A Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) is any device that releases radioactive material into the environment (e.g. Dirty Bomb). Depending on the size of the explosion, location, and the weather conditions the affected area could be several city blocks. In such an event there could be hundreds, even thousands of contaminated victims seeking medical treatment. One concern in the healthcare industry is the uncertainty of the level of radiation exposure to the healthcare providers from these contaminated patients. The intention of this study is to estimate the levels of skin contamination for victims arriving at the hospital needing conventional medical treatment. Given a skin contamination of the victim the effective dose rate to the healthcare providers can be estimated in certain scenarios. The effective dose rate will determine how long the healthcare provider would be able to care for the victims.

An RDD attack against the U.S. is something America needs to prepare against. If such an event occurs the ability to quickly identify the source of the radiological material used in an RDD would aid investigators in identifying the perpetrators. Spent fuel is one of the most dangerous possible radiological sources for an RDD. In this work, a forensics methodology was developed and implemented to attribute spent fuel to a source reactor. The specific attributes determined are the spent fuel burnup, age from discharge, reactor type, and initial fuel enrichment. It is shown that by analyzing the post-event material, these attributes can be determined with enough accuracy to be useful for investigators. The burnup can be found within a 5% accuracy, enrichment with a 2% accuracy, and age with a 10% accuracy. Reactor type can be determined if specific nuclides are measured. The methodology developed was implemented into a code call NEMASYS. NEMASYS is easy to use and it takes a minimum amount of time to learn its basic functions. It will process data within a few minutes and provide detailed information about the results and conclusions.

O presente trabalho tratou do estudo dos riscos apresentados pelos radioisótopos após serem submetidos aos efeitos da detonação de um artefato explosivo. O estudo permitiu a obtenção de dados baseados em pesquisas bibliográficas, documentais, cálculos e softwares, possibilitando análises das consequências resultantes de artefatos explosivos contendo radioisótopos. O objetivo deste trabalho foi a obtenção de conhecimentos quanto à potencialidade destrutiva do explosivo denominado emulsão, composto principalmente por nitrato de amônia, bem como das propriedades do cobalto, iodo e do irídio que farão parte da carga destes explosivos. Supomos que à emulsão fossem acrescentadas as atividades de 1,5.102 TBq de cobalto-60, 3,7.10-3 TBq de iodo-131 e 3,7 TBq de irídio-192 que são suas atividades representativas em radioterapia, medicina nuclear e gamagrafia respectivamente. Avaliamos a progressão da pluma radioativa a partir do epicentro da explosão, possibilitando análises dos valores das doses, da distribuição e do alcance, a partir do epicentro, dos radioisótopos estudados. A simulação da progressão da pluma radioativa foi realizada por cálculos e simulação computacional fazendo uso dos programas Blast/FX Explosive Effects Analysis Software e The HotSpot Health Physics Codes - Version 2.07.2. No trabalho só foram estudadas as doses resultantes da exposição externa considerando que todo material radioativo volatizou. Foi deixado para estudos futuros calcular as doses internas e no pulmão bem como as doses resultantes de estilhaços radioativos produzidos na explosão. / This job devotes to the study of the radioisotopes risks, after the effects of an explosion of an explosive device. This study developes data based on bibliographies, documents, calculation and also software, and as a result, could provide analysis of an explosive device blast with radioisotopes. The purpose of this work is to provide knowlegde about the potencial destructive result of a blast of an explosive called emulsion, made with ammonia nitrate, and also with cobalt properties, iodine and iridium of a explosive charge. To this emulsion were added activities of 1,5.102 TBq of Cobalt-60, 3,7.10-3 TBq of iodine-131 and 3,7 TBq of iridium-192. Such activities are seen in radioterapy, nuclear medicine and gamagraphy. It could consider the radioative plume progress from the blast epicenter, in order to analyse the value of the dose, the distribution and the distance from the epicenter of the radioisotope studied. The simulation of the radioative plume progress was made with calculation and computer software, such as Blast/FX Explosive effects analysis software and The Hotspot health physics Codes version 2.07.2. In this study was only possible to check the doses from the external effects, to consider the fact that all radioative material result in volatization. It´s important to say that we left for future studies the calculation of the internal doses and inside the lung, and also the doses of the radioative shrapnel from the blast.

O presente trabalho tratou do estudo dos riscos apresentados pelos radioisótopos após serem submetidos aos efeitos da detonação de um artefato explosivo. O estudo permitiu a obtenção de dados baseados em pesquisas bibliográficas, documentais, cálculos e softwares, possibilitando análises das consequências resultantes de artefatos explosivos contendo radioisótopos. O objetivo deste trabalho foi a obtenção de conhecimentos quanto à potencialidade destrutiva do explosivo denominado emulsão, composto principalmente por nitrato de amônia, bem como das propriedades do cobalto, iodo e do irídio que farão parte da carga destes explosivos. Supomos que à emulsão fossem acrescentadas as atividades de 1,5.102 TBq de cobalto-60, 3,7.10-3 TBq de iodo-131 e 3,7 TBq de irídio-192 que são suas atividades representativas em radioterapia, medicina nuclear e gamagrafia respectivamente. Avaliamos a progressão da pluma radioativa a partir do epicentro da explosão, possibilitando análises dos valores das doses, da distribuição e do alcance, a partir do epicentro, dos radioisótopos estudados. A simulação da progressão da pluma radioativa foi realizada por cálculos e simulação computacional fazendo uso dos programas Blast/FX Explosive Effects Analysis Software e The HotSpot Health Physics Codes - Version 2.07.2. No trabalho só foram estudadas as doses resultantes da exposição externa considerando que todo material radioativo volatizou. Foi deixado para estudos futuros calcular as doses internas e no pulmão bem como as doses resultantes de estilhaços radioativos produzidos na explosão. / This job devotes to the study of the radioisotopes risks, after the effects of an explosion of an explosive device. This study developes data based on bibliographies, documents, calculation and also software, and as a result, could provide analysis of an explosive device blast with radioisotopes. The purpose of this work is to provide knowlegde about the potencial destructive result of a blast of an explosive called emulsion, made with ammonia nitrate, and also with cobalt properties, iodine and iridium of a explosive charge. To this emulsion were added activities of 1,5.102 TBq of Cobalt-60, 3,7.10-3 TBq of iodine-131 and 3,7 TBq of iridium-192. Such activities are seen in radioterapy, nuclear medicine and gamagraphy. It could consider the radioative plume progress from the blast epicenter, in order to analyse the value of the dose, the distribution and the distance from the epicenter of the radioisotope studied. The simulation of the radioative plume progress was made with calculation and computer software, such as Blast/FX Explosive effects analysis software and The Hotspot health physics Codes version 2.07.2. In this study was only possible to check the doses from the external effects, to consider the fact that all radioative material result in volatization. It´s important to say that we left for future studies the calculation of the internal doses and inside the lung, and also the doses of the radioative shrapnel from the blast.

It remains unlikely that a terrorist organization could produce or procure an actual nuclear weapon. However, the construction of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) from commercially produced radioactive sources and conventional explosives could inflict moderate human casualties and significant economic damage. The vast availability of radioactive sources and the nearly limitless methods of dispersing them demand an inclusive study of the acquisition pathways for an RDD. A complete network depicting the possible acquisition pathways for an RDD could be subjected to predictive modeling in order to determine the most likely pathway an adversary might take. In this work, a comprehensive network of RDD acquisition pathways was developed and analyzed utilizing the Bayesian network analysis software, Netica. The network includes variable inputs and motivations that can be adjusted to model different adversaries. Also, the inclusion of evidence nodes facilitates the integration of real-time intelligence with RDD plot predictions. A sensitivity analysis was first performed to determine which nodes had the greatest impact on successful completion of RDD acquisition. These results detail which portions of the acquisition pathways are most vulnerable to law enforcement intervention. Next, a series of case studies was analyzed that modeled specific adversarial organizations. The analysis demonstrates various features of the constructed Bayesian RDD acquisition network and provides examples of how this tool can be utilized by intelligence analysts and law enforcement agencies. Finally, extreme cases were studied in which the adversary was given the maximum and minimum amount of resources in order to determine the limitations of this model. The aggregated results show that successful RDD acquisition is mostly dependent on the adversary’s resources. Furthermore, the network suggests that securing radiological materials has the greatest effect on interdicting possible RDD plots. Limitations of this work include a heavy dependence on conditional probabilities that were derived from intuition, as opposed to actual historical data which does not exist. However, the model can be updated as attempted or successful RDD plots emerge in the future. This work presents the first probabilistic model of RDD acquisition pathways that integrates adversary motivations and resources with evidence of specific RDD threats.

In the event that a radiological dispersal device (RDD) is detonated in the U.S. or near U.S. interests overseas, it will be crucial that the actors involved in the event can be identified quickly. If irradiated nuclear fuel is used as the dispersion material for the RDD, it will be beneficial for law enforcement officials to quickly identify where the irradiated nuclear fuel originated. One signature which may lead to the identification of the spent fuel origin is the isotopic composition of the RDD debris. The objective of this research was to benchmark a forward model methodology for predicting isotopic composition of spent nuclear fuel used in an RDD while at the same time optimizing the fidelity of the model to reduce computational time. The code used in this study was Monteburns-2.0. Monteburns is a Monte Carlo based neutronic code utilizing both MCNP and ORIGEN. The size of the burnup step used in Monteburns was tested and found to converge at a value of 3,000 MWd/MTU per step. To ensure a conservative answer, 2,500 MWd/MTU per step was used for the benchmarking process. The model fidelity ranged from the following: 2-dimensional pin cell, multiple radial-region pin cell, modified pin cell, 2D assembly, and 3D assembly. The results showed that while the multi-region pin cell gave the highest level of accuracy, the difference in uncertainty between it and the 2D pin cell (0.07% for 235U) did not warrant the additional computational time required. The computational time for the multiple radial-region pin cell was 7 times that of the 2D pin cell. For this reason, the 2D pin cell was used to benchmark the isotopics with data from other reactors. The reactors from which the methodology was benchmarked were Calvert Cliffs Unit #1, Takahama Unit #3, and Trino Vercelles. Calvert Cliffs is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) using Combustion Engineering 14??14 assemblies. Takahama is a PWR using Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 17??17 assemblies. Trino Vercelles is a PWR using non-standard lattice assemblies. The measured isotopic concentrations from all three of the reactors showed good agreement with the calculated values.

Possible risks of using radioactive materials are a highly discussed topic nowadays. This work is dealing with this problem and it is focused on possible risks of using radioactive materials from the ex-treatment plant of uranium ores MAPE Mydlovary. In introductory chapters I am describing the current state of ex-treatment plant of uranium ores. I am dealing with the history of operation of MAPE, information about sludge lagoons and about stored sediments in them and other characteristics concerning this operation. For years, sediments in which radionuclides are contained have been stored in treatment plants and that is why I am dealing with ionizing radiation. Because the topic is the using of radioactive materials which can be used mainly by terrorists, I am also describing this worldwide phenomenon of recent years where I first of all focused on super-terrorism using radioactive weapons, namely so-called ?dirty bombs?. The target of this work is to find out possibilities of using radioactive materials from the ex-treatment plant. Therefore I measured values of radioactivity and exposition of radiation at some places with the help of exploratory research. That meant sampling of soils and water and also measurement of power of dose equivalent of radiation gamma. After gathering information of needed radiation values I carried out simulation of possible using of radioactive materials from the premises MAPE. By means of dirty bomb I used the programme TerEx at using radioactive material. Then I carried out several calculations which were focused on inhalation, ingestion or outdoor radiation from radioactive materials and also calculation how much it is necessary to gain a significant source of ionizing radiation. From these sources I have deduced impacts for individuals, society or environment. Based on analysis and evaluation of given problems, my set hypothesis ?By using radioactive materials from the ex-treatment plant of uranium ores MAPE Mydlovary a serious threat to people will not occur? was confirmed. Results of my work can be used as a study material for completing and broadening knowledge about risks resulting from using radioactive materials. Further an increase of foreknowledge and explanation of certain consequences of ionizing radiation on humans from materials from the ex-treatment plant of uranium ores MAPE Mydlovary, for inhabitants of Mydlovary and surrounding areas and also useful information for lay and professional society which is interested in these problems.

The safety and security of a radiological facility shares a common objective which is to ensure the protection of the population and the environment from an undue radiological hazard. Adapting and extending risk assessment to security applications has been limited because of the adaptive nature of the sub-state actors and the lack of historical data of terrorist attacks on radiological facilities. Currently, no broad risk index exists for radiological facilities, such as healthcare centers and universities. This study develops a quantitative risk-based methodology that radiological facilities can employ to conduct self-assessments and gain better understanding of the threat they face. The computation of the Potential Facility Risk Index (PFRI) is based on the triplet definition (threat, vulnerability, and consequences) of risk. The threat component of the PFRI is devised as a utility function weighing the threat group attributes and asset preference. The principles of probabilistic risk assessment and pathway analysis are implemented to account for radioactive material theft probabilities in different attack scenarios. Locational hazards and nuclear security culture are measured as a function of radiological facility vulnerability. The consequences of loss of life and economic loss are computed, as a result of an attack from the radiological dispersal device (RDD). The methodology is applied to a hypothetical healthcare facility a single radioactive with three material assets (⁶⁰Co, ¹³⁷Cs, ¹⁹²Ir). The representation of the PFRI value on a qualitative scale-ranging from “very low risk” (1) to “very high risk” (10) presents a holistic view of the state of the facility risk to RDD. The PFRI may be used by decision makers to evaluate any security upgrades and justify security investments. The RDD game, developed as an extension to PFRI, provides the healthcare facility (defender) with strategic options to budget scarce security resources and make optimal choices under severe uncertainty about the terrorist adversary (attacker) theat.

One of the relatively cheap and easily available instruments suitable for a terrorist attack is the dirty bomb. Using conventional charges (TNT, Semtex etc.) it disperses radioactive materials. Its use is based on contamination of the area where the explosion took place and on creating a radioactive cloud, which may travel rather fast depending on the wind, and which pollutes other areas with its fall-out particles. Such areas become dangerous to live or stay in for a longer period due to the danger of irradiation sickness and cancer. The polluted areas must be decontaminated, which is a very difficult task. Another problem that may occur after the explosion of such a bomb is also panic as well as burns and injuries caused by shells. This work deals with possibilities of radiological weapon construction, the results of using a dirty bomb and with the work of integrated emergency services on such an occasion.

The detonation of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) may result in a situation where many individuals are exposed to contamination due to the inhalation of radioactive materials. Assessments of contamination may need to be performed by emergency response personnel in order to triage the potentially exposed public. The feasibility of using readily available standard 2x2-inch sodium-iodide detectors to determine the committed effective dose to a patient following the inhalation of a radionuclide has been investigated. The 2x2-NaI(Tl) detector was modeled using the Monte Carlo simulation code, MCNP-5, and was validated via a series of experimental benchmark measurements using a polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) slab phantom. Such validation was essential in reproducing an accurate detector response. Upon verification of the detector model, six anthropomorphic phantoms, based on the MIRD-V phantoms, were modeled with nuclides distributed to simulate inhaled contamination. The nuclides assessed included Am-241, Co-60, Cs-137, I-131, and Ir-192. Detectors were placed at four positions on the phantoms: anterior right torso, posterior right torso, anterior neck, and lateral left thigh. The detected count-rate varied with respect to detector position, and the optimal detector location was determined on the body. The triage threshold for contamination was set at an action level of 250-mSv of intake. Time dependent biokinetic modeling was employed to determine the source distribution and activity in the body as a function of post-inhalation time. The detector response was determined as a function of count-rate per becquerel of activity at initial intake. This was converted to count-rate per 250-mSv intake for triage use by first responders operating the detector to facilitate triage decisions of contamination level. A set of procedure sheets for use by first responders was compiled for each of the phantoms and nuclides investigated.