Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, leaves 425-431). / by Brian Nichiporuk. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-101). / Malignant narcissism is a personality syndrome marked by hubris, paranoia, and reckless indifference to the human consequences of decisions. Malignant-narcissistic leaders tend to commit major blunders in international relations. Examples include Saddam, Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Mao, and Nasser. Seventeen hypotheses are presented on malignant narcissism, exploring its relationships to cognition, domestic political systems, and blunders in international relations. The hypotheses are illustrated with historical examples to support their plausibility. Saddam is explained as a malignant narcissist who was especially prone to blunders throughout his political career. / by Daniel B. Landau. / S.M.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2016. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 197-210). / This dissertation explores two interrelated puzzles about external intervention and internal war. The first asks why rebels, governments, and third party interveners often continue to invest in costly and protracted conflicts rather than sue for peace and a negotiated settlement. The second considers the consequences of these behaviors for temporal variation in the average duration and global prevalence of civil wars. A central finding that emerges concerns the critical role of competitive intervention-two sided, simultaneous military assistance from different third party states to both government and rebel combatants-in the dynamics and intractability of civil wars across time and around the globe. Developing a generalizable theory of competitive intervention, the dissertation explains the distortionary effects this form of external meddling has on domestic bargaining processes, describes the unique strategic dilemmas it entails for third party interveners, and links its varying prevalence to international systemic change. In doing so, it moves beyond popular anecdotes about "proxy wars" by deriving theoretically-grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating competitive intervention in civil wars. It also uncovers a heretofore overlooked feature of this form of intervention-namely, that "not losing" is often more important than "winning" from the perspective of third party interveners under the shadow of inadvertent escalation. The theory is tested with a mixed-method design that combines statistical analyses of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 with detailed case studies of competitive intervention in Angola (1975-1991) and Afghanistan (1979-1992). The dissertation's theoretical and empirical results shed new light on the international dimensions of civil war, address ongoing debates concerning the utility of intervention as a conflict management tool, and inform policy prescriptions aimed at resolving some of today's most violent internal conflicts. / by Noel Thomas Anderson. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2011. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 471-501). / Advocates of diplomatic engagement with states of concern argue that talking to both allies and adversaries is essential for advancing U.S. foreign policy interests. Critics of this approach argue that engagement with these regimes is tantamount to appeasement and signals acceptance of behavior that ought to be condemned. In their view, little can be gained by talking to these states. Thus, diplomatic sanctions are seen as a low-cost means of isolating and delegitimizing regimes. This perspective, however, fails to recognize that maintaining diplomatic sanctions may actually entail a number of substantial costs to the United States and may even undermine economic sanctions' effectiveness. Although the U.S. has employed policies of diplomatic disengagement in approximately 30% of its economic sanctions episodes, studies have focused solely on economic sanctions. Seeking to weigh in on this debate, my doctoral dissertation focuses on two central questions: (1) What are the effects of diplomatic sanctions as a foreign policy tool? and (2) Do diplomatic sanctions increase or decrease the likelihood of target state compliance with U.S. demands? I develop and test a new theory of sanctions effectiveness focusing on the role of information, communication, and diplomatic ties. I argue that diplomatic sanctions and disengagement result in unintended consequences, including a loss of valuable intelligence, increased difficulty of communication, and reduced capabilities for public diplomacy in the target state. I also argue that when United States is more diplomatically engaged with the target state, economic sanctions are more likely to be effective in getting the target state to comply with U.S. demands. To reach these conclusions, I use both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I use economic sanctions data from 1945-2000 from the Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott database, along with original data on diplomatic sanctions. I conduct ordered logit multivariate regressions to test the diplomatic sanctions hypotheses and assess whether or not diplomatic sanctions impact the effectiveness of economic sanctions. I also conduct comprehensive longitudinal case studies of Sudan and Libya, along with a series of shorter mini-case studies focusing on Afghanistan, South Africa and Burma. / by Tara Maller. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2016. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / Time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data are widely used in today's social sciences. Researchers often rely on two-way fixed effect models to estimate causal quantities of interest with TSCS data. However, they face the challenge that such models are not applicable when the so called "parallel trends" assumption fails, that is, the average treated counterfactual and average control outcome do not follow parallel paths. The first chapter of this dissertation introduces the generalized synthetic control method that addresses this challenge. It imputes counterfactuals for each treated unit using control group information based on a linear interactive fixed effect model that incorporates unit-specific intercepts interacted with time-varying coefficients. It not only relaxes the often-violated "parallel trends" assumption, but also unifies the synthetic control method with linear fixed effect models under a simple framework. The second chapter examines the effect of Election Day Registration (EDR) laws on voter turnout in the United States. Conventional difference-in-differences approach suggests that EDR laws had almost no impact on voter turnout. Using the generalized synthetic control method, I show that EDR laws increased turnout in early adopting states but not in states that introduced them more recently. The third chapter investigates the role of informal institutions on the quality of governance in the context of rural China. Using TSCS analysis and a regression discontinuity design, I show that village leaders from large lineage groups are associated with considerably more local public investment. This association is stronger when the groups appeared to be more cohesive. / by Yiqing Xu. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2012. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 320-343). / Comparative data reveal that Japan consistently has had one of the highest poverty rates among advanced industrialized nations, yet its government taxes the poor more heavily and gives them less in public cash transfers than its peers. Why does a country, endowed with democratic institutions, deep pockets, and a sizable social welfare system provide so little public assistance to the poor? I identify two features of Japan's political and economic development that gave rise to a distinctively threadbare safety net. First, the country's late-developer status paired with state-led industrial development incentivized the primary interest groups-namely, the agrarian landlords, industrialists, and organized labor-to oppose redistribution. Second, the manner in which democratic institutions were introduced in the late nineteenth century and the subsequent expansion of suffrage enabled these groups to gain political influence and block expansion of poor relief in the Diet. Beyond formulating redistributive policies, they locked in the minimalist pattern of redistribution by denying the poor the right to vote (pre-1945) and adopting an electoral system that muted their political voice after suffrage was obtained (post-1945). Consequently, Japan's welfare state developed unevenly, featuring a heavy layer of social insurance programs that benefit well-organized interest groups and an exceptionally minimalist public assistance program for the poor. Thus, contrary to extant theories that associate democracy, economic modernization, and a robust labor movement with higher social spending for the poor, I show that these factors stifled redistribution in the case of Japan. My findings strongly suggest that how a country built its democracy and wealth influences whether a welfare state reinforces or ameliorates existing inequality. / by Yumiko T. Shimabukuro. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 371-391). / by Elizabeth H. Prodromou. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 561-605). / by Judith Amanda Layzer. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / What, if anything, renders unelected bureaucrats accountable to the public? This thesis draws upon field research on contemporary China's news media, officials, and activists to theorize the role of publicity in non-electoral accountability. "Publicity-driven accountability" argues that even in highly undemocratic settings officials respond to critical media coverage for two reasons: revealing agency slippage and producing common knowledge about government failings. This mechanism empowers the news media and individual citizens even when formal political rights are severely curtailed, producing a degree of public accountability within authoritarian institutions. The study begins with original evidence that China's Internet news outlets created forms of journalistic autonomy within the constraints of state censorship. Next it documents the sensitivity of Chinese officials to negative media coverage with an original survey experiment on local bureaucrats. The third empirical chapter provides case studies of contemporary activists in China wielding publicity to change the behavior of unelected officials. Publicity-driven accountability has consequences for theories of political development and the roles of both authority and information in aligning nondemocratic governance with the public interest. / by Gregory Michael Distelhorst. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-82). / This study was performed to test competing theories of innovation for their explanatory power in describing the series of innovations in United States Army aviation centered on the helicopter. The theories of strategic threat, civilian intervention, and inter service rivalry were applied to the innovations of air mobility, the anti-tank helicopter, and recent developments in Army doctrinal thought. This study found that while strategic threat and inter-service rivalry theories provided adequate explanation for the developmental phases of the innovation, only civilian intervention could fully explain the implementation of these innovations into Army force structure. / by Joseph Kristopher Keener. / Ph.D.