What do we owe to our loved ones? What is the status of these requirements? How do we reconcile them with other requirements? Are we allowed to buy our child an expensive car when that money could save countless strangers overseas? What exactly does morality demand of us? / My thesis defends an account of partiality justified in terms of relationships. I develop the view that relationships are inextricably linked to wellbeing, and I defend the idea that morality must be concerned with our wellbeing. I try to make sense of this account of partiality with the idea that morality carries a requirement of impartiality. If wellbeing is an important part of morally right actions, and if acting in accordance with reasons of partiality (qua relationships) sometimes promotes wellbeing better than impartiality, then some reasons of partiality lead to morally right actions. Minimally, I argue that for why a strictly impartial (or, on the other extreme, a strictly partial) theory does not work. Both reasons (of partiality and impartiality) must be taken into account and carefully calibrated. More ambitiously, I argue for why partiality deserves its own place at the table in normative ethical theorizing. This is not to say that partiality always leads to right action, rather the suggestion is that there are some forms of partiality (found within relationships) which morality requires. / Thesis / Candidate in Philosophy / Some forms of partiality seem clearly wrong, like racial bias or nepotism; in such cases, it is better to consider our reasons to be impartial, which seem to lead to more fairness or equality. Still, there seem to be other forms of partiality which are clearly right, like the love and care a parent has for their child; in these cases, considering our reasons to be impartial seem like (to quote Bernard Williams), “one thought too many.” This thesis tries fit reasons of partiality and reasons of impartiality together, and argues for a view of (moral) partiality grounded in relationships.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andre Luis Torres Pessoa.pdf: 647487 bytes, checksum: 5d3cea3c95b2a945e820afbf61bbeaef (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-24 / This dissertation addresses the application of good faith and its obligations within an individual work contract. The dissertation starts off by bringing the concept of good faith, its characterization and history as a general rule, as well as showing its development and integration into Brazilian law. After this, the study brings forth the functions of the good faith objective, including the creation of obligations by bringing an analysis of the most common ones within this specialized doctrine. What follows is a study of the application of these duties to the standards within labor law and the duties of the parties in a labor contract, which is shown through a provision analysis of obligations in the Brazilian Labor Code, subsequently, showing the consequences arising from any violation of the contract when there is failure by the parties to abide to the concepts of good faith and the obligations that follow it / A presente dissertação aborda a aplicação dos deveres anexos da boa-fé objetiva ao contrato individual de trabalho. Inicia trazendo o conceito de boa-fé, a sua caracterização como cláusula geral e o seu histórico, demonstrando o seu desenvolvimento e a sua inserção no direito brasileiro. Após isso, traz um estudo sobre as funções da boa-fé objetiva, dentre elas a de criação de deveres anexos, trazendo uma análise acerca daqueles mais comuns na doutrina especializada. Segue estudando a aplicação destes deveres anexos às normas do Direito do Trabalho e as obrigações geradas às partes do contrato de trabalho, evidenciando a análise da previsão dos deveres anexos na CLT e, posteriormente, avaliando as consequências oriundas da violação positiva do contrato, quando da inobservância dos deveres anexos da boa-fé objetiva pelos contratantes