The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of the policy shift from strategic stability (the policy that guided U.S. and Soviet nuclear doctrine and acquisition strategies throughout the Cold War) to a new strategy privileging ballistic missile defence (BMD). Prior to this shift BMD programs were considered by both sides to be financially untenable, technologically unreliable, and dangerously destabilising and potentially catastrophic, primarily because they risked undermining the stability of a second strike capability and other stabilizing features of mutually assured destruction (MAD). I argue that this new environment is making missile defence a viable alternative to massive nuclear arsenals. In this new security environment Canada remains an anomaly. Canadian officials support NATO BMD programs but reject any bilateral and/or bi-national negotiations with Washington on continental BMD for North America. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that Canada, through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) agreement on early warning radars, is in fact part of missile defence.

Theories of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot fully account for the nuances of certain cases because proliferation is a complex process involving numerous variables, the importance of which can potentially shift across time. This seems especially true when applied to the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) where motivations have shifted in relevance numerous times in its proliferation history. In order to investigate this, this thesis reviews extant theories of nuclear proliferation and their ability to explain the case of the DPRK by critically examining its historical nuclear progress and nuclear weapons ambitions across time. The result is that indeed, proliferation theories are ill-equipped to completely account for the DPRK’s nuclear choices. The DPRK has ostensibly been motivated by numerous variables at different times, each having varying degrees of influence, inexplicable for mono-causal and often western and ethno-centric accounts of its proliferation motivations.

Theories of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot fully account for the nuances of certain cases because proliferation is a complex process involving numerous variables, the importance of which can potentially shift across time. This seems especially true when applied to the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) where motivations have shifted in relevance numerous times in its proliferation history. In order to investigate this, this thesis reviews extant theories of nuclear proliferation and their ability to explain the case of the DPRK by critically examining its historical nuclear progress and nuclear weapons ambitions across time. The result is that indeed, proliferation theories are ill-equipped to completely account for the DPRK’s nuclear choices. The DPRK has ostensibly been motivated by numerous variables at different times, each having varying degrees of influence, inexplicable for mono-causal and often western and ethno-centric accounts of its proliferation motivations.

This dissertation examines Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policy. It demonstrates that contrary to the received wisdom on nuclear behaviour, Canada does not think ‘strategically’ in the nuclear field. I argue that while the decision-making of great powers may be straightforward in the nuclear field, non-great powers can afford to be more ambivalent and even less cautious. The focus of the dissertation is on Canada’s nuclear export decisions from the 1950s to the late 1970s. My contention is that middle powers, like Canada, are rarely influenced by military-strategic interests, but that they, nonetheless, act according to their own particular self-interests when determining whether or not to export nuclear materials and technology. In looking at Canada’s nuclear decision-making from its entry into the nuclear age until the late 1970s, the dissertation offers three findings. First, Canada does not make decisions that fit a military-strategic calculus. Second, Canada is often ambivalent in the nuclear field. I argue that Canada can afford to be ambivalent because constraints on its decision-making do not stem primarily from security concerns or existential threats but from beliefs as to what Canada should do and should be in global affairs. Finally, Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policies have been defined primarily by its place – both real and imagined – in the world as a middle power. The argument rests on insights draw from liberal IR theory as well as domestic politics explanations of nuclear behaviour. My contention is that Canada’s decision-making has been influenced by domestically held beliefs and perceptions of its identity – that is, where Canada ranks on the figurative power spectrum and what values it professes in relation to other actors in the international system. My research thus makes a contribution to the literature on nuclear supply and on the broader literature on nuclear behaviour, more generally.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in 2015 by President Obama and began a political and religious battle that ensued for months in the United States Congress. Two of the main actors in the fight against JCPOA were Christians United for Israel (CUFI), a Christian-Zionist lobby[1], and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), one of the most prominent pro-Israel lobbies founded and largely supported by Zionist-Jewish Americans[2]. Both organizations deployed tactics of religious and apocalyptic-religious rhetoric to encourage their large and influential constituencies to join them in the fight against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, motivating U.S. citizens otherwise unaware and uninvolved of nuclear proliferation policy to become heavily involved in the process of the political debates surrounding the deal. This paper will seek to answer the questions: How is apocalyptic rhetoric typically conveyed through religious outlets? What then, does the deployment of this tactic say about religion in America in the public sphere? [1] Cohn-Sherbok, Dan. The Politics of the Apocalypse. Oneworld Publications Ltd., Oxford. 2006, pp. 165-166. [2] Waxman, Dov. Trouble in the Tribe. Princeton University Press. Princeton. 2016, pp.4.

This thesis examines the apparent discrepancy in success between Iran and North Korea when it comes to developing nuclear weapons. Both states at one time sought to acquire nuclear weapons for internal political and external security reasons. But whereas North Korea successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in 2006, Iran was pressured into an agreement in 2015 which put significant restraints on its nuclear programme. This thesis finds that there were multiple contributory factors that lay behind these differing outcomes. Specifically, it finds that while both nations had similar motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, their economic/military capabilities and the external pressure against their ambition differed in one case from the other. The ability of North Korea to deter a potential military attack from the United States together with the regime's ability to rely on its Chinese and South Korean partners for diplomatic protection as well as its own brutality towards its own population played the key role.

- EN The aim of this thesis is to answer the research question of "Why did the US not conduct a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities during the Trump presidency despite the sharp criticism of Iran's nuclear program?" The thesis presents several hypotheses that deal with the conditions for a military strike against nuclear facilities of a potential nuclear proliferator to be conducted. One such hypothesis is chosen to be confirmed or refuted in the case of US- Iran relations during Trump's presidency. The hypothesis states that Iran was able to deter the US by the threat of conventional retaliation. Methods of single case study and discourse analysis are used. The empirical part of the thesis firstly assesses whether all three steps of securitization as described by the Copenhagen school were completed. This work claims that Iranian nuclear program was indeed successfully securitized in the US during Trump's presidency. Secondly, an analysis of the components of Iranian conventional deterrence is provided. It is ascertained that Iran commanded strong enough conventional forces to be able to mount effective attacks on targets valuable to the US. All three conditions of the deterrent's credibility were also met, and Iran sufficiently communicated the threat to the US. Therefore, this thesis...

Nuclear weapons are the key element of the security policy of the United States of America since 1945. Since then, nuclear weapons and related nuclear threats were part of a social discourse of the United States. This thesis examined how these threats were socially constructed within the discourse by individual actors. Then, by discoursive analysis, the thesis investigated how the nuclear disarmament discourse responded to these identified threats. The study focused on how these identified threats and the nuclear disarmament discourse influenced each other in each period and how they impacted following periods. This diploma thesis examined the U.S. nuclear discourse while using a methodological framework of discoursive analysis. The diploma thesis operated with the theory of securitization and determined key moments, when particular threat was designated as existential to the security of the United States and when, eventually, this threat subsided.

This thesis aims to evaluate Sweden’s policies on nuclear proliferation and create a better understanding of how these policies affect Sweden’s work towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Amid global concerns about nuclear weapons and their impact on peace, security and sustainable development, Sweden stands as a global leader both regarding disarmament and non-proliferation and sustainable development. In this thesis, Swedish policies and statements both from the Swedish government and parliament have been evaluated along with a few laws relating to the topic. An evaluative qualitative content analysis was employed, which with coding and categorisation has delved deep into these dynamics to create a better understanding of the connection between policies on nuclear proliferation and the SDGs in Sweden. From the coding, seven categories emerged; Alignment with the SDGs, Positive Impacts on the SDGs, Negative Impacts on the SDGs, International Collaboration, Adaptive Capacity, Global Leadership Role and Disarmament Efforts.    To provide more perspectives and create a deeper understanding of the connection between nuclear proliferation and the SDGs and the findings from the coding, an analytical framework, realism and the security-development nexus, were employed. These two frameworks were put next to each other to give two different views of how nuclear proliferation affects the SDGs. Sweden is not a country typically examined from the perspective of realism as it is peaceful and not one of the world’s great powers. The same goes for the security-development nexus, which often focuses on conflict-ridden countries or countries that are underdeveloped. This thesis has therefore provided a new perspective of both Sweden and these frameworks that will benefit policymakers and academics in the future when similar studies or studies on similar issues are conducted.

No description available.