After nearly 20 years of negotiations and peacebuilding, Palestinians are no nearer to self-determination. This article explains this failure through an analysis of the context and peacebuilding framework created as a product of the Oslo Accords and the assumptions of Western donors about how peace would be achieved. It argues that the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is subject to an assemblage of colonial practices - some of which are the product of Western peacebuilding. While the practices of the occupying power, Israel, has constituted one part of the colonial equation (extracting and controlling resources and settling its own people), Western peacebuilding has played another through its pursuit of a modern version of the 'mission civilisatrice'. The ideological discursive framework that binds these two parts of the colonial equation together and gives them common purpose is the 'partners for peace' discourse that has been used to justify a multitude of practices, including the arrest and detention of Palestinian politicians, military action, the withdrawal of aid and regime change.

This thesis examines the political trajectory of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) during the period from the 1982 eviction of the Palestinian factions from their headquarters in Beirut, to the 2006-07 division between Hamas and Fatah in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). During this period, the PFLP experienced a process of decline that resulted in its marginalisation within the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the wider Palestinian national movement. This study addresses the issue of the PFLP’s decline by focusing on its own political agency to determine the role of policy and decision making, ideology and political narrative in the marginalisation process. This work therefore, on the one hand, aims at putting the PFLP’s decline into historical perspective, identifying it as a process rather than simply the effect of outstanding events as it is often argued. On the other, its goal is to ascribe to ‘subjective factors’, namely aspects directly linked to the PFLP’s agency, the adequate weight in determining its decline. This appears particularly significant as the weakening of the Palestinian left has been frequently explained as a by-product of global and local external or ‘objective’ developments such as the downfall of the Soviet Union or the emergence of political Islam. By providing a comprehensive and processual analysis of the PFLP’s decline, this study not only aims at complementing the literature on the Palestinian national movement, which still lacks a focused approach on the main Palestinian leftist force. It also aims at shedding light on a major cause, and its historical origins, of the current Palestinian political impasse, namely the absence of an alternative between Hamas and the PNA’s governing entities, both crippled by a legitimacy crisis and unable to progress Palestinian interests. By virtue of its close survey of the PFLP’s conduct, a further goal of this thesis is to address the historical role of the PLO and its de-facto heir, the PNA. What is evidenced is the double, and contradictory, role of the essential but also constraining framework that the PLO and later the PNA represented for the PFLP’s policies. The focus on the PFLP’s political agency allows the identification of a pattern in its policy which affected negatively its standing within the Palestinian national movement. Throughout the period addressed, policy fluctuation marked the PFLP’s action, undermining the effectiveness of its political line and jeopardising its political weight. The present study highlights how such a policy fluctuation pattern originated from major dilemmas and contradictions that the PFLP had to consider while producing its policies. The main dilemma, informing all other sources of tensions affecting the PFLP, has been defined as an ‘opposition-integration’ dilemma. In other words, the PFLP, while opposing the PLO leadership’s policies, first and foremost its quest for a diplomatic settlement with Israel under US patronage, needed to maintain its integration within the PLO regime, which represented an essential economic and political framework. This produced inconsistent, ‘fluctuant’ policies that prevented the PFLP from maintaining its political weight and stopping its marginalisation process. This opposition-integration dilemma was combined with other sources of tensions marking the PFLP such as: relations with other PLO opposition factions, relations with Arab partners, its contacts with Palestinian Islamists, the confrontation with the PNA after the 1993 Oslo accords or the internal divide between the exiled leadership and the cadres located in the OPT. The PFLP’s official publications, mainly retrieved from its mouthpiece, Al-Hadaf magazine, embodied the main source upon which this study relies. Beside this corpus of documents, other primary sources, such as documents issued by relevant actors, have been scrutinised, while all information has been read against the background of the wider academic literature currently available on the Palestinian national movement. This research also drew information from interviews with former and current PFLP members as well as with experts of the Palestinian national movement.

Submitted by LUCIANA SAAB null (lcn.saab@gmail.com) on 2016-09-21T20:31:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO ANVERSO LUCIANA SAAB.pdf: 1483729 bytes, checksum: a711e48980c086f15ceb25c3334a7e5c (MD5) / Rejected by Juliano Benedito Ferreira (julianoferreira@reitoria.unesp.br), reason: Solicitamos que realize uma nova submissão seguindo a orientação abaixo: O arquivo submetido não contém o certificado de aprovação. Corrija esta informação e realize uma nova submissão contendo o arquivo correto. Agradecemos a compreensão. on 2016-09-27T12:33:50Z (GMT) / Submitted by LUCIANA SAAB null (lcn.saab@gmail.com) on 2016-09-30T17:44:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO ANVERSO LUCIANA SAAB.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-09-30T19:46:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 saab_l_me_mar.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-30T19:46:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 saab_l_me_mar.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-26 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este trabalho retoma a assinatura dos Acordos de Oslo entre israelenses e palestinos em setembro de 1993 a partir do entendimento de que os termos necessários para a resolução do conflito histórico não são discutidos no processo de paz. No decorrer da análise do texto do primeiro documento a ser assinado, a Declaração de Princípios (DOP), percebe-se que o conteúdo da proposta de paz e a fórmula de negociações bilaterais adotada não propõem uma alteração da assimetria de poder existente entre palestinos da OLP e o Estado de Israel, o que torna o processo desigual e extremamente favorável à continuação da ocupação militar israelense sobre os territórios da Faixa de Gaza e da Cisjordânia. O trabalho, portanto, foca sua análise no processo de negociação anterior à assinatura da DOP e no contexto político e econômico dos responsáveis por Oslo para estabelecer quais foram os interesses envolvidos em fechar um acordo e de que maneira eles influenciaram a redação dos termos da declaração. Durante a pesquisa, notamos que os Acordos de Oslo beneficiaram exclusivamente os atores envolvidos nas negociações secretas na Noruega, a OLP e israelenses do partido trabalhista, o que nos permite afirmar que o processo de paz não foi representativo dos diversos setores políticos palestinos e israelenses. O estudo também revela que a proposta de paz oferecida aos palestinos em Oslo é uma formulação israelense que remete ao início do processo de paz no Oriente Médio no ano de 1978, cujo principal objetivo foi a normalização das relações diplomáticas entre israelenses e os Estados árabes vizinhos. Assim, as condições negociadas na ocasião de Oslo partiram de um antigo pressuposto de que a paz regional não pressupõe a criação do Estado palestino, mas apenas o direito de autorrepresentação dos residentes dos territórios ocupados. Essas condições foram aceitas pela liderança de Yasser Arafat como estratégia para obter prestígio político e retornar ao território da Palestina. Concluímos, portanto, que o processo de paz de Oslo não se tratou de uma legítima iniciativa para estabelecer a paz de maneira justa e igualitária na região, conforme divulgado por Israel e pelos Estados Unidos, mas de um acordo entre o partido trabalhista e os palestinos da OLP, elaborado de uma maneira que possibilitou a expansão territorial israelense sobre Gaza e Cisjordânia, desconsiderou a questão dos refugiados e não reconheceu o direito à autodeterminação nacional palestina. / This paper refers to the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 from the understanding that the necessary terms in order to solve the historical conflict are not discussed in the peace process. The reading of the first document to be signed, the Declaration of Principles (DOP), reveals that the contents of the peace proposal and the bilateral negotiations formula do not alter the existing asymmetry of power between Palestinians from the PLO and the State of Israel, which makes the uneven process extremely favorable to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation over the territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The paper therefore focuses its analysis on the negotiation process previous to the signing of the DOP and the political and economic context of those responsible for Oslo, in order to establish what were the interests involved and how they influenced the drafting of the terms of the Declaration. During the research, it becomes clear that the Oslo agreements only benefited the actors involved in secret negotiations in Norway, namely the PLO and Israeli Labor Party, which allows us to state that the peace process was not representative of the various Palestinian and Israeli political sectors. The study also reveals that the peace proposal made to the Palestinians in Oslo is an Israeli formulation, that refers back to the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East in 1978, whose main goal was the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab neighboring states . Thus, the conditions discussed in Oslo were based on an old assumption that regional peace does not imply in the creation of a Palestinian state, but only the right to self-representation of the Palestinian residents in the occupied territories. These conditions were accepted by Yasser Arafat as a strategy to gain political prestige and return to the territory of Palestine. We conclude therefore that the Oslo peace process was not a legitimate initiative to establish a fair and equal peace in the region, as claimed by Israel and the United States, but an agreement made between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO, drafted to enabled the Israeli territorial expansion over the West Bank and Gaza, to dismiss the question of refugees and not recognize the Palestinian’s right to national self-determination.

Ce travail tente d’une part, d’étudier les origines de la thématique du retour d’exil et ses différentes formes dans la littérature arabe : la forme de retour chez les écrivains arabes contemporains et celle des poètes du Mahğar. Puis, la forme du retour dans la poésie classique, notamment chez les poètes qui sont rentrés chez eux après une longue absence. Enfin, la forme de retour chez les poètes préislamiques, telle qu’elle se manifeste dans « al-Muqaddimaẗ al-ṭalaliyyaẗ » (l’introduction des ruines). D’autre part, notre étude tente d’explorer la thématique de retour dans la littérature palestinienne contemporaine et de montrer la particularité de ce phénomène chez les auteurs palestiniens revenus en Palestine après les Accords d’Oslo en 1993. En effet, plusieurs d’entre eux abordent la thématique du retour dans des œuvres littéraires variées. Ils y expriment souvent l’échec et la déception face à la réalité retrouvée. En outre, cette étude s’intéresse à la complexité du retour dans la littérature palestinienne. En effet, deux problématiques principales émergent : la première est liée au phénomène du retour d’exil et la deuxième est liée au contexte socio-politique particulier de la Palestine. Ces deux problématiques font du cas du retour palestinien un phénomène à part dans la littérature arabe contemporaine. / This research attempts on one hand, to study the origins of the theme of return and its various forms in Arabic literature : as perceived by contemporary arab writers versus by poets of Mahğar. Then, the shape of the return in classical poetry, especially among poets who have returned back home after a long absence. Eventually, the shape it adopted among pre-Islamic poets, as illustrated in « al-muqaddimaẗ ṭalaliyyaẗ » (the introduction of the ruins). On the other hand, our study intents to explore the theme of return in contemporary Palestinian literature and to demonstrate the peculiarity of this phenomenon among Palestinian returnee authors after Oslo agreements in 1993. Indeed, many of them oftently expressed the failure and disappointment facing the newfound reality. Furthermore, this research addresses the return’s complexity in Palestinian literature. Indeed, two main issues were raised : the first one is related to the phenomenon of return from exile and the second one, to the specific political context of Palestine. These two issues render unique the Palestinian return, a phenomenon in contemporary Arabic literature.

La communauté internationale et le droit international sont confrontés à un défi majeur : trouver une solution mettant un terme au conflit israélo-palestinien. L’étude du conflit israélo-palestinien à la lumière du droit international montre les nombreuses difficultés relatives à l’émergence d’un Etat palestinien. En effet, ce dernier est une source de violation du droit international du fait notamment des manquements aux droits fondamentaux qui ne cessent de sévir sur ce territoire. Les violations commises à l’encontre du droit international remontent à l’époque du mandat britannique et sont finalement caractérisées par l’impunité des entités qui les ont commises. Cela permet donc de mettre en évidence les lacunes où même les faiblesses du droit international, plus précisément celles de l’ONU qui se trouve en difficultés face à un manquement constant à ces principes et à ces décisions. On a cherché à pallier à cette situation infernale par l’usage de techniques qu’offre le droit international dont l’objectif est de mettre un terme à un conflit. Il existe une technique qui paraît être la plus appropriée pour le conflit israélo-palestinien, il s’agit de la fameuse technique de la négociation. Cependant le processus de paix ayant débuté en 1990 se trouve aujourd’hui presque oublié.Malgré tout cela, la création d’un Etat palestinien se trouve être la base de la solution du conflit israélo-palestinien. Cette présente étude cherche à démontrer, sur la base de la définition de l’Etat selon le droit international, que la Palestine dispose d’une part, d’éléments avérés, mais imparfaits, permettant à cette dernière de constituer un Etat selon le droit international, et d’autre part que cette dernière ne peut accéder au rang d’Etat dans la mesure où certains éléments nécessaires à la constitution d’un État demeurent contestables. Ce qui manque à la Palestine pour se constituer en Etat c’est l’effectivité. / The international community and the international law are facing a great challenge: find the solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in light of international law shows many difficulties related to the emergence of a Palestinian state. Indeed, this conflict is a source of violation of international law specifically a violation of human rights that continues to strike in this area. Violations against international law go back to the time of the British mandate and are finally characterized by the impunity towards the entities that have committed them. Therefore, this allows us to highlight the weaknesses of international law, more specifically those of the United Nations that is confronted with the constant breach of its principles and decisions. We have tried to overcome this infernal situation by using the techniques offered by the international law that aims to put an end to a conflict. There is a technique that seems to be the most appropriate for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict known as the negotiation. However, the peace process that began in 1990 is now almost forgotten.Despite all this, the creation of a Palestinian state is the base to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This present study aims to demonstrate, based on the definition of the State under international law, that Palestine has, on one hand, confirmed elements/components that are imperfect, allowing the latter to constitute a State under international law, and on the other, that it can’t achieve statehood to the extent that certain elements necessary for statehood remain questionable. What Palestine is missing is effectiveness.