Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1994. / Vita. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, 655-680). / by Judyth L. Twigg. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. / Military intervention for stated humanitarian purposes has been undertaken on several occasions since the end of the Cold War. It is bound to be attempted again, yet academics and policy makers have left fundamental questions unanswered. Have past humanitarian military interventions saved lives? Under what conditions is humanitarian intervention likely to save lives in the future? Case studies of humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq from 1991 through 1996, Somalia from 1992 to 1995, and Rwanda in 1994 reveal that seven out of ten military operations saved more lives than would have been saved in the absence of intervention. However, the number of lives saved was lower than is commonly believed, ranging from thousands in Iraq to tens of thousands in Rwanda, not the hundreds of thousands governments claim. Humanitarian intervention saved lives in all three countries, suggesting that contextual variables -- such as the immediate causes of death and the particular causes of political break down -- do not determine success or failure. Five factors determine success and failure. They are the (1) balance between an intervenor's humanitarian and political objectives, (2) strategy employed by the intervening force, (3) intervenor's capabilities, (4) level of coordination between humanitarian and military organizations, and (5) length of delay before an international response. My research suggests humanitarian.an intervention is very likely to save lives when the intervenor(s) has political objectives as well as humanitarian ones, follows an operational strategy that is determined by needs on the ground rather than preconceptions, has the capability to dominate the battlefield and communicate with the local population, actively coordinates the interaction between humanitarian and military organizations, and responds to a humanitarian emergency quickly. In most cases, the optimal conditions for humanitarian intervention are not present because the states that are capable of intervening do not feel their national interests are engaged. As a result, they respond slowly (timing), do not plan their actions well (strategy and coordination), and have little motivation to persist when costs begin to rise (objectives and capabilities). / by Taylor Bond Seybolt. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 55-60). / Despite their common Ottoman heritage, Greece and Turkey have diverged widely in their modem history of civil-military relations. The armed forces have a long record of intervention in both countries, but there is a crucial difference: the military emerged as a roughly unitary, independent political actor in Turkey, whereas in Greece it remained divided into factions aligned with civilian political parties through patronage relationships. This empirical observation is then used as a basis for an attempt at theory building. Several countries exhibit a pattern of military interventions more similar to Turkey and others to those found in Greece. Societies which developed a strong parliamentary tradition early in the modernization process also acquired organized civilian political groups with clientelist networks extending into the armed forces. On the contrary, in countries with limited or weak parliamentary development and strong security pressures, political activism was often channeled through the military, which emerged as a hotbed of political thinking, predating and pre-empting any civilian party tradition. The former type of civil-military relations was more commonly found in Southern European and Latin American countries while the latter was predominant in non-Western societies that resisted Western colonization. / by Evangelos Liaras. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2010. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 219-232). / Community participation in development projects, in which billions of dollars are invested every year, has become quite controversial. While these initiatives can be beneficial, many participatory projects fall short of expectations, succumbing to problems such as corruption amongst local elites. What explains the diversity of experiences with participation in development projects? More specifically, under what conditions is participatory project governance successful? Through case studies of Projects Guided by the Community (PGCs) of the Nicaraguan Social Fund, and based on over 150 interviews, I find that the differing experiences can be explained by 1) the pre-existing associational life of the community and 2) the regulatory strategy of local government officials. A community's associational life influences participation in at least two ways. First, associations help the community to elect honest and capable individuals for influential executive positions in the project. Associations do so by producing leaders who become candidates for these positions, as well as creating and disseminating information on those leaders. Second, particular associations, such as a Pentecostal Church, serve to mobilize mass community participation. The dissertation describes at length the specific characteristics of associations that are necessary for these mechanisms to function. Government officials play a crucial role in regulating community participation, to ensure that the projects are completed successfully. The case studies highlight two main regulatory strategies. In the preventive strategy, government officials seek to build the capacity of the community to execute the project, by providing necessary information and encouraging participation. In the reactive strategy, officials monitor the communities' behavior and punish them when they violate the rules. Overall, while both strategies serve their purpose, the preventive strategy is more effective because it takes advantage of community participation, while the reactive strategy is limited by the difficulty that officials face when seeking out violations of the rules and applying punishment mechanisms. Policy makers may use the analysis to target resources to cases of likely success, or to improve local conditions for participatory development projects. / by Jonathan Rose. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 136-138). / This thesis explores the congressional politics of the financial services industry in the United States between 1989 and 2008. Three approaches are pursued. First, I provide a detailed account of the major legislation concerning the industry during this period, with particular reference to interest group competition between commercial banks, securities firms and insurance companies and to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. I suggest that intraindustry conflict was instrumental in delaying Glass-Steagall's repeal until 1999, but that these eventually faded away in response to events outside the Congressional sphere and gave way to a period of intra-industry cooperation in the years after 1999 because the repeal of Glass-Steagall effectively aligned the interests of industry sub-sectors. Second, I present statistical evidence that suggest that these changes are reflected in the contribution strategies of PACs aligned with the financial services industry. Before the repeal of Glass-Steagall, competing groups within the industry valued certain individual legislator characteristics (above all, various committee memberships) at quite different levels. However, after 1999, the contribution strategies of the industry sub-sectors converge in patterns consistent with the reduction of interest group competition. Third, I present the results of statistical models that provide further evidence that the repeal of Glass-Steagall represents a turning point with respect to intra-industry competition. I show that after 1999 competing interest groups began to coordinate their contributions to members of committees with jurisdiction over financial services legislation; before the repeal of Glass-Steagall, there is no evidence of this. Taken together, these three approaches suggest that the regulatory environment shapes not only the business practices of corporations, but also the ways they attempt to influence public policy. / by Matthew Philip Clifford. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2012. / This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. / Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 819-878). / Governments often try to use their foreign policies to influence the choice of who will rule in other countries. However, scholars know strikingly little about this commonplace and consequential phenomenon, especially when it is scoped down to the use of diplomatic tools short of force. Indeed, this lacuna is especially striking in comparison to the voluminous literatures on other forms of international meddling such as military intervention or coercive diplomacy for producing policy change. This project seeks to contribute to the nascent research program on partisan intervention by drawing on the historical record to pose tentative answers to two pertinent research questions in the context of America's Mideast policies. The first topic focuses on occurrence: when are sender states likely to engage in this behavior, and when are they less likely to do so? The second topic focuses on efficacy: when does this policy help achieve the sender state's objectives, and when does it fail? This project seeks to answer these questions by drawing on Washington's peace process diplomacy. It uses official archives and expert interviews to supplement the existing historiographic record, documenting America's efforts to bolster perceived pro--peace leaders in Israel since 1977 and among the Palestinians since 1986. It also explores U.S. decision--making toward Iran as a shadow case for leverage over additional study variables, along with other instances of outside intervention into Israeli politics by European or Arab states. It finds that the issue area of leadership selection intervention is unusually subject to the individualistic preferences of top leaders in the sender state. Because exceptionally blatant meddling of this sort tends to elicit a backlash, self-admitted LSI is therefore discouraged. Instead, practitioners go to great lengths to maintain alternative pretenses that prevent revelation of their true intentions. This inherently complicates the task of legislative oversight, decreases points of leverage for lobbyists or working--level bureaucrats, and magnifies these leaders' subjective interpretation of international circumstances. In short, LSI is intensely personal. / by David Andrew Weinberg. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56). / The thesis is motivated by two major trends: the rise of a global information and knowledge economy, and environmental degradation and the search for sustainable solutions. The increasing importance of knowledge has by some been equated with a new industrial revolution, one based on computer technology, digital infrastructure, and highly educated and technically skilled workers. But how do we assess the value of knowledge in this 'new' economy? The question over value is explored through the diffusion and localization of new knowledge via a knowledge network, based on information technology. The central argument is that in the knowledge economy, the value of knowledge lies in the ability to share it over a knowledge network, which allows for diffusion and localization of new knowledge. This central thesis and the value of knowledge networks is further explored by looking at the case of environmentally friendly or sustainable production. The knowledge network targets barriers to environmentally friendly practices by encouraging and enabling diffusion of knowledge related to sustainable products and processes. The knowledge scope for environmental solutions is analyzed, with the objective to develop common categories, and to understand better the increasing complexities and knowledge needs as enterprises engage in sustainable production. In discussing the knowledge economy and knowledge networks, the thesis focuses mostly on the business enterprise. But the development of the knowledge age has much larger implications, such as 'knowledge for whom?' and 'value for whom?'. The information technologies and networks offer new ways for people and groups to interact and influence social issues and can enable the diffusion of wide variety of views and perspectives. Thinking about the information and knowledge age in the larger economic and social context requires us to consider who builds, controls, influences and benefits from the technology and its use. Before we can reasonably approach this analysis, a basic conceptual framework or understanding of knowledge sharing, knowledge networks, and value of knowledge is called for. This thesis is a building block for such a framework, a contribution to future research into the economic and social implications of the knowledge economy. / by Vignir Mar Haraldsson. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1985. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Includes bibliographical references. / by Ahmed Anisur Rehman. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / "September 2009." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 356-377). / This dissertation finds that the full implementation of the traditional security approaches of prevention, deterrence and defense would not be effective at protecting the United States from a catastrophic biological attack. The traditional approaches would not merely fail but would be counterproductive. Most of the relevant literature - in both the policy and academic worlds - urges the application of traditional strategies to combat the risk of catastrophic biological attack. The traditional strategies are undercut by two broad changes in the strategic environment: 2 1 st century biotechnologies and the emergence of serious non-state adversaries. This dissertation proposes refinements to the traditional strategies of prevention, deterrence, and defense. Prevention seeks to stop an adversary or a potential adversary from acquiring a capability that could be used to decisive effect in an attack. Deterrence seeks to dissuade an adversary from launching an attack by making it plain in advance that the costs would significantly outweigh the benefits. Defense is protecting against an adversary's attack so as to minimize its effects. Traditional prevention strategy should shift from emphasizing export controls and inspections to norm-building. It should use international technical elites to build and enforce norms. These strengthened norms would, in turn, strengthen existing prohibitions. Traditional deterrence strategies should shift from post-attack retaliation to a declaratory strategy more tailored to the biological threat, underscoring the risk of failure for a terrorist group and the resulting exposure and destruction of their key operational assets. / Defense must strengthen both traditional defense and medical response. Traditional defense of the homeland would be overwhelmed by the greater scale, speed and technical complexity of a catastrophic biological attack. There would be a new requirement for strategic decisions, as well as a need for federal supplements to state and local tactical and logistical capabilities. The medical countermeasure strategy needs both substantive and structural improvements. Substantively, it needs a continuum of activities seeking to exploit the defensive potential of new technologies, even as adversaries may exploit their offensive potential. The structure that would be most useful would be an international scientific exchange, where the additional technical and fiscal contributions would likely speed needed progress. / by Carol R. Kuntz. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. / With the decollectivization of agriculture based on a system of private incentives, China's agricultural output increased significantly. After the successful implementation of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in agrarian China after the 1978 economic reforms, agricultural productivity finally surpassed the levels in the early 1950s. This led to significant increases in Chinese peasants' real incomes but agricultural productivity began to decline after 1984 for a myriad of reasons. This thesis seeks to do two things. Firstly, it intends to account for the increases in agricultural output during the post-78 period and to explain the causes of agricultural stagnation after 1984. Secondly, having investigated the causes of agricultural growth and decline after the introduction of the HRS, I will deliberate the case for and against land privatization as a policy prescription to sustain agricultural growth in China. / by Chun Min Terence Choh. / S.M.