Rise of imperfect competition, more precisely its oligopoly form, has became very wide spreed. In certain extent we can say that this is a result of government regulation in different areas of national economy. Aim of this work was to analyze and compare television stations market in SR and CR and evaluate those interactions among channels in their respective economies, which lead to rise in the concrete situation on the market. Also to show some oportunietis, that might be exploited by new TV companies entering this industry. Most importent in this sector will by liberalization, which will lead to better form of competetiv advantage and will bring more costumers to this market. It partly explains horizont of digital broadcasting, which implementing currently runs in all Europe contries.

This thesis will enable the reader to see how applications of game theory can help understand the development in oil market. Firstly, the thesis will introduce to the reader the foundations of game theory, a branch of microeconomics studying strategic interaction. Special focus will be put on the theory of oligopoly, the most important collusive and non-collusive models of oligopoly and their similarities and differences. Secondly, the thesis will show the reader how these theoretic models can be applied to the past development within the global oil industry, most prominently on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Finally, the thesis will present possible applications of game theory and some of the models to the oil market after the price decrease which started in 2014. This would help the reader assess the potential outcomes of the current crisis and possible development in the future.

Cette thèse est composée de trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre, "Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition with Substantial Product Differentiation", étudie le comportement d'un duopole lorsque les deux entreprises sont caractérisées par des contraintes de capacité et produisent un bien différencié à la Hotelling. En limitant l'analyse au cas d'un degré élevé de différentiation du produit, je démontre l'existence d'au moins un équilibre en stratégie pure pour tous les niveaux de capacités. Le deuxième chapitre, "Monopoly Pricing with Dual Capacity Constraints" analyse un monopole qui est contraint par deux types de contraintes de capacité: un sur la quantité produite, l'autre sur le nombre des consommateurs. Je démontre que les prix optimaux choisis par les entreprises en court terme ne sont pas monotones dans le niveau des contraintes de capacité. En outre, le bien-être agrégé des consommateurs peut décroître si une des contraintes de capacité est augmentée. Le troisième chapitre, "Competition with Dual Capacity Constraints", étend l'analyse du deuxième chapitre au cas du duopole symétrique dans lequel les deux entreprises font face aux mêmes niveaux de capacité. Je démontre l'existence de conditions sous lesquelles la non-monotonicité des prix et du bien-être des consommateurs observée dans le 2ème chapitre est également présente dans le cas du duopole. Certains équilibres donnent naissance à des prix de duopole égaux au prix de monopole. En outre, les entreprises peuvent choisir des prix d'équilibre identiques sur les deux marchés malgré leur pouvoir de discrimination des prix. / This Ph.D. thesis is composed of three chapters. Since Kreps and Scheinkman's seminal article (1983) a large number of papers have analyzed capacity constraints' potential to relax price competition. However, the majority of the ensuing literature has assumed that products are either perfect or very close substitutes. Therefore very little is known about the interaction between capacity constraints and local monopoly power. The aim of the present paper is to shed light on this question using a standard Hotelling setup. The high level of product dierentiation results in a variety of equilibrium firm behavior and it generates at least one pure-strategy equilibrium for any capacity level. The second chapter, "Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition with Substantial Product Differentiation", studies the price-setting behavior of a monopoly facing two capacity constraints: one on the number of consumers it can serve, the other on the total amount of products it can sell. Facing two consumer groups that difer in their demands and the distribution of their willingness-to-pay, the monopoly's optimal non-linear pricing strategy consists of offering one or two price-quantity bundles. The characterization of the firm's optimal pricing as a function of its two capacities reveals a rich structure that also gives rise to some surprising results. In particular, I show that prices are non-monotonic in capacity levels. Moreover, there always exists a range of parameters in which weakening one of the capacity constraints decreases consumer surplus. In the long run, when the firms can choose how much capacity to build, prices and consumer surplus are monotonic in capacity costs. The third chapter, "Competition with Dual Capacity Constraints", studies duopoly pricing under dual capacity constraints, limiting both the total quantity and the number of consumers served. It extends both the analysis of monopoly pricing with dual capacity constraints and the symmetric models of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with a singular capacity. By isolating parameter regions where a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists, I nd that several types of equilibria are possible, depending on the model's specications. For some of them, duopoly prices are identical to monopoly prices. Equilibrium prices are non-monotonic in capacity levels if consumers' valuations are suciently heterogeneous. Moreover, I show that despite their ability to price discriminate, competition may lead firms to charge identical prices across markets.

The problem with weak competition is the socially inefficient market it causes, but also the market power it gives firms to exercise. This thesis aimed to analyse whether the competition in the mortgage market had changed since 2013 compared to 2020. The market concentration on the Swedish mortgage market were calculated and the gross margins for the banks were compared to each other. The data used was the banks’ total mortgage lending and their listed interest rates. The results showed that the concentration had decreased and that the banks’ overall gross margins had increased. The conclusion made was that the competition was lower in 2020 than in 2013 and that more banks had entered the market, while smaller banks gained more market shares.

No description available.

In general, an individual commands a salary in return for their contribution to the production process at their place of employment. In the case of a quarterback for a National Football League team, the salary he commands depends on how much the team's owner expects him to contribute to the team and how unique his talents and services are. The salary of the quarterback is negotiated between the quarterback and the team and will vary greatly depending on the relative strengths of each side's bargaining position. The bilateral oligopoly provides a useful way to view how salaries are determined. This thesis uses an econometric model to explore the bilateral oligopoly framework for determining quarterback salaries. Within this framework, there are a set of on-field performance variables (related to the quarterback and the team) and off-field financial variables (related to the team) that are used to negotiate a quarterback's salary. This paper characterizes the quarterback-team relationship by identifying those variables that effect quarterback salaries. / Master of Arts

nÃo hà / This work aims to answer questions regarding the Brazilian aviation market, and how it behaves in terms of oligopolistic competition. That is, there are some firms in this sector competing for the same market, thereby analyzing issues among these firms, you may indicate issues of efficiency in this sector. Using data on market share of each company, and the elasticity of the aviation industry for the year 2009, it was mixed reviews on possible mergers in the airline market in Brazil, giving in each profile that elasticity which would potentially bring a greater distortion for the sector. The methodology for this was the model PCAIDS (Proportionality-Calibrated Almost Ideal Demand System), proposed by Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002) that simulates the merger of two companies in an oligopolistic market, and has an advantage of requiring fewer parameters to your pet than other methodologies. The findings suggest that the merger of GOL TAM will bring a higher price increases than other combinations that were made to give some scenarios that were tested. / Este trabalho visa responder questÃes referentes ao mercado de aviaÃÃo brasileiro e verificar como este se comporta em termos de concorrÃncia oligopolista. Ou seja, existem algumas firmas, neste setor, disputando o mesmo mercado, com isso, analisando questÃes entre essas firmas, à possÃvel indicar questÃes de eficiÃncia neste setor. Utilizando dados sobre a parcela de mercado de cada empresa, e as elasticidades do setor de aviaÃÃo para o ano de 2009, foram feitas vÃrias anÃlises sobre possÃveis fusÃes no mercado aÃreo brasileiro, indicando em cada perfil de elasticidade qual seria a que potencialmente traria uma maior distorÃÃo para o setor. A metodologia para tal processo foi o modelo PCAIDS (Proportionality-Calibrated Almost Ideal Demand System), proposto por Epstein e Rubinfeld (2002), que simula a fusÃo de duas empresas em um mercado oligopolizado, e possui uma vantagem de exigir menos parÃmetros para a sua estimaÃÃo do que as outras metodologias. As conclusÃes apontam que a fusÃo da empresa GOL com a TAM trarà uma maior elevaÃÃo de preÃos do que se outras combinaÃÃes fossem feitas para alguns cenÃrios de elasticidade que foram testados.

In the present work we study theory of cooperative games and their solution. We assume that all players may form groups and cooperate, and we will try to find a solution, a rule how to divide the profit of the group among individual players. We will focus on a core of the game, its description, theoretical results and methods for analyzing its emptiness. We also investigate core-center, which is one of the known options of choosing single profit division from the core. Then we will construct mathematical model of oligopoly together with method for counting characteristic function from real data. Finally, we apply the model on data from oil market. 1

Este trabalho analisou o cenário em que está inserida a comercialização de bovinos para abate, no estado do Rio Grande do Sul. Para isto, foram utilizados dados obtidos através das Guias de Trânsito Animal (GTAs), entre os anos de 2010 (ano em que o sistema informatizado para GTAs foi implantado na Secretaria da Agricultura, Pecuária e Agronegócio - SEAPA) a 2013. Também foram utilizados dados da Declaração Anual de Rebanho, fornecidos pela SEAPA. Um dos diferenciais deste trabalho é esta fonte única, com documentos obrigatórios a todos que comercializam animais e o agrupamento por mesorregião geográfica das informações obtidas. Para o entendimento deste cenário, foram utilizadas como aporte teórico a Teoria da Localização, que considera a otimização da localização de uma firma, e a Organização Industrial, que através do Modelo E-C-D proporciona subsídios para caracterização da concentração em uma indústria. Os resultados mostraram que o número de animais abatidos é diferente entre as mesorregiões geográficas. Os matadouros-frigoríficos recebem animais para abate provenientes da mesorregião geográfica em que se estão localizados, mas também de outras mesorregiões do RS, em diferentes proporções. Nas análises, as mesorregiões geográficas Centro Oriental e Metropolitana destacaram-se pelo maior número de animais abatidos. No entanto, o rebanho nestas mesorregiões ainda não foi o suficiente para a demanda gerada pelo mercado consumidor, que está muito próximo devido as grandes cidades que compõem estas mesorregiões, como Santa Maria e Porto Alegre. A Mesorregião Sudoeste é a terceira que mais abateu animais. A quantidade abatida nesta mesorregião é composta por 74% de animais da própria mesorregião Sudoeste, porém, o seu rebanho foi uma importante fonte de animais para as demais mesorregiões. Neste cenário, o estado do RS apresentou mais de 60 mil ofertantes (pecuaristas) em 2013, e o número de demandantes (matadouros-frigoríficos) chegou a 459. O matadouro-frigorífico que mais abateu em 2010 perdeu participação de mercado até 2013, e frigoríficos menores conseguiram aumentar as suas participações, havendo uma tendência de maior equilíbrio entre as empresas. Não existe concentração na indústria de carne bovina, e as medidas de concentração analisadas mostram índices cada vez menores. / This study analyzed the scenario in which the marketing of cattle for slaughter is inserted in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. For this, it was used data of Animal Transit Guides (GTAs) for slaughter since 2010 - year that these guides were made available electronically by the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock and Agribusiness (SEAPA) - to 2013. It was also used data from Herd Annual Statement, supplied by SEAPA, which is one of the remarkable points of this paper, the unique and reliable source that was provided with a set of mandatory documents that all cattle sellers must have. Based on information that was founded, it was used the theory of location, considering the optimization of the location of a firm, and the Industrial Organization, through the S-C-P model, focusing on the structure that allows one to see if there was concentration in the industry. The Metropolitan ant Eastern Center Mesoregions are the ones that slaughter the most, having their own production as their raw material. However, these cattle are still not enough for the demand generated by the consumer market, which live close to these centers. The Southwest Mesoregion slaughters a great number of animals, with 74% of these slaughtered cattle coming from their own production and it is still an important source of animals for other Mesoregions. The number of suppliers (farmers) exceeded 60,000 in 2013, and the slaughter houses had reached 459. There is no concentration in the beef industry, and analyzed concentration measurements show dwindling numbers. The most important slaughterhouse in 2010 lost market by 2013, and smaller slaughterhouses were able to increase their holdings, with a trend towards greater balance between companies.

The goals of the master thesis are describing the strategic oligopoly environment of chosen industry of Czech telecommunications, together with introducing basic game theory principles with their possible real case application. It mentions historical shifts in Czech telecommunications sector which influence the actual industry conditions. The thesis briefly describes the individual players in the market and turns its attention towards the industry characterization through standard oligopoly models. Following, it introduces theoretical insight on possible market entry strategies into oligopoly industries. The application part focuses on game-theory in pricing strategies, market entry and entry deterring scenarios with examples. Final part summarizes the objectives in detail and provides final comments on the thesis.