Climate policy has been mainly studied with economic models that assume representative, rational agents. However, it aims at changing behavior associated with carbon-intensive goods that are often subject to bounded rationality and social preferences, such as status and imitation. Here we use a macroeconomic multi-agent model with such features to test the effect of various policies on both environmental and economic performance. The model is particularly suitable to address distributional impacts of climate policies, not only because populations of many agents are included, but also as these are composed of different classes of households driven by specific motivations. We simulate various policy scenarios, combining in different ways a carbon tax, a reduction of labor taxes, subsidies for green innovation, a price subsidy to consumers for less carbon-intensive products, and green government procurement. The results show pronounced differences with those obtained by rational-agent model studies. It turns out that demand-oriented subsidies lead to lower unemployment and higher output, but perform less well in terms of carbon emissions. The supply-oriented subsidy for green innovation results in a significant reduction of carbon emissions with a slight reduction of unemployment. / Series: WWWforEurope

La présente thèse s'intéresse à l'évolution d'organisations à caractère démocratique ou ouvert, au travers de leur stabilité ainsi que d'autres caractéristiques comme leur capacité à fédérer, à satisfaire leurs membres ou pérenniser des situations de partage de risque entre agents hétérogènes. Les modèles proposés sont des modèles agents qui s'appuient sur une étude menée depuis 2004 par Juliette Rouchier sur les circuits courts agroalimentaires et particulièrement sur les Associations pour le Maintien d'une Agriculture Paysanne (AMAP) et leur structuration en réseaux d'AMAP à différentes échelles géographiques. La thèse suggère l'existence d'une tension entre la stabilité et la représentativité dans ce type d'organisations démocratiques et discute, dans plusieurs cas de figure, l'impact de différents facteurs sur cette tension comme le nombre de sujets discutés dans l'organisation, l'état d'esprit des membres, l'existence d'une communication structurée au sein de l'organisation, ou encore la répartition géographique des membres. Dans un second temps la thèse s'intéresse à des groupes de partage de risque entre agents hétérogènes, comme c'est le cas dans les AMAP entre producteurs et consommateurs. Elle suggère que l'apprentissage par les agents de leurs risques, c'est à dire de leurs préférences vis-à-vis des caractéristiques de leur organisation au cours du temps, pérennise un partage de risque complet entre des agents hétérogènes. De plus cet effet semble renforcé par l'introduction de préférences pour autrui, comme l'altruisme ou l'aversion aux inégalités. / This PhD thesis studies the evolution of organizations under democratic settings through their stability along with other characteristics like their representativeness, their capacity to satisfy their members or to ensure risk sharing agreement between heterogenous agents. Proposed models are agent based models grounded in a study, initiated by Juliette Rouchier in 2004, on short food chains and particularly on "Associations pour le Maintien d'une Agriculture Paysanne" (AMAP), the french equivalent of United States' Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) along with their structuration in AMAP' networks at different geographical levels. This PhD thesis suggests the existence of a tension between stability and representativeness under democratic settings and discusses, in different cases, the effect of several factors on this tension, like the number of topics discussed in the organization, the state of mind of members, the existence of structured communication, or the spatial repartition of members. In a second part, this Phd thesis deals with risk sharing groups between agents heterogenous in terms of risk exposures, as it is the case in AMAP between producers and consumers. It underlines how learning by agents of their risk exposures through times, which is equivalent here to constantly revise their preferences with respect to the characteristics of their organization, can stabilize risk-sharing groups mixing heterogenous agents and how this effect is strengthen by the introduction of other-regarding-preferences, like altruism or inequality aversion.