Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Lausanne, 1936. / Bibliography: p. 251-255.

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as a world leader, putting into place international institutions based on its own liberal economic philosophy. Since then, the world has witnessed an increasing interconnectedness among states, with economic relationships continually blurring the distinction between domestic and international, as well as between state and societal forces. Much of the world associates this increased interconnectedness with human suffering around the globe. This dissertation seeks to test the effects of economic globalization on personal integrity violations within a state, on the whole. Specifically, I examine three aspects associated with globalization, trade openness, investment and IMF funding within a state. Liberal economic theory suggests that economic relationships should foster positive gains. Particularly, economic relationships engender economic prosperity, diffusion of norms and idea, as well as the growth of a middle class which increasingly demands respect for its political and civil rights. Consistent with the liberal paradigm, I find that open trade and investment lead to improved personal integrity rights. In addition, investment which originates from the hegemon is especially likely to increase a state's respect for personal integrity rights. Conversely, IMF funding is likely to provoke protests from people in recipient countries, which often leads to increased repression by the state. To the extent that the IMF chooses to place importance on human rights, future attention should be paid to the practices of recipient countries. Overall, this dissertation suggests overall support for the liberal paradigm, that open economic policies are most likely to lead to improved levels of personal integrity rights.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2010. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 138 p. : ill. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 128-132).

The aim of this thesis is to show how the unconventional monetary policy rounds of Quantitative Easing introduced in the United States between 2008 and 2014 have led to an increase in wealth inequality. The need for the thesis arises due to the uncharted nature of QE and because of more and more information is surfacing to light which points to this connection. By analysing the distribution of these funds and adding it to the then base distribution of money supply, this study was able to determine a significant 10 % increase in the Gini Index. Furthermore it highlights how a large portion of wealth was transferred from the middle class over to the top 5 % income households. Starting from a set of assumptions the calculation is performed by extrapolating the data required and by isolating the system from any external variables. The result is a theoretical model meant to describe the mechanism that links Quantitative Easing to wealth inequality. Moreover a detailed comparison is provided with the effect of a conventional monetary policy such as Open-Market Operations. Finally solutions to this issue are being discussed from economical, political and fiscal standpoints.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus einer Einleitung und drei empirischen Kapiteln, die sich mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Offenmarktgeschäfte der Bank of England in der Zwischenkriegszeit befassen. Offenmarktgeschäfte sind der Kauf und Verkauf von kurzfristigen Staatsanleihen. Die Einleitung definiert Instrumente und Ziele der Geldpolitik und beschreibt welche Folgen die veränderte Rolle Großbritanniens in der Welt nach dem 1. Weltkrieg für die Geldpolitik hatte. Das zweite Kapitel zeigt, wie Offenmarktgeschäfte die verfügbare Liquidität auf dem Londoner Geldmarkt erhöhen oder senken können. Dies erlaubt die kurzfristigen Marktzinsen relativ zum Leitzins zu steuern, was wiederum häufige Änderungen der Leitzinsen unnötig machte. Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass Offenmarktgeschäfte die Wahrscheinlichkeit verändern können, dass Marktteilnehmer sich Geld bei der Diskontfazilität leihen müssen. Das dritte Kapitel zeigt, dass Offenmarktgeschäfte noch weitere Zwecke erfüllen. In der Finanzkrise von 1931 trugen Offenmarktgeschäfte dazu bei die größten Geschäftsbanken in London vor größerem Schaden zu bewahren. Der Verlust von Goldreserven wurde durch Offenmarktgeschäfte in großem Maße kompensiert und stabilisierte so die Liquidität der Geschäftsbanken. Das vierte Kapitel zeigt, dass Offenmarktgeschäfte zudem eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Stabilisierung der kurzfristigen Marktzinsen nach Kriegsausbruch 1939 spielten. Die empirische Analyse zeigt wie sorgfältig gewählte Laufzeiten von Offenmarktgeschäften dazu beigetragen haben, übermäßige Schwankungen der kurzfristigen Marktzinsen zu verhindern. Insgesamt deutet diese Dissertation darauf hin, dass die Bank of England in der Zwischenkriegszeit ähnlich einer modernen Zentralbank agierte. Kurzfristige Marktzinsen waren das operatives Ziel der Geldpolitik und nicht die Zentralbankgeldmenge. Im Jahr 1931 zog die Bank of England es vor die Geschäftsbanken zu stützen, auch wenn dies die Aufgabe des festen Wechselkurses bedeutete. / This dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and three empirical chapters which deal with various aspects of open-market operations by the Bank of England during the interwar period. Open-market operations are the purchase and sale of Treasury bills. The introduction defines monetary policy implementation and describes the economic circumstances after World War I and outlines what consequences the changing role of Britain in the world had for monetary policy. The second chapter shows how open-market operations could add or drain liquidity in the London money market and help steer short-term market rates relative to the Bank rate, which made frequent changes in the Bank Rate unnecessary. The empirical analysis shows that open-market operations could change the probability of market participants having to borrow at the discount facility. The third chapter argues that in time of crisis the purpose of open-market operations goes further. During the financial crisis of 1931 open-market operations most likely helped to protect the largest clearing banks in London from severe harm. The empirical analysis shows how open-market operations offset the effect of reserves losses at an unprecedented scale and stabilized the liquidity of the London clearing banks. Chapter four examines the role of open-market operation after the outbreak of war in 1939. Open-market operations played a crucial role in stabilizing short-term market rates and preserving the London money market in its original form, most notably the London discount houses and clearing banks. The descriptive evidence shown suggests how carefully chosen maturities of open-market operations helped offset any undue disturbances to short-term market rates after the outbreak of war. Overall, this dissertation suggests that the Bank of England, not unlike modern central banks, targeted short-term market rates, not some monetary quantity, and chose banking stability over a fixed exchange rate in 1931.