Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 1985. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

It is a given that the late works of Beethoven occupy a special place in our musical life; that they continue to speak so directly to audiences more than a century and a half after they were written says much for the universality of their appeal. Although the music of Beethoven's final decade is much appreciated today, some early listeners found the coexistence of apparently contradictory aspects in these works to be very difficult to understand. Analysis that would attempt to do justice to such complex music must take into account the interplay of both form and content, thus broaching the question of how music can communicate that content. Since music has no lexical capacity, it is helpful to consider analogies from other fields in an investigation of the problem. Myth, alchemy, Jungian psychology, and seventeenth-century religious poetry are, like Beethoven's music, engaged with the exploration and communication of meaningful human experience; to deal with such issues requires a means of expressing the inexpressible, and so at the core of ideas in each of these fields is the paradox. Paradox, an apparent self-contradiction that carries with it the implicit possibility of its resolution, is a self-referential phenomenon. That paradox is present in Beethoven's music has been recognized in a general way by a number of scholars, but a more detailed examination of this aspect of his compositions offers new insight into their construction and content. A precedent for Beethoven's use of musical paradox is found in the reflexive works of Haydn, although Beethoven's use of the technique developed into a tool capable of being applied to many more types of compositional situations, and with a much greater expressive range. An adaptation of William Empson's Seven Types of Ambiguity offers an introduction to the use of paradox in Beethoven's works, while two extended critical essays, on the string quartets opp. 132 and 130, develop a multidisciplinary critical framework in order to provide a more detailed examination of the utility of paradox in shaping the overall narrative design and expressive structure in these two compositions, and by implication, in many others of Beethoven's late works as well. / Graduate

M.A. (Clinical Psychology) / This study traces the description of Paradox as a therapeutic measure by numerous therapists since Erikson first used the paradox in the form of positive reframing during the thirties. Major theoretical definitions of the paradoxical communication are reviewed. The therapeutic Paradoxical intervention is categorized into a series of relatively circumscribed intervention strategies, each of which shares theoretical similarities but emphasizes different aspects of the paradox. The paradoxical intervention has been utilized in a number of ways depending on the epistemological premise of the therapist, and the theory of change accepted within this epistemology. The study initially discusses the paradoxical intervention as designed as an isolated intervention within a linear cause and effect paradigm. Within a context of power and control, the paradoxical intervention was used by therapists of the Mental Research Institute (Watzlavick et a1. 1977) to emphasize and maintain the hierarchical distinction between the therapists and patient. The Strategic approaches including those of Fisch, Weakland and Segal (1982) Haley (1963) and Papp (1979) involve direct and planned influence of persons and are based, in large part, on an analysis of the power relationships that they aim to modify (Golann 1988.) According to Bogdan (1982) the Milan approach even with its systemic circular approach, involves the use of the paradoxical intervention as a means of simultaneously influencing the behavior of all the members of a family. The paradoxical intervention is discussed within a circular cybernetic paradigm following De Shazer's (1982) explanation of a therapeutic intervention. De Shazer (1982) sees the paradoxical intervention as one type of intervention within a pattern of isomorphic interventions, and stresses the necessity for this intervention to follow the family interaction patterns. De Shazer developed the concept of Isomorphism and used this as a prescriptive tool for guiding the therapists efforts to promote change, by intervening from a different angle, based on the description of family patterns. Where the family's interactive patterns are paradoxical in nature, a paradoxical intervention would be appropriate. With this emphasis on a more encompassing pattern of interventions based on patterns of client-family interactions, the significance of the feedback processes within the relationship between therapist and client in the design and utilization of the paradoxical intervention is stressed. The study concludes that the psychotherapeutic relationship between the therapist system and the client system can be seen to contextualize and provide meaning to the paradoxical intervention.

This paper attempts to deal with architectural theory at the level of the design process. By concentrating on a particular idea, or really a particular type of idea construction, I intend to illustrate the nature of contemporary design process. The method of idea construction dealt with is the notion of paradox. The nature of the contemporary design process is illustrated through discussions which mark the transition from Modern to Post-Modern design. It is my contention that the paradox is a particularly strong vehicle with which to discuss the shift from the Modernist approach to the Post-Modern concept of designing. Further, I will illustrate how paradoxes possess innate qualities which are greatly prized by the Post-Modernists but which were not highly extolled by the Modernists. The qualities of paradoxes which are proving to be of considerable value to design are ambiguity and complexity. These qualities are held to be of great importance for creative work. Their special value today results from the diverse and rapidly transforming social and technological realms, which require complex yet integrated conceptual models in order to cope with rapid change. Paradoxes are shown to parallel the structure of creative thinking in-so-far as creativity has been described. Paradoxes are a special case of the bi-association used in creative thinking. In bi-association one entity is juxtaposed in a single framework with an antagonistic entity. The resultant conflict gives rise to the creation of new integrated ideas. In a paradox the conflict arises over the question of whether or not a contradiction is true or false. In fact the ambiguity that results from a contradiction that is both true and false at the same time is one of the most valuable properties of a paradox. The creation of an integrated idea that can deal with the ambiguity is to resolve the paradox and to perform a promising creative act. In short, a paradox can be defined as an apparent contradiction. It is to be valued for its ability to introduce indeterminate thinking to the design process. By definition, the paradox retains the idea that a contradiction is present, even while the contradiction is known to be false. I will maintain that an appreciation of a contradiction even after the contradiction is shown to be false has the ability to vault the designer to still higher levels of synthesis and abstraction. This movement between levels of abstract integration is held to be fundamental to the design process in general and to paradoxical thinking in particular. This paper introduces the idea of the paradox in preparation for a discussion of the complexity and indeterminacy that results when we attempt to apply it to particular examples. The body of the paper is taken up with the definition and discussion of the role of seventeen paradoxes. These paradoxes have been chosen for their ability to illustrate the transformation from Modernism to Post-Modernism, which in the broadest terms are described as the machine age and the communications age respectively. The intention has been to illustrate the character and role of paradox in specific instances. But additionally the selected examples are intended to reveal how paradoxical thinking has a natural affinity with the sensitivities and objectives of Post-Modern design. The general conclusion based on the insights gained from discussing the paradoxes is not radical. To conclude that the essential purpose of design must be to personify the perpetual act of creating meaning on many levels at the same time is to corroborate findings established in many quarters. The fact that the notion of paradox reinforces widely held beliefs does reveal the relevance of paradoxical thinking to mainstream design. Essentially, paradox is important to the design process as a rational construction of a type which incorporates irrational functions. A very potent creative tool results when both rational and irrational functions can be combined to compose meaning at a variety of levels at the same time. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Architecture and Landscape Architecture (SALA), School of / Graduate

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Joining the rich literary history of prayerful and supplicative poetry, Louise Glück’s The Wild Iris pays homage to this tradition, while at the same time subverting it. In the critical introduction, I discuss how Glück incorporates the adhesive power of paradox as a means of connecting the entire collection, with its competing and often contradictory voices, together in a meaningful way. I argue that the end result is a beautifully complex collection of spiritually secular prayers. The second part of my thesis contains thirty-eight pages of my own poetry, which also explore issues of the divine, as well as lying, family, and loss.

My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ Another principled division is intuitively anticipated. I coin the term 'hypodox' (adj.: 'hypodoxical') for a generalization of Truth-tellers across paradoxes of truth, satisfaction, membership, reference, and where else it may find applicability. I make and investigate a conjecture about paradox and hypodox duality: that each paradox (at least those in the scope of the classification) has a dual hypodox.¶ In my investigation, I focus on paradoxes that might intuitively be thought to be relatives of the Liar paradox, including Grelling’s (which I present as a paradox of satisfaction) and, by analogy with Grelling’s paradox, Russell’s paradox. I extend these into truth-functional and some non-truth-functional variations, beginning with the Epimenides, Curry’s paradox, and similar variations. There are circular and infinite variations, which I relate via lists. In short, I focus on paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and some paradoxes of membership. ¶ Among the new paradoxes, three are notable in advance. The first is a non-truth functional variation on the Epimenides. This helps put the Epimenides on a par with Curry’s as a paradox in its own right and not just a lesser version of the Liar. I find the second paradox by working through truth-functional variants of the paradoxes. This new paradox, call it ‘the ESP’, can be either true or false, but can still be used to prove some other arbitrary statement. The third new paradox is another paradox of satisfaction, distinctly different from Grelling’s paradox. On this basis, I make and investigate the new distinction between two different types of paradox of satisfaction, and map one type back by direct analogy to the Liar, and the other by direct analogy to Russell's paradox.

Kontroll och relation är två vanligt förekommande ämnen som ofta diskuteras och behandlas inom franchisinglitteraturen. Tidigare teori visar att kontroll och övervakning av franchisetagare är den mest centrala aspekt för att lyckas bedriva en franchiseorganisation. Samtidigt finns det teori och studier som tyder på att den personliga relationen mellan franchisegivare och franchisetagare är avgörande för om franchiseorganisationen kommer att lyckas eller inte. Då både kontroll och relation två är viktiga faktorer för att en franchiseorganisation ska kunna fungera ställer vi oss frågan vad som händer om den ena faktorn bedrivs för mycket, kommer den andra faktorn då bli lidande? Vi menar att det existerar en paradox mellan kontroll och relation där exempelvis en bra relation mellan parterna i sin tur innebär en reducerad kontroll. Studiens syfte går således ut på att stärka och utveckla tidigare forskningen inom området genom att empiriskt belysa paradoxen mellan kontroll och relation i en franchiseorganisation. Baserat på detta ämnar studien vidare till att bidra med en ökad förståelse för hur franchisegivaren kan hantera denna paradox. För att svara på syftet har vi använt oss av en kvalitativ metod där ett utvalt fallföretag legat i fokus för det empiriska underlaget. Den teoretiska referensramen som har använts består av olika teorier med koppling till kontroll och relation inom franchising. Studien visar på att det existerar en paradox mellan kontroll och relation vilket i sin tur kan hanteras genom en förbättrad kommunikation mellan parterna.

The main goal of this dissertation is to explore alternative economic indicators to GDP. The paper also analyses whether GDP is able to capture the development of a society's welfare, and whether different indicators can show other results about the development of national economy. After an introductory description of GDP, the paper outlines the core limits of this indicator. Following this is a discussion of happiness economics and Easterlin's paradox. The paper then goes on to explore the subject of alternative indicators in more detail. In the final chapter, five selected alternative indicators are analyzed, and compared with GDP using the USA's economy as an example. In conclusion, the paper evaluates the usefulness of these alternative indicators and finds that alternative indicators give a different perspective on national economy than GDP.

This thesis investigates logico-philosophical aspects of using either a non-transitive or a non-reflexive logic to obtain a logic of truth in which truth is transparent. It enquires into and rejects the claim that restricting transitivity of entailment to accommodate transparent truth suffices to make the connective tonk acceptable by arguing that tonk as defined in a cut-free sequent calculus requires in addition that the logic is non-reflexive to be uniquely defined, and develops a semantics for tonk based on models with two valuations which delivers a non-transitive and non-reflexive logic. It develops a cut-free sequent calculus and two kinds of semantics for a non-reflexive logic of truth in which truth is transparent, one based on trivalent models and one based on models with two valuations. It shows how to define a non-transitive, a paraconsistent and a paracomplete logic of truth on the models with two valuations and develops a cut-free sequent calculus that captures all four logics. It investigates to which extent the non-reflexive and the non-transitive logic of truth can express their own meta-inferences, and shows among other things how one can employ the paraconsistent and the paracomplete logic to express the meta-inferences of the non-transitive and the non-reflexive logic respectively. Finally, it proves that the non-transitive logic of truth is omega-inconsistent and furthermore that transitivity is not required as assumption to establish that a logic in which truth satisfies the conditions of quantified standard deontic logic is omega-inconsistent.