Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2010. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 333-371). / This study is about Chinese economic statecraft: what it is, how it works and why it is more or less effective. The study builds a theory of economic statecraft that provides an explanation of how states use firms to pursue their strategic goals. This theoretical construct begins with an understanding of economic statecraft that has its roots in the concept of security externalities. These externalities are the security consequences that result from the commercial activity of firms or other entities that conduct international economic transactions. When states seek to deliberately generate such strategic effects by manipulating the activities of commercial actors, they are engaging in economic statecraft. Such manipulation rests on the state being able to direct and control the commercial actors. Five factors account for when the state will be able to control commercial actors. These factors reflect the business-government conditions under which economic statecraft will be likely to succeed. Given the centrality of state-business relations in this account of economic statecraft, China provides a useful empirical context in which to explore this theory. Chinese economic statecraft provides useful variation across a number of cases to illustrate the dynamics of the theory. Specifically, the study examines three important areas of China's grand strategy that feature economic statecraft prominently: Mainland relations toward Taiwan, China's efforts to secure access to strategic raw materials, and China's sovereign wealth funds. The study compares cases of both successful and unsuccessful economic statecraft across each of these empirical contexts. This study finds that economic statecraft is not an easy lever of national power for states to wield but when they master it, economic statecraft can have powerful strategic effects. These effects are reflected in a typology of security externalities. Control of commercial actors is a critical element enabling states to be able to generate such effects. Alignment of goals between the state and the commercial actors, unity of the state, a limited number of commercial actors, bureaucratic resources, and direct reporting relationships all facilitate effective economic statecraft. / by William J. Norris. / Ph.D.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science. Thesis. 1973. Ph.D. / MICROFICHE COPY ALSO AVAILABLE IN DEWEY LIBRARY. / Includes bibliographical references. / Ph.D.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science. Thesis. 1968. B.S. (Also B.S. in Economics). / Sixteen unnumbered leaves inserted. Co-author: Jeffrey Raffel. / Bibliography: ℓ. 82. / B.S.(Also B.S.in Economics).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-153). / by Jan Matias Sundgren. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2010. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / This dissertation examines the factors affecting national security mission assignment decisions. It focuses on cases in which military or civilian agents are selected in lieu of the other. Six factors are identified for testing as possible contributors to agency selection. These factors are drawn from the existing academic literature in the fields of civil-military relations, presidential and congressional politics, and public administration and bureaucratic decisionmaking. After isolating a post-World War 11 data set of American national security mission assignments, the author examines eight cases that roughly divide between military agent choice and civilian agent choice. The military cases are: the governance of defeated Germany, the 1961 transfer of civil defense responsibility to the Department of Defense, aerial and maritime detection and monitoring in the war on drugs, and support to domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management missions. Cases of civilian agent choice include the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the creation of civilian civil defense agencies following World War II, the training of foreign police, and the transfer to FEMA of civil defense responsibilities once managed by DoD. From the evidence in these cases, the author concludes that the degree to which civilian decision-makers are seized with the importance of a national security mission and the implications they ascribe to military or civilian institutionalization of that role are paramount considerations in determining how agencies are selected to lead in new threat areas. Moreover, the geopolitical implications of agent selection are themselves calculated according to an agency's effectiveness-or, alternatively, foreign and domestic public perceptions of its effectiveness. This assessment of effectiveness is critical in determining what strategic signal is being sent by its assignment to a new mission. The findings in this analysis appear to be consistent with David Mayhew's theory that political leaders often seek symbolic value for their policy choices. / by Kathleen H. Hicks. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / MIT Institute Archives copy: pages 41-56 bound in reverse order. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-56). / The 2000 and 2004 U.S. national elections were plagued by problems which caused a significant number of citizens to be effectively denied access to the vote. This paper uses data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) public opinion poll to measure whether certain electoral problems persisted in the 2006 midterm elections. Of particular concern are whether voters were asked to show photo ID in order to vote, whether voters experienced problems with their registrations upon attempting to vote, what demographic groups experienced these problems most frequently, and what remedies were offered to such voters. Additionally, public opinion on whether all voters should be required to show photo IDs in order to vote and on whether polling stations were well operated in this election is also examined. The data shows that while significant percentages of CCES respondents experienced registration problems when voting and/or were asked to show photo ID before voting almost no respondents were prevented from casting ballots. Respondents showed overwhelming support for measures which would require all voters to show photo ID before voting, though this support varied significantly by party ID. Finally, respondents were overwhelmingly pleased with how their polling stations were operated during this election and very few of them were forced to wait in long lines before voting. / by Samantha Green-Atchley. / S.M.

Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, February 2017. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 47-51). / The Progressive movement presents a puzzle for analysts of Congress: a deeply divided Republican party that appears in roll calls as extremely unified and homogenous. Historical records and theories of Congress suggest that part of the answer lies in missing votes - legislators abstaining in order to reduce cross-pressure between their party and constituents, and the Speaker using quorum calls to exclude disloyal Republicans. Using imputation to "fill in" the missing vote data from the 60th House reveals that missing votes had the effect of concealing Republican heterogeneity. This preceded the revolt against Cannon in the 61st House, and was more common for the non-Insurgents who faced the strongest cross-pressure. This pattern continued under Democratic rule in the 62nd House, fading out after the GOP revolt in the Speakership elections of the 68th. This evidence of non-random missingness can help resolve the puzzle of the Progressives, and inform historical study of Congress. / by Alexander Copulsky. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1992. / Vita. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 623-753). / by Thomas U. Berger. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2011. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 141-150). / Prestige is a term that appears in a wide range of international relations literature, but it is rarely ever defined. There is a vague consensus that prestige involves measures of status and respect, but its exact usage is different in every work. This thesis analyzes the various manifestations of prestige to develop a workable definition of the concept and then uses this definition to show how prestige plays a role in the major foreign policy decisions of states. This thesis argues that prestige motivations can overcome security concerns in some instances and cause a state to take an action that seems irrational. This is especially true if the state has recently suffered a severe drop in prestige, such as one incurred after losing a war, becoming isolated from the international community or facing state collapse. When such a dramatic loss occurs a state must take one of four paths to salvage its lost reputation: winning a war, becoming an economic power, taking the lead on an important political negotiation or developing nuclear weapons. This thesis uses two large case studies - Iran and Egypt - along with three smaller case surveys - France, Japan and Pakistan - to illustrate these four paths of status adjustment in action. It also presents a dataset of states that have suffered a severe loss in prestige to show how states can lose prestige and how they can gain it back. / by Samantha Anne Kacos. / S.M.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2014. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / In democracies, the public make decisions that affect policy. In some situations, these decisions are only indirectly related to policy: voters choose an elected executive, who then appoints an unelected policy-maker, who in turn decides policy. In other situations, these decisions are more directly related to policy: voters bypass the executive and elect the policy-maker directly. In still other situations, voters bypass the electoral process altogether, deciding policy for themselves. Do these different configurations matter? While centuries of debate over the merits of democracy have been premised on the assumption they do, there is still limited evidence that voter control affects policy. In this dissertation, I provide three empirical tests of the claim that voter control institutions matter for public policy. The first empirical chapter examines what happens when voters lose control over property tax policy in New York towns. Consistent with expectations, voter control has large impacts on property tax policy. The second empirical chapter examines what happens when voters gain control over local education policy in Virginia school districts. In this case, policy is unaffected when voter power is increased. The third and final empirical chapter examines what happens when voters gain control over fire protection policy in Illinois special district governments. In this case, the increase in voter control happens via two channels: elections and referendums. While elections have no effect on policy, referendums cause significant changes in both policy and performance. The final chapter concludes by considering several outstanding questions raised by the results, including the precise conditions under which voter control will matter, the implications of these results for debates over citizen competence, and the degree to which the results may be driven by elites capturing the democratic process. / by Michael William Sances. / Ph. D.