The enactment of civil asset forfeiture legislation by Alberta and Ontario in the fall of 2001, followed by the passage of similar legislation in five other provinces, has signalled a dramatic change in the way Canadian constitutional law ought to be understood. This thesis builds on American legal scholarship by highlighting how deficiencies in Canada’s constitutional law could create space for more invasive civil forfeiture statutes. Following a historical overview of forfeiture law in Canada, the thesis (i) examines how the Supreme Court of Canada mischaracterized this legislation as a matter of property and civil rights; (ii) considers whether the doctrine of federal paramountcy should have rendered the legislation inoperable and the consequences of the failure by the Court to do so; and (iii) evaluates iiithe impact of the absence of an entrenched property right in the constitution, in regard to this matter.

The enactment of civil asset forfeiture legislation by Alberta and Ontario in the fall of 2001, followed by the passage of similar legislation in five other provinces, has signalled a dramatic change in the way Canadian constitutional law ought to be understood. This thesis builds on American legal scholarship by highlighting how deficiencies in Canada’s constitutional law could create space for more invasive civil forfeiture statutes. Following a historical overview of forfeiture law in Canada, the thesis (i) examines how the Supreme Court of Canada mischaracterized this legislation as a matter of property and civil rights; (ii) considers whether the doctrine of federal paramountcy should have rendered the legislation inoperable and the consequences of the failure by the Court to do so; and (iii) evaluates iiithe impact of the absence of an entrenched property right in the constitution, in regard to this matter.