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Many people think that political equality is obviously a good thing, an ideal toward which any decent political system should strive. Despite this -- or perhaps because of it -- some basic questions about political equality remain unanswered. What is political equality? What is good about it? Could some other ideal(s) take its place? My aim here is to answer each of these questions. In regards to the first question, I argue that political equality obtains when political power is distributed equally. Two people are political equals if, and only if, they have the same amount of political power. By 'political power' I mean (roughly) the ability to get what one wants in the political arena. Conceiving of political equality in this way allows us to accommodate both the moral and amoral dimensions of politics. What is good about political equality, so conceived? Political equality is good insofar as it leads to the equal advancement of everyone's interests. There are several reasons to think that advancing everyone's interests is important. It may be a fundamental requirement of morality, a principle of social justice, or a necessary condition of political legitimacy. Of course, an equal distribution of political power is not unique in its ability to advance people's interests equally. Indeed, I argue that an unequal distribution of power will almost always lead to a moral equal advancement of everyone's interests. This is because different people have different interests, and, depending on the circumstances, different amounts of power may be needed in order to advance different sets of interests to the same degree. Thus, it is a mistake to assume that an equal distribution of power will lead to the equal advancement of everyone's interests. If the equal advancement of interests is our ultimate goal, then political power should be distributed in accordance with a principle of sufficiency, not equality. Everyone should have whatever amount of political power they need in order for their interests to be advanced to the same degree.

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Devolution of the welfare state brings with it problems of democratic accountability to taxpayers, equality and uniformity in services, and the protection of vulnerable service populations. This research contributes to discussions of devolution and outsourcing by exploring the role of service populations in shaping the relationship between policy formation and implementation and the implications of this relationship for accountability in public policy implementation. A comparative analysis of community based services in aging and behavioral health illuminates the role of political power, professional interests, and organized advocacy in policy formation and implementation. The study pools evidence from legislative histories, newspaper archives, field observations, and surveys to provide a detailed account of the relationship between legislation and implementation. The findings suggest that the political power of service populations affects public policy formation, and written policies structure implementation organizations. Strengths and weaknesses of legislation are transferred to the organizations of implementation as state policies determine the constraints and resources that structure implementation organizations.

This study uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine the basis of industry political power by assessing conditions of economic interdependence and political action associated with the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), and the significant reduction in effective tax rates for eight of eighteen U.S. industries. Past research has focused on the simple passage of "pro-business" legislation, failing to provide adequate evidence as to who benefits or how they benefit from the legislation. The Boolean analysis used in this study indicates that a distinct combination of both political action and economic factors present a clear pattern of causal conditions associated with both tax winners and losers. Using three separate analyses, the theoretically exclusive explanations offered by both class dominance and structural theories fail to provide any clear explanations. Tax policy is associated with a set of conditions that are conjunctural in nature, supporting a combined model. Strong PAC contributions, number of registered lobbyists, and outside lobby firms in association with a strong federal relationship, and either total economic strength or strong inter-industry relations produced the specific conjunctural patterns associated with "winning' industries. Lack of significant PAC contributions to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees insured an industries failure to benefit from the legislative change. The results from this study indicate that a new theoretical model is needed that incorporates the complexity of the interdependent-relationships of political and economic conditions. Evolving from the mutually exclusive theoretical explanations of the past, class segmentation, political dominance, and structural economic explanations are brought back together in a manner that exposes the complexity of the relationships resulted in tangible benefits from the passage of ERTA.

This study uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine the basis of industry political power by assessing conditions of economic interdependence and political action associated with the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), and the significant reduction in effective tax rates for eight of eighteen U.S. industries. Past research has focused on the simple passage of "pro-business" legislation, failing to provide adequate evidence as to who benefits or how they benefit from the legislation. The Boolean analysis used in this study indicates that a distinct combination of both political action and economic factors present a clear pattern of causal conditions associated with both tax winners and losers. Using three separate analyses, the theoretically exclusive explanations offered by both class dominance and structural theories fail to provide any clear explanations. Tax policy is associated with a set of conditions that are conjunctural in nature, supporting a combined model. Strong PAC contributions, number of registered lobbyists, and outside lobby firms in association with a strong federal relationship, and either total economic strength or strong inter-industry relations produced the specific conjunctural patterns associated with "winning' industries. Lack of significant PAC contributions to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees insured an industries failure to benefit from the legislative change. The results from this study indicate that a new theoretical model is needed that incorporates the complexity of the interdependent-relationships of political and economic conditions. Evolving from the mutually exclusive theoretical explanations of the past, class segmentation, political dominance, and structural economic explanations are brought back together in a manner that exposes the complexity of the relationships resulted in tangible benefits from the passage of ERTA.

This study examines the impact of Queen Victoria's political and diplomatic power on the marriages of her five daughters. Queen Victoria's influence on her daughters' marriages highlights her enduring behind the scenes power despite some claims to the contrary. Unlike the sons’ marriages, where considerable outside political influences brought to bear, the daughters’ marriages were almost solely influenced by Victoria. Examining the Queen's five daughters offers an alternate view of her motherhood while simultaneously exploring the diverse gender dynamics between her and her daughters.