archives@tulane.edu / In this thesis, I define and study the foundations of the new framework of graded category theory, which I propose as just one structure that fits under the general banner of what Andree Eheresman has called “dynamic category theory”. Two approaches to defining graded categories are developed and shown to be equivalent formulations by a novel variation on the Grothendieck construction. Various notions of graded categorical constructions are studied within this framework. In particular, the structure of graded categories in general is then further elucidated by studying so-called “variable-object” models, and a version of the Yoneda lemma for graded categories. As graded category theory was originally developed in order to better understand the intuitive notions of absolute and relative cardinality – these notions are applied to the problem of vindicating the Skolemite thesis that “all sets, from an absolute perspective, are countable”. Finally, I discuss some open problems in this framework, discuss some potential applications, and discuss some of the relationships of my approach to existing approaches in the literature. / 1 / Nathan bedell

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The epistemology of intuitions has become popular recently with philosophers’ increasing use of experimental methods to study intuitions. Philosophers have focused on the reliability of intuitions, as empirical studies seem to suggest that conflicting intuitions are common. One set of studies, concerning what Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) calls the abstract/concrete paradox, suggests that conflicting intuitions are common and, hence, that mistaken intuitions are common. As Goldman (2007) notes, if mistaken intuitions are sufficiently prevalent, then we might have reason to think intuitions are unreliable. I argue that mistaken intuitions are not common, since studies concerning the abstract/concrete paradox have unknowingly studied several distinct phenomena instead of the abstract/concrete paradox and, hence, that they present merely apparently conflicting intuitions. I then discuss the import of empirical studies for debates about reliability, noting that those studies can inform us about the unreliability of intuitions but we are still unclear about the conditions for reliability.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Concordia Seminary, 1997. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-145).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 196-203) and index.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- Australian National University, 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2008. / "Graduate Program in Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (p. 327-333).

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, April 2008.