This work presents a computational tool that calculates optimally efficient safeguarding strategies at and across nuclear fuel cycle facilities for a cost-constrained inspector seeking to detect a state-facilitated diversion or misuse. The tool employs a novel methodology coupling a game theoretic solver with a probabilistic simulation model of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant and an aqueous reprocessing facility. The simulation model features a suite of defender options at both facilities, based on current IAEA practices, and an analogous menu of attacker proliferation pathway options. The simulation model informs the game theoretic solver by calculating the detection probability for a given inspector-proliferator strategy pair and weighting the detection probability by the quantity and quality of material obtained to generate a scenario payoff. Using a modified fictitious play algorithm, the game iteratively calls the simulation model until the equilibrium is reached and outputs the optimal inspection strategy, proliferation strategy, and the equilibrium scenario payoff. Two types of attackers are modeled: a breakout-willing attacker, whose behavior is driven by desire for high value material; and a risk-averse attacker, who desires high-value material but will not pursue a breakout strategy that leads to certain detection. Results are presented demonstrating the sensitivity of defender strategy to budget and attacker characteristics, for an attacker known to be targeting the enrichment or reprocessing facility alone, as well as an attacker who might target either facility. The model results indicate that the optimal defender resource allocation strategy across multiple facilities hardens both facilities equitably, such that both facilities are equally unattractive targets to the attacker. / text

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The thesis of is to strengthen the capacity building of nuclear safety and disaster prevention all over the world from a preventive perspective, and to ensure zero probability of any nuclear disaster in the world. In the face of threat from skyrocketing fossil fuel prices and the pressure of GHG emission reduction, nuclear power generation, with its advantages on low carbon emission, has been valued once again. More and more countries have taken positive and active attitudes toward nuclear power generation, facilitating the development of it or adopting nuclear energy as a potential alternative energy option in the future. Through information sharing, knowledge dissemination and cross-organizational collaboration aim at assisting enery country in their capacity building of nuclear safety and nuclear disaster prevention, and to promote conformity of enery operation towards nuclear safety and disaster prevention. Thus we should seek to help to promote every country¡¦s public education and communication of nuclear safety and to contribute to energy security and sustainable development in the world.

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Os ataques terroristas ocorridos nos Estados Unidos em setembro de 2001, o acidente ocorrido na central nuclear de Fukushima em março de 2011 e os recentes ataques em Paris em novembro de 2015 são exemplos de eventos que corroboram a necessidade da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica em melhorar a segurança nas instalações nucleares. O governo brasileiro vem contribuindo com este projeto e investindo recursos para melhoria do Sistema de Proteção Física, do reator nuclear de pesquisas localizado no Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares São Paulo, sistema que tecnicamente é colocado em prática pelos subsistemas de detecção, retardo e a resposta. O Sistema de Proteção Física é um conjunto integrado de pessoas, equipamentos e procedimentos usados para proteger instalações e fontes nucleares e/ou radioativas, contra ameaça, roubo, sabotagem ou outras ações dolosas causadas pelo homem; buscando sempre evitar, mitigar ou minimizar as consequências causadas por estas ações. Baseado na metodologia desenvolvida por especialistas em segurança do Sandia National Laboratories, AlbuquerqueEUA, o estudo apresenta a avaliação da eficácia do Sistema de Proteção Física do reator IEAR1. Essa metodologia possibilita a mensuração da eficácia do sistema e a identificação das suas vulnerabilidades por meio de análises hipotéticas, probabilísticas e estimativas de valores. Após a aplicação da metodologia obteve-se o valor aproximado de 40% para o indicador PE, o que demonstra a necessidade de implementar melhorias no sistema para minimizar as vulnerabilidades. / The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant on March 2011and the recent attacks in Paris on November 2015 are examples of events that justify the efforts of the International Agency of Energy AtomicIAEA to improve security at nuclear facility. The Brazilian government has been collaborating with this project and investing resources to improve the Physical Protection SystemPPS of the nuclear research reactor system, technically is associated with the elements of detection, delay and response. The PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. The PPS works to avoid, to mitigate or to minimize the consequences caused by these actions. This study evaluates the PPS of the reactor, identifying the vulnerabilities and suggesting ways to improve the system effectiveness. The analyses were based on the methodology developed by Sandia National Laboratories´ security experts in AlbuquerqueUSA, allowing the system evaluation through hypothetical and probabilistic analyzes; identifying threats, determining the targets and analyzing the possible adversaries paths. From the methodology adopted was obtained the value around 40% for PE indicator, which shows the need to improve the system to minimizing the vulnerabilities.

Os ataques terroristas ocorridos nos Estados Unidos em setembro de 2001, o acidente ocorrido na central nuclear de Fukushima em março de 2011 e os recentes ataques em Paris em novembro de 2015 são exemplos de eventos que corroboram a necessidade da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica em melhorar a segurança nas instalações nucleares. O governo brasileiro vem contribuindo com este projeto e investindo recursos para melhoria do Sistema de Proteção Física, do reator nuclear de pesquisas localizado no Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares São Paulo, sistema que tecnicamente é colocado em prática pelos subsistemas de detecção, retardo e a resposta. O Sistema de Proteção Física é um conjunto integrado de pessoas, equipamentos e procedimentos usados para proteger instalações e fontes nucleares e/ou radioativas, contra ameaça, roubo, sabotagem ou outras ações dolosas causadas pelo homem; buscando sempre evitar, mitigar ou minimizar as consequências causadas por estas ações. Baseado na metodologia desenvolvida por especialistas em segurança do Sandia National Laboratories, AlbuquerqueEUA, o estudo apresenta a avaliação da eficácia do Sistema de Proteção Física do reator IEAR1. Essa metodologia possibilita a mensuração da eficácia do sistema e a identificação das suas vulnerabilidades por meio de análises hipotéticas, probabilísticas e estimativas de valores. Após a aplicação da metodologia obteve-se o valor aproximado de 40% para o indicador PE, o que demonstra a necessidade de implementar melhorias no sistema para minimizar as vulnerabilidades. / The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant on March 2011and the recent attacks in Paris on November 2015 are examples of events that justify the efforts of the International Agency of Energy AtomicIAEA to improve security at nuclear facility. The Brazilian government has been collaborating with this project and investing resources to improve the Physical Protection SystemPPS of the nuclear research reactor system, technically is associated with the elements of detection, delay and response. The PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. The PPS works to avoid, to mitigate or to minimize the consequences caused by these actions. This study evaluates the PPS of the reactor, identifying the vulnerabilities and suggesting ways to improve the system effectiveness. The analyses were based on the methodology developed by Sandia National Laboratories´ security experts in AlbuquerqueUSA, allowing the system evaluation through hypothetical and probabilistic analyzes; identifying threats, determining the targets and analyzing the possible adversaries paths. From the methodology adopted was obtained the value around 40% for PE indicator, which shows the need to improve the system to minimizing the vulnerabilities.

Robust and reliable quantitative proliferation resistance assessment tools are critical to a strengthened nonproliferation regime and to the future deployment of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. Efforts to quantify proliferation resistance have thus far met with limited success due to the inherent subjectivity of the problem and interdependencies between attributes that contribute to proliferation resistance. This work focuses on the diversion of nuclear material by a state and defers other threats such as theft or terrorism to future work. A new approach is presented that assesses the problem through four stages of proliferation: the diversion of nuclear material, the transportation of nuclear material from an internationally safeguarded nuclear facility to an undeclared facility, the transformation of material into a weapons-usable metal, and weapon fabrication. A complete and concise set of intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of the nation, facility and material that could impede proliferation are identified. Quantifiable inputs for each of these attributes are defined. For example, the difficulty of handling the diverted material is captured with inputs like mass and bulk, radiation dose, heating rate and others. Aggregating these measurements into an overall value for proliferation resistance can be done in multiple ways based on well-developed decision theory. A preliminary aggregation scheme is provided along with results obtained from analyzing a small spent fuel reprocessing plant to demonstrate quantification of the attributes and inputs. This quantification effort shows that the majority of the inputs presented are relatively straightforward to work with while a few are not. These few difficult inputs will only be useful in special cases where the analyst has access to privileged, detailed or classified information. The stages, attributes and inputs of proliferation presented in this work provide a foundation for proliferation resistance assessments which may use multiple types of aggregation schemes. The overall results of these assessments are useful in comparing nuclear technologies and aiding decisions about development and deployment of that technology.

The safety and security of a radiological facility shares a common objective which is to ensure the protection of the population and the environment from an undue radiological hazard. Adapting and extending risk assessment to security applications has been limited because of the adaptive nature of the sub-state actors and the lack of historical data of terrorist attacks on radiological facilities. Currently, no broad risk index exists for radiological facilities, such as healthcare centers and universities. This study develops a quantitative risk-based methodology that radiological facilities can employ to conduct self-assessments and gain better understanding of the threat they face. The computation of the Potential Facility Risk Index (PFRI) is based on the triplet definition (threat, vulnerability, and consequences) of risk. The threat component of the PFRI is devised as a utility function weighing the threat group attributes and asset preference. The principles of probabilistic risk assessment and pathway analysis are implemented to account for radioactive material theft probabilities in different attack scenarios. Locational hazards and nuclear security culture are measured as a function of radiological facility vulnerability. The consequences of loss of life and economic loss are computed, as a result of an attack from the radiological dispersal device (RDD). The methodology is applied to a hypothetical healthcare facility a single radioactive with three material assets (⁶⁰Co, ¹³⁷Cs, ¹⁹²Ir). The representation of the PFRI value on a qualitative scale-ranging from “very low risk” (1) to “very high risk” (10) presents a holistic view of the state of the facility risk to RDD. The PFRI may be used by decision makers to evaluate any security upgrades and justify security investments. The RDD game, developed as an extension to PFRI, provides the healthcare facility (defender) with strategic options to budget scarce security resources and make optimal choices under severe uncertainty about the terrorist adversary (attacker) theat.

<p dir="ltr">Risk assessment involves analyzing potential accident scenarios to identify hazards and assess associated risk factors. Nuclear safety and security share the common goal of protecting against radiation exposure. However, they have developed separately, each with their own distinct risk assessment methodologies. As a result, there is a need for a comprehensive risk assessment method that covers both safety and security aspects. This thesis proposes a methodology that integrates risk assessment approaches for nuclear safety and security to address the gap in the current development of their risk assessment methodologies.</p><p dir="ltr">The proposed methodology applies the existing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to the PFRI (Potential Facility Risk Index), originally developed to evaluate quantitative nuclear security risks, to enable the inclusion of safety risks in the assessment. The PFRI framework and methodology are modified to ensure that the PFRI score accurately reflects the overall risk of the facility for both nuclear safety and security. The facility-based approach of the existing PFRI is maintained to ensure a comprehensive assessment of the research reactor.</p><p dir="ltr">To achieve the goal of developing a comprehensive risk assessment method, the traditional PRA tools, such as event tree analysis (ETA) and fault tree analysis (FTA), are utilized in combination with the modified PFRI methodology. In addition, the consequence analysis method of PFRI is changed using the MACCS, which is commonly used for consequence analysis in PRA. The modified methodology is then used to conduct a risk assessment for the PFRI by setting safety and security scenarios at a hypothetical nuclear facility. The results demonstrate that the modified PFRI can provide a reasonable traditional risk unit and enable the comparison of risks from both safety and security aspects.</p><p dir="ltr">The final goal of this study is to develop the PFRI to determine the overall risk of the facility, considering both nuclear safety and security aspects. The PFRI score is utilized as a quantitative measure to show the total risk associated with hypothetical nuclear facility, providing a comprehensive understanding of its safety and security. By developing a methodology that integrates risk assessment approaches for nuclear safety and security, this thesis contributes to the improvement of the risk assessment methodology for nuclear facilities.</p>

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