The theoretical frameworks of transaction cost economics and agency theory are widely used to design appropriate governance structure for constraining opportunism within marketing channels. These approaches generally assume that marketing channel managers are opportunistic, and only economic constraints deter opportunism in exchange relationships. However, some empirical studies have shown that managers do not always behave opportunistically even if conditions permit such behavior. In addition, some researchers have proposed a "cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy" and have argued that the uncritical assumption of opportunism and excessive use of control mechanisms such as monitoring only exacerbates the problem. Thus, it is important to identify conditions in which opportunism likely occurs. The present research argues that marketing channel managers exhibit differing propensities for opportunism (PFO), and it spans three levels of analysis to identify contributing factors. The individual-level analysis treats marketing channel managers as a heterogeneous population and investigates the impact of individual traits on their behaviors in business relationships. At the dyadic level, I modify standard microeconomics models to incorporate norms of fairness. Finally, the extra-dyadic level of analysis goes beyond the traditional dyadic focus to include network-wide social influence on a relationship. Using the data collected from 162 unit franchieees. the hypotheses were tested using structural path analyses. The findings of this dissertation provide guidance on the extent to which costly and potentially damaging control mechanisms are really necessary in a given marketing channel relationship. Overall, the research contributes to the existing literature by re-examining a fundamental behavioral assumption about marketing channel managers and providing an alternative framework that can meaningfully inform us as to when and why opportunism occurs. / Ph. D.

Submitted by Fabricia Fialho Reginato (fabriciar) on 2015-08-05T01:23:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EduardoCalvilho.pdf: 1038907 bytes, checksum: 42aa99d4bd73dde5b305062373fa2c0e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-05T01:23:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EduardoCalvilho.pdf: 1038907 bytes, checksum: 42aa99d4bd73dde5b305062373fa2c0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-24 / Nenhuma / Os países em desenvolvimento têm se mostrado como um ótimo investimento para empresas multinacionais que desejam ampliar sua área de atuação. A limitação de certos recursos tecnológicos nesses países somada à dificuldade de penetração de organizações estrangeiras faz com que as Alianças Estratégicas Internacionais (AEI) despontem como boa opção para as empresas de ambas nacionalidades. Segundo o estudo da Booz & Company Consultoria o cenário decorrente da exploração do Pré-sal demandará por tecnologia de ponta e investimentos da ordem de US$ 500 bilhões no setor de Exploração e Produção (E&P) de Petróleo. Entender então que pontos deveriam ser observados antes de criar e ao conduzir as Alianças Estratégicas (AE) demandadas por esse novo ambiente trará vantagens competitivas e maior probabilidade de sucesso às organizações. A literatura aponta a divergência cultural como um item importante a ser considerado no processo de formação de alianças. Há uma relação direta entre a cultura e as estrutura de governança das organizações, a qual define princípios e comportamentos que nortearão a gestão da aliança. (LANGFIELD-SMITH, 2008). Estudos desenvolvidos por Ness e Haugland (2005), Poppo e Zenger (2002) e Roath et al. (2002) apontaram como sendo duas as dimensões de estrutura de governança das organizações: foco no contrato (transacional) e foco no relacionamento. Para investigar como as diferentes culturas organizacionais (relacional e transacional) interagem em AEs ou AEIs foram investigadas seis alianças que foram constituídas para prestação de serviços especializados para uma empresa do governo. O autor identificou que todas as alianças operaram em ambientes predominantemente transacionais. As divergências de culturas entre as empresas nacionais e internacionais não afetou o desempenho das alianças. Entretanto, o desequilíbrio de forças provocado pela empresa do governo resultou na elevação dos custos para alianças no primeiro momento. Para recuperação dos resultados as alianças se valeram de comportamentos oportunistas aproveitando indefinições nos contratos de serviços, aumentando os custos ex post para o cliente em um segundo momento. Por fim, a análise dos achados permitiu a identificação de três formas como se estabelece a estrutura de governança das alianças, definido pela cultura, pela situação ou pela estratégia. / The developing countries are presenting themselves as a good investment option to international companies which are aiming for expanding their busines area. The technological limitation of those countries added to the difficulties that the foreign companies have to access the local market make the International Strategic Alliances (ISA) become as a good option for companies of both nationalities. According to Booz & Company Consulting study, the Pre-salt exploration scenario will demand not only for high technology, but also for financial investments around US$ 500 billion on the Exploration and Production (E&P) sector. So that, understanding which points should be observed after the Strategic Alliances (SA) creation and when running an alliance will result in competitive advantage and in an additional chances of the organizations success. The literature points out to cultural divergence as an important issue to be considered on the alliances process formation. There is a close relation between the organization culture and its Governance structure and this defines principles and behaviors which guide the alliance management. (LANGFIELD-SMITH, 2008). The studies of Ness and Haugland (2005), Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Roath et al. (2002) indicated two governance structure dimensions, contract oriented (transactional) and relations oriented. To investigate how different organizational cultures (contractual or relational) interact in SA or in ISA were researched six alliances. These SA were established to perform specialized services to a governmental company. The author found out that all alliances had run on scenarios predominantly transactional. The cultural divergences between national and international companies didn’t seem to affect the alliances performance. The unbalance of power situation created by the governmental company resulted in costs raise to the alliances at the first time. To recover the revenue the alliances had to use opportunistic behaviors, by means of taking advantage of lack of details of the service contract, raising the ex post costs to the customer afterwards. In the end, the findings analysis led the author to identify three different ways how the alliances’ governance structure is established, defined by culture, by the situation or by the strategy.