This thesis analyzes the Western missile defense initiatives and their role in Russia&#039 / s relations with NATO and the U.S. The main question of this thesis is whether the Western missile defense initiatives have paved the way for a new era of cooperation between Russia and the West or not. The main argument of this thesis is that Russia has failed to collaborate with NATO in a meaningful manner on missile defense issue as Russia has not adjusted its security policies and nuclear strategy, which are still based on the Cold War thinking, to the changing conditions of global security in the post Cold War era. The missile defense initiatives have a negative impact on the relations between Russia and the West due to the intransigent stance of Russia on this issue. A robust cooperation can only be achieved between Russia and NATO if Moscow changes its Cold War mentality about global security issues.

Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on nuclear deterrence has declined. The rise of China has generated a voluminous literature on power transition theory and whether China and the United States can avoid the “Thucydides Trap.” A lacuna in this literature is the role that nuclear deterrence plays in the strategic dynamic between the United States, Japan, and China. This dissertation fills this lacuna by analyzing the role that nuclear deterrence plays in the military strategies of Japan, China, and the United States. How do China and Japan internalize and understand nuclear deterrence theory in ways that depart from the Cold War paradigm? What effect do dissimilar conceptions of nuclear deterrence theory have on the nuclear and conventional force structure and strategies of each country? To understand the reasons for variation in nuclear strategy in East Asia, I argue that contra systemic theories Japan legitimizes its military capabilities in an extended nuclear deterrence framework based on ideationally driven constitutional theory. Departing from Japan’s strategic mindset during the Cold War, China now occupies the place of the “Other” in Japanese national identity, thus in part explaining its shift to a more pro-active military posture. This is to say that it is not China’s rise that preoccupies Japan, but China’s rise that influences Japanese strategic behavior. Lastly, I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy behavior and nuclear strategy are driven not by structural incentives dictated by the international system, but by ideational and historical imperatives under the rubric of the “China Dream (zhongguo meng)” and “National Rejuvenation (minzu fuxing).” Using analyses of Japanese and Chinese language sources, e.g., official government and defense documents, newspapers, books, and journal articles, this dissertation makes two major contributions. First, departing from the dominant and acultural structural realist and game theoretic approaches to nuclear deterrence theory, it offers an alternative “thin constructivist approach” that considers distinct ideational determinants of each country’s approach to nuclear deterrence theory and their effect on nuclear strategy. Second, it uncovers dissimilar approaches to nuclear escalation that depart from Cold War-derived models.

La réorientation stratégique des États-Unis vers l’espace indo-pacifique a été accompagnée par un regain d’intérêt pour ce qui est des questions maritimes. A la différence des théâtres principaux de la Guerre Froide, la géographie stratégique et économique de la région est fortement marquée par ses larges océans, ses détroits congestionnes, et ses eaux contestées. En conséquent, les profils nivaux des deux grandes puissances émergentes asiatiques, l’Inde et la Chine, ont attire une quantité non négligeable de travaux académiques. Cependant, alors que diverses études se sont focalises sur le rôle de la marine chinoise en tant que composante d’une stratégie militaire plus globale, jusqu’a récemment la majorité des explorations détaillées de la puissance navale indienne se sont penches sur la marine indienne elle-même, plutôt que sur la question de comment la quête de la puissance maritime s’articulait au sein d’une “grande stratégie” (grand strategy) plus compréhensive. Se basant sur plusieurs années de travail de terrain en Inde, en Chine, au Sri Lanka, ainsi qu’aux États-Unis, et plus d’une centaine d’entretiens avec des officiers de la marine indienne, ainsi qu’avec des responsables gouvernementaux ou militaires indiens, chinois, pakistanais, ou américains ; cette thèse vise a donner lieu a une meilleure compréhension-a la fois plus nuancée et aboutie-des tenants et des aboutissants de la modernisation navale indienne. Pour être plus précis, cette thèse tente de fournir une réponse a un paradoxe particulièrement troublant: la non juxtaposition, ou le « désalignement » (misalignment) constant entre la stratégie militaire indienne et la géographie maritime du pays. En effet, la position enviable de la péninsule indienne au centre de l’océan indien devrait, a priori, suggérer une prédisposition naturelle pour l’exercice de la puissance maritime. Depuis l’Independence, cependant, la marine indienne, d’une manière consistante, a été la moins bien financée des branches militaires indiennes, et a fréquemment lutté pour remplir un éventail exigeant de missions avec seulement des ressources très limitées. Il est certes vrai que, depuis deux décennies a peu près, le trajectoire de la marine indienne a pris un virage que l’on pourrait qualifier de positif, a la fois en terme de financement, et en terme d’acquisitions. Cela étant dit, la branche dite « Cendrillon » (Cinderella Service) continue de capter la portion la plus infime du budget de défense indien, qui persiste a nettement favoriser une armée indienne particulièrement lourde en effectifs humains. En 2013, par exemple, la marine indienne a seulement reçu 16 % du budget de défense, alors que l’armée a perçu a peu près 58 %, et l’armée de l’air 26%. Depuis plus d’une demie-décennie, des officiers de marine ont affirme a de multiples reprises, au cours de conversations avec cet auteur, que la part de budget de la marine s’élèverait éventuellement a 25 % du budget global, seulement pour voir leurs espoirs brises. La question fondamentale, donc, a laquelle cette thèse s’évertue a répondre est la suivante : cette tendance persistera t’elle, ou peut-on s’attendre a ce qu’une combinaison de facteurs provoque une refonte graduelle de la stratégie militaire indienne, ainsi que du schéma d’acquisitions et financement de son outil militaire ? / The United States’ strategic reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific has been accompanied by a heightened interest in matters maritime. In contrast to the primary theaters of the Cold War, the region’s strategic and economic geography is strongly defined by its wide oceans, narrow chokepoints, and meandering waterways. As a result, the naval profiles of Asia’s two great rising powers, India and China, have attracted a hitherto unprecedented level of scholarly attention. However, while various studies have focused on the role of China’s navy within its wider military strategy, until recently most detailed explorations of India’s growing naval power primarily focused on the Indian navy itself-rather than on how the quest for seapower fit into New Delhi’s emerging grand strategy. Building on several years of research in India, China, Sri Lanka, and the United States, and over one hundred interviews of Indian naval officers and government officials, both serving and retired, this dissertation aims to provide a deeper understanding of the context and ramifications of India’s naval rise. In particular, it seeks to explain a troubling paradox: the continued misalignment of New Delhi’s military strategy with its maritime geography. Indeed, the country’s enviable position at the heart of the Indian Ocean, along with its peninsular formation and extensive coastlines, would seem to suggest a natural predisposition towards the exercise of naval power. In reality, however, India’s navy since independence has consistently been the most poorly funded of its military services, and has frequently struggled to make do with limited resources. While the navy’s fortunes have taken a positive turn over the past two decades, both in terms of funding and procurement, the so-called Cinderella service still only captures the smallest portion of the overall defense budget, which remains heavily skewed toward the nation’s manpower-intensive Army. In 2013, for example, the Indian Navy only captured 16% of the defense budget, whereas the Army captured approximately 58%, and the Air Force 26%. Over the past five years, Indian naval officers have repeatedly assured this author that the Navy’s share would eventually rise to 25% of the overall defense budget, only to be sorely disappointed. The core question this dissertation endeavors to address is whether this trend will persist, or whether various factors will combine in order to provoke a gradual rebalancing of the nation’s military strategy and force structure.

Throughout the 1950s, U.S. policymakers actively encouraged Americans to participate in civil defense through a variety of policies. In 1958, amidst confusion concerning which of these policies were most efficient, President Eisenhower established the National Shelter Plan and a new civil defense agency titled The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. This agency urged homeowners to build private fallout shelters through print media. In response, Americans used newspapers, magazines, and science fiction novels to contest civil defense and the foreign and domestic policies that it was based upon, including nuclear strategy. Many Americans remained unconvinced of the viability of civil defense or feared its psychological impacts on society. Eventually, these criticisms were able to weaken civil defense efforts and even alter nuclear defense strategy and missile defense technology.

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