The enactment of civil asset forfeiture legislation by Alberta and Ontario in the fall of 2001, followed by the passage of similar legislation in five other provinces, has signalled a dramatic change in the way Canadian constitutional law ought to be understood. This thesis builds on American legal scholarship by highlighting how deficiencies in Canada’s constitutional law could create space for more invasive civil forfeiture statutes. Following a historical overview of forfeiture law in Canada, the thesis (i) examines how the Supreme Court of Canada mischaracterized this legislation as a matter of property and civil rights; (ii) considers whether the doctrine of federal paramountcy should have rendered the legislation inoperable and the consequences of the failure by the Court to do so; and (iii) evaluates iiithe impact of the absence of an entrenched property right in the constitution, in regard to this matter.

The enactment of civil asset forfeiture legislation by Alberta and Ontario in the fall of 2001, followed by the passage of similar legislation in five other provinces, has signalled a dramatic change in the way Canadian constitutional law ought to be understood. This thesis builds on American legal scholarship by highlighting how deficiencies in Canada’s constitutional law could create space for more invasive civil forfeiture statutes. Following a historical overview of forfeiture law in Canada, the thesis (i) examines how the Supreme Court of Canada mischaracterized this legislation as a matter of property and civil rights; (ii) considers whether the doctrine of federal paramountcy should have rendered the legislation inoperable and the consequences of the failure by the Court to do so; and (iii) evaluates iiithe impact of the absence of an entrenched property right in the constitution, in regard to this matter.

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The courts in Canada have often been cast, by both courts and legal scholars, as 'umpires' or 'arbiters' of the federal-provincial division of powers - umpires or arbiters that have the exclusive, or at least decisive, authority to clarify and enforce, and resolve disputes about, 'who does what' in the federal system. However, the image conveyed by these metaphors underestimates the role that the federal and provincial political branches play in the federal system, by working out their own solutions, in the intergovernmental arena, both directly and indirectly, where questions and disputes arise about how jurisdiction is and should be allocated. The image conveyed by the umpire or arbiter metaphors also sits uncomfortably with the facilitative role that the Supreme Court of Canada has carved out for itself in its recent division of powers decisions, a role that casts the courts as facilitators of these instances of intergovernmental dialogue. This doctoral dissertation challenges, and moves beyond, the umpire and arbiter metaphors. It examines the political safeguards available to the provinces in Canada to prevent, or limit, perceived federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction, in the process highlighting the role that the political branches play in Canada in working out their own allocations of jurisdiction, outside of the courts. It describes, and critically evaluates, the facilitative role carved out by the Court in its recent division of powers decisions, identifying various reasons to be skeptical of a facilitative role that casts the courts as facilitators of intergovernmental dialogue. Finally, and with an eye to future research, it briefly outlines an alternative facilitative role that focuses on facilitating deliberation about the division of powers implications of particular initiatives, arguing that it would be premature to dismiss facilitative approaches to judicial review altogether.

La théorie classique du fédéralisme prône la symétrie : les entités fédérées devraient être traitées de la même manière par la Constitution. Or, il arrive que le texte constitutionnel prévoie plutôt des asymétries, soit des différences ayant un caractère permanent quant au statut des provinces au sein des institutions centrales ou quant aux pouvoirs législatifs qui leur sont reconnus. En conséquence, ce mémoire vise à répondre à la question suivante : quelles sont les asymétries constitutionnelles qui existent entre les provinces canadiennes, et quel traitement reçoivent-elles de la part du tribunal de dernière instance ? Cette question a pour pendant de déterminer si les asymétries présentes dans la Constitution sont renforcées ou atténuées par l’interprétation judiciaire. Puisque les réflexions sur l’asymétrie émanent principalement de la science politique, le premier chapitre fait état des réflexions théoriques que l’on retrouve dans cette discipline quant aux fondements ainsi qu’aux limites d’arrangements asymétriques dans une fédération. Le second chapitre porte sur l’analyse des asymétries de représentation des provinces au sein des institutions centrales, soit au Sénat et à la Cour suprême. Le troisième chapitre traite des asymétries en termes de pouvoirs législatifs et prend pour cas d’étude l’article 94 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ainsi que l’exigence constitutionnelle de bilinguisme parlementaire, législatif et judiciaire qui s’impose uniquement à trois des provinces canadiennes. Cette démarche nous mène à conclure que les asymétries quant au statut des provinces dans les institutions centrales sont renforcées par l’interprétation judiciaire. En revanche, la Cour suprême semble plus réticente à l’idée qu’il puisse y avoir des asymétries entre les pouvoirs législatifs des provinces, ce qui la mène parfois à atténuer la portée des asymétries que la Constitution prévoit dans ce domaine. Enfin, nous constatons que les fondements ainsi que les avantages associés à l’asymétrie par les auteurs de science politique se reflètent dans le raisonnement de la Cour lorsqu’elle renforce une asymétrie. De même, les limites théoriques, reconnues en science politique, aux asymétries admises entre les entités fédérées se reflètent dans les jugements de la Cour qui favorisent plutôt la symétrie. / The classical theory of federalism promotes symmetry: federated entities should be treated in the same way by the Constitution. However, a constitutional text can sometimes provide for asymmetries, i.e. permanent differences in the status of provinces within the central institutions, or in the legislative powers vested in them by the Constitution. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: what are the constitutional asymmetries that exist between Canadian provinces, and how are they treated by the apex court? The corollary of this question is to determine whether the asymmetries found in the Constitution are reinforced or attenuated by judicial interpretation. Since studies on asymmetry have mainly emanated from the field of political science, the first chapter outlines the theoretical arguments found in this discipline regarding the foundations and limits of asymmetrical arrangements within a federation. The second chapter analyzes asymmetries in provincial representation within central institutions, namely the Senate and the Supreme Court. The third chapter focuses on asymmetries in terms of legislative powers, taking as a case study section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as well as the constitutional requirement of parliamentary, legislative and judicial bilingualism that is only imposed on three Canadian provinces. This analysis leads us to conclude that asymmetries in provincial representation within central institutions are reinforced by judicial interpretation. On the other hand, the Supreme Court seems more hesitant to the idea that there may be asymmetries between provinces in terms of their legislative powers. This sometimes leads the Court to attenuate the asymmetries that the Constitution provided for in this area. Finally, this thesis finds that the foundations and advantages associated with asymmetry by political science theorists are reflected in the Court's reasoning when it reinforces asymmetries between provinces. Similarly, the theoretical limits, recognized by political scientists, to the asymmetries admitted between federated entities are reflected in the Court's rulings that tend to favor symmetry.