After basic analysis three variables were identified. These are three transformation areas - institutional development, and mission conduct. On the base of theoretical approach analysis three independent variables were added. These were - level of institutionalization, character of...