This thesis describes the way in which sound is taken up and subsequently suppressed within the visual arts. The idealisation and development of sound as a plastic material is able to be traced within the modernist trajectory, which, reflecting a set of cultural practices and having developed its own specific terminologies, comes to regard any material, or anything conceived of as material, as appropriate and adequate to the expression of its distinctive and guiding concepts and metaphors. These concepts and metaphors are discussed as already having at their bases strongly visualist biases, the genealogies of which are traced within traditional or formal philosophies. Here, the marginalising tendency of ocularcentrism is exposed, but the very nature and contingency of marginalisation is found to work for the sound artist (where the perpetuation of the mythologised 'outsider' figure is desired) but against sound which is positioned in a purely differential and negative relation. In this epistemological and ontological reduction, sound becomes simply a visual metaphor or metonymic contraction which forecloses the possibility of producing other ways of articulating its experience or of producing any markedly alternative 'readings'. Rather than simply attempting to reverse the hierarchisation of the visual over the aural, or of prefacing sound within a range of artistic practices (each which would keep the negative tradition going) sound's ambiguous relation to the binarism of presence/absence, system and margin, is, however oddly, elaborated. The strategy which attempts to suspend sound primarily within and under the mark of the concept is interrogated and its limits exposed. The sound artist, the 'margin surfer' is revealed as a perhaps deeply conservative figure who may in the end desire the suppression of sound, and who, actually rejecting any destabilising and threatening notion of 'radical alterity' anxiously clings to the 'marginalised' modernist pretence. It is the main contention of this thesis that the marginalisation of sound obscures the more pressing question of its ambiguous relation to notions of sameness and difference, and that its conceptualisation suppresses the question of the ethical. That the ethical question should (and always does) take 'precedence' over purely epistemological and ontological considerations, and that more genuinely open attitudes should be assumed with respect to sound studies are forwarded in this thesis / Master of Arts (Hons)

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This research explores the possibility of a phenomenology of religion that is ontological, founded on Martin Heidegger’s philosophical thought. The research attempts to utilise Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as ontology while also engaging in a critical relation with his path of thinking; as a barrier to the phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of Religion. This research formulates Religion as an ontological problem wherein the primary question becomes: how are humans, in our being, able to be religious and thus also able to understand the meaning of ‘religion’ or something like ‘religion’? This study focuses on the problem of foundation; of whether it is possible to provide an adequate foundation for the study of religion(s) via the notion ‘Religion’. Further, this study also aims to explore the problem of methodological foundation; of how preconceptions of the meaning of Religion predetermine how religion(s) and religious phenomena are studied. Finally, this research moves toward the possibility of founding a regional ontological basis for the study of religion(s) insofar as the research explores the ontological ground of Religion as a phenomenon. Due to the exploratory and methodological/foundational emphasis of the research, the thesis is almost entirely preliminary. Herein, the research focuses on three main issues: how the notion of Religion is preconceived, how Heidegger’s phenomenology can be tailored to the phenomenon of Religion, and how philosophical thought (in this case, Pre-Socratic philosophy) discloses indications of the meaning of Religion. Pre-Socratic thought is then utilised as a foundation for a preliminary interpretation of how Religion belongs-to humans in our being. This research provides two interrelated theses: the provision of an interpretation of Religion as an existential phenomenon, and an interpretation of Religion in its ground of being-human. With regard to the former, I argue that Religion signifies a potential relation with the ‘originary ground’ of life as meaningful. Accordingly, the second interpretation discloses the meaning of Religion as grounded in being-human; that for humans in our being, the meaning of life is an intrinsic question/dilemma for us. This being-characteristic, I argue, can be called belief.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Many online services access a large number of autonomous data sources and at the same time need to meet different user requirements. It is essential for these services to achieve semantic interoperability among these information exchange entities. In the presence of an increasing number of proprietary business processes, heterogeneous data standards, and diverse user requirements, it is critical that the services are implemented using adaptable, extensible, and scalable technology. The COntext INterchange (COIN) approach, inspired by similar goals of the Semantic Web, provides a robust solution. In this paper, we describe how COIN can be used to implement dynamic online services where semantic differences are reconciled on the fly. We show that COIN is flexible and scalable by comparing it with several conventional approaches. With a given ontology, the number of conversions in COIN is quadratic to the semantic aspect that has the largest number of distinctions. These semantic aspects are modeled as modifiers in a conceptual ontology; in most cases the number of conversions is linear with the number of modifiers, which is significantly smaller than traditional hard-wiring middleware approach where the number of conversion programs is quadratic to the number of sources and data receivers. In the example scenario in the paper, the COIN approach needs only 5 conversions to be defined while traditional approaches require 20,000 to 100 million. COIN achieves this scalability by automatically composing all the comprehensive conversions from a small number of declaratively defined sub-conversions. / Singapore-MIT Alliance (SMA)

The brief introductory chapter attempts to motivate the project by pointing to (a) the intuitive appeal and importance of the notion of an object (that is, a “paradigmatic” individual), and (b) the need – for the sake of progress in at least two important debates in ontology – to replace this notion with a series of related notions of individuals of different sorts. Section One of Chapter Two aims to accomplish two primary tasks. The first is to clarify the intensions of three often employed but ambiguous categorical terms: ‘individual’, ‘particular’ and ‘object’, with emphasis on the third, which is often taken to be of particular philosophical significance. I carry out this clarificatory task by weighing various positions in the literature and arguing for explications of each notion that are maximally economical and neutral, that is, explications which (a) overlap as little as possible with other important ontological notions and (b) do not require us to take a stand on any apparently intractable (but not directly relevant) debates (e.g. on the problem of realism vs. nominalism about universals). The second task of 2.1 is to delineate the various ontological distinctions that will be turned, in Chapter Four, into the “dimensions” of which the ontological framework I will be advocating there is composed. The delineation of these distinctions takes place naturally in the course of attempting to characterize the notion of an object (an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular) and to distinguish it from the notions of an individual and a particular, in spite of the fact that objects are both individuals and particulars. In the second section of Chapter Two I illustrate the centrality of the notion of an object in Ontology by showing how that notion figures in the debate over the existence of artifacts. I argue that progress in this debate has been hindered by the way it has been framed, and that seeing the issue as concerning not whether artifacts exist but whether artifacts are objects (in the sense outlined in 2.1) enables us to better appreciate and accommodate the different perspectives of the debate’s participants. At the same time, this way of dissolving the dispute makes clear that existence is not limited to entities that fall under the relevant concept of an object, foreshadowing the pluralistic ontological framework to be developed in Chapter Four. Chapter Three pronounces on a second debate in ontology, in which three positions concerning the correct ontological assay of the class of intrinsically unified independent concrete particulars (objects) are in competition with each other. My conclusion is that none of the three positions succeeds, since each faces fairly serious difficulties. I suggest that the (or at least one major) root of our inability to locate the correct ontological assay is the inclination to treat all ontologically significant entities as objects in the indicated sense, and the corresponding inclination to attempt to give an ontological assay that covers all objects, neglecting important differences between distinct types of individuals. Chapter Four begins by displaying in greater detail the considerations (canvassed very briefly in the introductory chapter) that make the notion of an object appear to be indispensible. However, the results of the second section of Chapter Two and of the entirety of Chapter Three have already shown two areas in which the notion of an object tends to lead to confusion. So a tension emerges between the prima facie necessity of the notion and the reasons we have found for thinking that this notion either is itself problematic or at least tends to cause problems for other issues in Ontology. The remainder of Chapter Four consists in explaining my strategy for moving forward. Briefly, this strategy involves replacing the notion of an object with a series of concepts applicable to individuals of various types. Each of the components belonging to a given “individual-concept” is drawn from one or another side of one of the ontological distinctions that together form an overall ontological framework, and which components are involved is a matter to be determined by examining the conceptual demands imposed by the various practices (explanatory or otherwise) which we engage in, that require us to appeal to individuals of the type in question. The resulting “pluralistic” ontological framework provides a way of situating and relating types of individuals that both avoids the confusions that the single general concept of an object leads to, and is capable of indicating the varying degrees of “ontological robustness” or “object-like-ness” of any given type of individual. I conclude by suggesting how the framework I am advocating can be elaborated on and put to use in further research.

The brief introductory chapter attempts to motivate the project by pointing to (a) the intuitive appeal and importance of the notion of an object (that is, a “paradigmatic” individual), and (b) the need – for the sake of progress in at least two important debates in ontology – to replace this notion with a series of related notions of individuals of different sorts. Section One of Chapter Two aims to accomplish two primary tasks. The first is to clarify the intensions of three often employed but ambiguous categorical terms: ‘individual’, ‘particular’ and ‘object’, with emphasis on the third, which is often taken to be of particular philosophical significance. I carry out this clarificatory task by weighing various positions in the literature and arguing for explications of each notion that are maximally economical and neutral, that is, explications which (a) overlap as little as possible with other important ontological notions and (b) do not require us to take a stand on any apparently intractable (but not directly relevant) debates (e.g. on the problem of realism vs. nominalism about universals). The second task of 2.1 is to delineate the various ontological distinctions that will be turned, in Chapter Four, into the “dimensions” of which the ontological framework I will be advocating there is composed. The delineation of these distinctions takes place naturally in the course of attempting to characterize the notion of an object (an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular) and to distinguish it from the notions of an individual and a particular, in spite of the fact that objects are both individuals and particulars. In the second section of Chapter Two I illustrate the centrality of the notion of an object in Ontology by showing how that notion figures in the debate over the existence of artifacts. I argue that progress in this debate has been hindered by the way it has been framed, and that seeing the issue as concerning not whether artifacts exist but whether artifacts are objects (in the sense outlined in 2.1) enables us to better appreciate and accommodate the different perspectives of the debate’s participants. At the same time, this way of dissolving the dispute makes clear that existence is not limited to entities that fall under the relevant concept of an object, foreshadowing the pluralistic ontological framework to be developed in Chapter Four. Chapter Three pronounces on a second debate in ontology, in which three positions concerning the correct ontological assay of the class of intrinsically unified independent concrete particulars (objects) are in competition with each other. My conclusion is that none of the three positions succeeds, since each faces fairly serious difficulties. I suggest that the (or at least one major) root of our inability to locate the correct ontological assay is the inclination to treat all ontologically significant entities as objects in the indicated sense, and the corresponding inclination to attempt to give an ontological assay that covers all objects, neglecting important differences between distinct types of individuals. Chapter Four begins by displaying in greater detail the considerations (canvassed very briefly in the introductory chapter) that make the notion of an object appear to be indispensible. However, the results of the second section of Chapter Two and of the entirety of Chapter Three have already shown two areas in which the notion of an object tends to lead to confusion. So a tension emerges between the prima facie necessity of the notion and the reasons we have found for thinking that this notion either is itself problematic or at least tends to cause problems for other issues in Ontology. The remainder of Chapter Four consists in explaining my strategy for moving forward. Briefly, this strategy involves replacing the notion of an object with a series of concepts applicable to individuals of various types. Each of the components belonging to a given “individual-concept” is drawn from one or another side of one of the ontological distinctions that together form an overall ontological framework, and which components are involved is a matter to be determined by examining the conceptual demands imposed by the various practices (explanatory or otherwise) which we engage in, that require us to appeal to individuals of the type in question. The resulting “pluralistic” ontological framework provides a way of situating and relating types of individuals that both avoids the confusions that the single general concept of an object leads to, and is capable of indicating the varying degrees of “ontological robustness” or “object-like-ness” of any given type of individual. I conclude by suggesting how the framework I am advocating can be elaborated on and put to use in further research.

Many researchers in the social science, includes the political science, insist that the main stream of theory of social science depends on structural foundation. But we tried to provided new approach for social science through Elster¡¦s view, on the hand, we clarified what reductionism is, on the other hand, we believed the social science can connect with the natural science by the reductive approach. In order to prove that the natural science¡¦s foundation is the reductive mechanism, we researched the philosophy of natural science and stressed the importance of the ontology and the epistemology. We confirmed the foundation of natural science is micro-mechanism. Elster re-interpret Rational Choice and Marxism through cognition psychology and game theory. We can increase the research range of human behaviors, moral and culture through the intensive explanation.

An increasing body of literature shows that genomes of eukaryotes can contain clusters of functionally related genes. Most approaches to identify gene clusters utilize microarray data or metabolic pathway databases to find groups of genes on chromo- somes that are linked by common attributes. A generalized method that can find gene clusters, regardless of the mechanism of origin, would provide researchers with an unbiased method for finding clusters and studying the evolutionary forces that give rise to them. I present a basis of algorithm to identify gene clusters in eukaryotic genomes that utilizes functional categories defined in graph-based vocabularies such as the Gene Ontology (GO). Clusters identified in this manner need only have a common function and are not constrained by gene expression or other properties. I tested the algorithm by analyzing genomes of a representative set of species. I identified species specific variation in percentage of clustered genes as well as in properties of gene clusters, including size distribution and functional annotation. These properties may be diagnostic of the evolutionary forces that lead to the formation of gene clusters. The approach finds all gene clusters in the data set and ranks them by their likelihood of occurrence by chance. The method successfully identified clusters.

The aim of this dissertation is to reflect on economic methodology. To reflect means to think about the relationship between researcher and the object of research. The object in mainstream economics is fixed in market realm. When the object is fixed then the focus in economic study is the method. Mainstream economics used equilibrium analysis method in order to make the research outcome be certainty. In the process of pursuing certainty the ontology of the object is neglected. The de-centering strategy we applied is deconstruction concept. My main reason for taking Derrida¡¦s deconstruction as a starting point is to de-center the fixed center which operating mechanism is the invisible hand. In this dissertation the logic of deconstruction is ¡§neither..or..¡¨ form and the steps are to undo and displace. In order to emphasize the multiples means and the relation of knowledge and power we use the term discourse. In chapter four we undo ¡§the invisible hand¡¨ metaphor that is the center of market. The direct consequence of the undo process is the finding of the ontological implication. In chapter five we displace ¡§the invisible hand¡¨ metaphor. Through rereading Adam Smith¡¦s methodology we interpret invisible hand as causal relation and find the same ontological implication. Together with these two processes above we find out the inspiration for reflection of economic methodology that is to answer the most fundamental question about what is the economic object. In chapter six we call for discussion to bringing the ontology back into economics. We believe the study of economic ontology is a prerequisite for understanding economics as a scientific discipline. It is thus intended and hoped that this reflection will help to beyond the opposite between positivism and post-positivism. For the defined goal to coordinate the opposite we introduce philosopher Quine¡¦s ontological method called ontological commitment. After the reflection we claim ¡Gthe method such as formation and econometric is important, but if we can emphasize the ontology of research object then the study will be activity. The defense of this claim is the main subject of this dissertation. Finally we just point out that if the claim is accepted, then something along this line of the attention is essential to the practice researcher. That is to take more time to think the nature of the research object when he construes a model.

¡@¡@e-Learning is becoming more and more important for many educational institutions, and many educators believe that there is a good potential for providing adaptive learning in e-learning environment. In order to support the design of adaptive learning materials, teachers need to refer to the ontology of the subject domain to be taught. Moreover, ontology can show the whole picture and the core knowledge of a subject domain. Literature reviews also pointed out that graphical representation of ontology can reduce the problems of information overloading and learning disorientation for learners. However, ontology constructions all rely on domain experts in the past; it is a time consuming and high cost task. It would be more challenge for those emerging new domains like e-Learning. ¡@¡@e-Learning is a new and fast developing domain, how to automatic constructing its ontology is a very important topic. In this research, we use some relevant e-Learning journals and conferences papers as input data sources, and apply data mining techniques to automatically construct the concept maps for e-learning. We also analyzed the evolution in e-Learning domain according to the concept maps constructed at different time periods. ¡@¡@The contribution of this research is automatic constructing the concept maps of e-Learning domain using text-mining techniques. It can provide a comprehensive and useful reference for researchers to do research, for teachers to do adaptive course design and for learners to understand the related knowledge in e-Learning.