The enactment of civil asset forfeiture legislation by Alberta and Ontario in the fall of 2001, followed by the passage of similar legislation in five other provinces, has signalled a dramatic change in the way Canadian constitutional law ought to be understood. This thesis builds on American legal scholarship by highlighting how deficiencies in Canada’s constitutional law could create space for more invasive civil forfeiture statutes. Following a historical overview of forfeiture law in Canada, the thesis (i) examines how the Supreme Court of Canada mischaracterized this legislation as a matter of property and civil rights; (ii) considers whether the doctrine of federal paramountcy should have rendered the legislation inoperable and the consequences of the failure by the Court to do so; and (iii) evaluates iiithe impact of the absence of an entrenched property right in the constitution, in regard to this matter.

The enactment of civil asset forfeiture legislation by Alberta and Ontario in the fall of 2001, followed by the passage of similar legislation in five other provinces, has signalled a dramatic change in the way Canadian constitutional law ought to be understood. This thesis builds on American legal scholarship by highlighting how deficiencies in Canada’s constitutional law could create space for more invasive civil forfeiture statutes. Following a historical overview of forfeiture law in Canada, the thesis (i) examines how the Supreme Court of Canada mischaracterized this legislation as a matter of property and civil rights; (ii) considers whether the doctrine of federal paramountcy should have rendered the legislation inoperable and the consequences of the failure by the Court to do so; and (iii) evaluates iiithe impact of the absence of an entrenched property right in the constitution, in regard to this matter.

Traditionnellement, le droit est perçu comme devant assurer la stabilité de la norme et des situations régies afin de garantir la sécurité juridique des sujets de droit. Mais ceci n'est pas une vérité absolue, il ne s'agit que d'une apparence fondée sur l'approche classique de la théorie de l'Etat de droit. Pourtant, une temporalité a été mise en place afin de répondre à ce besoin. Elle se caractérise par un instant pérennisé. La temporalité juridique est une suite de séquences immobiles juxtaposées conduisant à des arythmies lors d'un passage d'un état du droit à un autre. Ainsi se révèle un temps juridique fictif hors temps réel, enfermé dans une bulle de stabilité entre deux instants déterminés. Or cette politique s'avère inefficace et dépassée face aux atteintes portées à la force obligatoire du contrat, à la permanence des lois, et face au désordre régnant au sein du système juridique. Nous pensons que les changements intervenus au sein des mécanismes juridiques et au sein du système juridique lui-même ne peuvent être traités comme de simples dérèglements ou maux à traiter. Les actes normatifs en acceptant de prendre en compte l'évolution des situations juridiques ont changé de nature. Ils sont devenus des processus intégrant en leur sein l'incertitude du temps, ses effets créateurs, et donc une certaine flexibilité. Le temps du droit n'est plus un hors temps fictif, il est un temps "contextualisé". Cette nouvelle politique du temps se révèle être remarquablement efficace en permettant de réassurer une séparation des pouvoirs par la réorganisation des sphères temporelles. / Traditionally, the right is perceived as that must assure the stability of the legal rule and the situations governed to guarantee the legal security of the subjects of right. But this is not the absolute truth; it is only about an appearance established on the classic approach of the theory of the Rule of law. Nevertheless, a temporality was organized to answer this need. It is characterized by perpetuated moment. The legal temporality is a suite of leading juxtaposed immovable sequences drives to arrhythmias during a passage of a state from the right to the other one. So shows itself a fictitious legal time except real time, locked into a bubble of stability between two definite moments. Now this politics turns out ineffective and exceeded in front of carried infringements on the binding effect of the contract, on the durability of the laws, and in front of disorder reigning within the legal system. We think that the changes intervened within the legal mechanisms and within the legal system itself cannot be treated as simple disorders or troubles to be treated. The normative acts by agreeing to take into account evolutions the situations which they govern so changed nature. They became processes integrating within them the uncertainty of time, its creative effects, and thus certain flexibility. The time of the right is not any more one except fictitious time; it is a time "contextualisé ". This new politics of time shows to be outstandingly effective by allowing to re-assure a division of powers by the reorganization of the temporal spheres.

O fenômeno do ativismo jurisdicional tem como causa a crise do direito. Uma releitura do tema a partir de uma perspectiva existencial permite concluir que sua origem assenta-se na perda do sentido da ocupação e preocupação do homem em relação ao direito. Esta crise articula-se, grosso modo, em dois níveis distintos. De um lado, pelo desgaste do modelo de racionalização contido na proposta da tripartição de poderes de Montesquieu; de outro, na perda do sentido do direito como forma de controle social no processo de incorporação da armação da técnica. Diante da anomia do legislador e do Estado aos desafios atuais em torno do direito, presencia-se, na atualidade, o aumento do ativismo jurisdicional na definição do conteúdo do direito continental. Dentro das possibilidades abertas no horizonte da experiência histórica, a evolução do direito continental permite constatar que esta se formou e perpetua-se a partir dos conceitos antagônicos de mutabilidade (em ajuste às necessidades da evolução da sociedade), mas também de segurança jurídica (representada pela norma posta). Um aumento do ativismo jurisdicional que pretenda preservar a experiência da tradição do direito continental exige que a ocupação e preocupação em torno do Direito se deem em aderência à experiência compartilhada dentro do mundo das vivências e no fino equilíbrio dos conceitos de normas sociais e de garantia, sem o que, no extremo da projeção do Dasein no horizonte de sua injunção social, teríamos inevitavelmente um processo de ruptura conceitual da experiência do Direito ou a anulação do Dasein perante o Direito. / The phenomenon of the jurisdictional activism is caused by the crisis of law. A re-reading of the theme from an existential perspective allows for the conclusion that its origin is based on the loss of mans care and concern sense regarding the law. Broadly, this crisis articulates in two distinct levels. On one side, by the rationalization model exhaustion contained in the tripartite division of powers proposed by Montesquieu; on the other side, in the loss of law sense as a way of social control in the incorporation process of the frame of the technique. As a consequence of the anomy of the legislature branch and the State to the current challenges around the law, the increase of the jurisdictional activism in the definition of the continental law content can be contemporarily noticed. Within the possibilities opened in the historical experience scope, the evolution of the continental law allows for the observation that it was formed and continues from the antagonistic concepts of mutability (adjusted to the evolution needs of the society), but also of legal security (represented by the rule provided for). An increase of the jurisdictional activism intending to preserve the experience of the continental law tradition requires that the care and concern concerning the law comply with the experience shared within the world of experiences and in the fine balance of the social rules and guarantee concepts, without which, in the extreme of the Dasein projection in the scope of its social injunction, we would inevitably have a process of conceptual rupture of the law experience or annulment of Dasein before the law.

In addition to demonstrating the judiciary’s role in constitutional adjudication and an application of the federal trade and commerce power, judicial determination of Parliament’s constitutional jurisdiction to enact securities legislation is noteworthy also due to the vast policy debates that are involved. Though such determinations routinely invite a process removed from the contemplation of desirable policy, the ‘General Motors test’ used to define and apply the relevant constitutional power here seems to implicitly allow it. The choice between ‘categorization’ and ‘balancing’ in constitutional analysis is therefore significant, in terms of its juxtaposed tolerance for policy considerations. With these analytical options in mind, this thesis considers Parliament’s proposal, so to identify a reasonable process for determining its constitutionality. It argues that balancing relevant policy concerns is necessary and justifiable in the application of the legal norms in question. Crucial, however, is lending the process structure, so that its shortcomings are mitigated.

In addition to demonstrating the judiciary’s role in constitutional adjudication and an application of the federal trade and commerce power, judicial determination of Parliament’s constitutional jurisdiction to enact securities legislation is noteworthy also due to the vast policy debates that are involved. Though such determinations routinely invite a process removed from the contemplation of desirable policy, the ‘General Motors test’ used to define and apply the relevant constitutional power here seems to implicitly allow it. The choice between ‘categorization’ and ‘balancing’ in constitutional analysis is therefore significant, in terms of its juxtaposed tolerance for policy considerations. With these analytical options in mind, this thesis considers Parliament’s proposal, so to identify a reasonable process for determining its constitutionality. It argues that balancing relevant policy concerns is necessary and justifiable in the application of the legal norms in question. Crucial, however, is lending the process structure, so that its shortcomings are mitigated.

Prigimtinėje būklėje žmogus perdavė savo teises Tautos atstovams, kurie geriausiai galėjo atstovauti jo nteresus, taip buvo įkurta įstatymų leidžiamoji valdžia. Visuomenės resursų valdymui bei sprendimų vykdymui buvo įkurta vykdomoji valdžia. Taigi, turėdamos skirtingą paskirtį visuomenės gyvenime, įstatymų leidžiamoji ir vykdomoji valdžios veikė išimtinai tik savo srityje, tokiu būdu galėdamos nešališkai, todėl geriausiai atstovauti Tautą bei dirbti jos labui. Tokia pagrindinė istorinio valdžių padalijimo principo prigimties idėja, kurią, įvairiai modifikuotą ar gryną, kaip demokratijos garantą, perėmė dauguma tiek labiausiai išsivysčiusių Vakarų Europos, tiek kitų žemynų valstybės. Pagal valdžių padalijimo principo pradininkų veikaluose išdėstytą doktriną, demokratinio valdymo šalyje turi būti trijų valdžių sąranga – įstatymų leidžiamoji, įstatymų vykdomoji bei teisminė. Minėta, kiekviena valdžios šaka turi tik jai priskirtus įgaliojimus ir jokiu būdu negali jų nei deleguoti, nei perimti iš kitos valdžios šakos, juo labiau negali būti valdžių susiliejimo. Tačiau valdžių atskyrimas nereiškia valdžių savitikslio savarankiškumo, - tai reiškia, kad valdžios bendradarbiauja ir įgyvendina tokį valdžių pusiausvyros lygį, kurio dėka nė viena valdžia neturėtų pranašumo prieš kitą. Tuo pačiu pagal šį principą turi būti nuolat atliekama parlamentinė kontrolė Vyriausybės atžvilgiu. Tik tokiu būdu bus tinkamai garantuotos Tautos teisės bei laisvės. Todėl, remiantis savo bei užsienio... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Every human being living in the State of Nature had equal opportunities. Because of the growth of human race, this state altered and the interests of each individual person began to intersect, especially when talking about property. As a result, the rights and freedoms of each individual person were taken under threat. Therefore people began to organize themselves into societies in order to solve collective issues of society all together. When they had elected the most competent representatives, able to represent the interests of all Nation the best they could, people living in the State of Nature voluntarily waived their rights for handling particular issues in collective manner. The first aim of the representatives was the welfare of people. Thus the fundamental institute of the highest government was born. However, decisions taken in the name of all the people would have no power if they could not be enforced and would not reflect interests of the Nation. Seeking to implement supervision, the executive power was established which took care of the general welfare and the realization of all decisions. Thus, having a different purpose in society, legislature and executive authorities acted solely for their own sphere. Therefore, legislature and executive authorities could represent and work for the people as fair as possible. This is the basic idea of the historical division of powers which, variously modified or pure, as the security of democracy, was adopted by the majority... [to full text]

O fenômeno do ativismo jurisdicional tem como causa a crise do direito. Uma releitura do tema a partir de uma perspectiva existencial permite concluir que sua origem assenta-se na perda do sentido da ocupação e preocupação do homem em relação ao direito. Esta crise articula-se, grosso modo, em dois níveis distintos. De um lado, pelo desgaste do modelo de racionalização contido na proposta da tripartição de poderes de Montesquieu; de outro, na perda do sentido do direito como forma de controle social no processo de incorporação da armação da técnica. Diante da anomia do legislador e do Estado aos desafios atuais em torno do direito, presencia-se, na atualidade, o aumento do ativismo jurisdicional na definição do conteúdo do direito continental. Dentro das possibilidades abertas no horizonte da experiência histórica, a evolução do direito continental permite constatar que esta se formou e perpetua-se a partir dos conceitos antagônicos de mutabilidade (em ajuste às necessidades da evolução da sociedade), mas também de segurança jurídica (representada pela norma posta). Um aumento do ativismo jurisdicional que pretenda preservar a experiência da tradição do direito continental exige que a ocupação e preocupação em torno do Direito se deem em aderência à experiência compartilhada dentro do mundo das vivências e no fino equilíbrio dos conceitos de normas sociais e de garantia, sem o que, no extremo da projeção do Dasein no horizonte de sua injunção social, teríamos inevitavelmente um processo de ruptura conceitual da experiência do Direito ou a anulação do Dasein perante o Direito. / The phenomenon of the jurisdictional activism is caused by the crisis of law. A re-reading of the theme from an existential perspective allows for the conclusion that its origin is based on the loss of mans care and concern sense regarding the law. Broadly, this crisis articulates in two distinct levels. On one side, by the rationalization model exhaustion contained in the tripartite division of powers proposed by Montesquieu; on the other side, in the loss of law sense as a way of social control in the incorporation process of the frame of the technique. As a consequence of the anomy of the legislature branch and the State to the current challenges around the law, the increase of the jurisdictional activism in the definition of the continental law content can be contemporarily noticed. Within the possibilities opened in the historical experience scope, the evolution of the continental law allows for the observation that it was formed and continues from the antagonistic concepts of mutability (adjusted to the evolution needs of the society), but also of legal security (represented by the rule provided for). An increase of the jurisdictional activism intending to preserve the experience of the continental law tradition requires that the care and concern concerning the law comply with the experience shared within the world of experiences and in the fine balance of the social rules and guarantee concepts, without which, in the extreme of the Dasein projection in the scope of its social injunction, we would inevitably have a process of conceptual rupture of the law experience or annulment of Dasein before the law.

A Constituição Federal de 1988 inseriu no ordenamento jurídico uma série de direitos e garantias fundamentais. Dentre eles, pode-se citar a divisão de poderes, a qual distribuiu no texto constitucional o papel de cada ente estatal, sobretudo, para o presente estudo, a função relativa ao Judiciário. Nesse esteio, pode-se afirmar que tanto as normas promulgadas no período pós 1988, como as que foram recebidas pelo novo ordenamento, passaram a ser analisadas sob o espectro do prisma principiológico. As normas procedimentais e processuais coordenam os trilhos da aplicação do Direito ao caso concreto e a formação do Direito para o caso abstrato. No entanto, há que se mitigar toda aplicabilidade ordinária pelo tempero dos princípios. Essa pesquisa terá como guia a colisão entre os princípios processuais da efetividade e da instrumentalidade em face do devido processo legal. Tem-se por premissa que o percurso do devido processo deve servir como ferramenta para a busca pela decisão final de mérito e consequente pacificação social. Caso contrário, em nada serviria todo o aparato do judiciário disponibilizado para a população. Desse modo, o presente estudo propõe uma análise sobre a atuação do Estado-Juiz no que tange ao ativismo processual. Diante do objetivo maior, qual seja a necessidade de efetivação dos direitos fundamentais e sociais, o fenômeno do ativismo judicial às vezes esquecido, às vezes exacerbado, se mostra como ferramenta necessária no contexto destacado. / The Federal Constitutional of 1988 introduces at the legal system a series of fundamental rights and guarantees. Among them, its significant the division of powers, which distributed in the Constitution the role of each state entity, above all, for this study, the judiciary function. Thus, it can be said that both the rules promulgated in the period after 1988 as those received by the new system, have been analyzed through the principles spectrum prism. The procedural rules coordinate the application of law to the cases and the creation of law for abstract case. However, it is necessary to mitigate any regular applicability with the principles orientation. This research tries are the collision between the procedural principles of effectiveness and instrumentality in the face of due process of law. As premised the route of due process should serve as a tool to the final decision and consequent social peace. Otherwise, it would be unnecessary the entire legal apparatus available to the public. Lastly, this study proposes an analysis about the performance of the Judge-State regarding the judicial activism. Looking to a larger goal, the need for enforcement of fundamental and social rights, the judicial activism phenomenon sometimes forgotten, sometimes exacerbated, shown itself as a necessary tool in the context highlighted.

A Constituição Federal de 1988 inseriu no ordenamento jurídico uma série de direitos e garantias fundamentais. Dentre eles, pode-se citar a divisão de poderes, a qual distribuiu no texto constitucional o papel de cada ente estatal, sobretudo, para o presente estudo, a função relativa ao Judiciário. Nesse esteio, pode-se afirmar que tanto as normas promulgadas no período pós 1988, como as que foram recebidas pelo novo ordenamento, passaram a ser analisadas sob o espectro do prisma principiológico. As normas procedimentais e processuais coordenam os trilhos da aplicação do Direito ao caso concreto e a formação do Direito para o caso abstrato. No entanto, há que se mitigar toda aplicabilidade ordinária pelo tempero dos princípios. Essa pesquisa terá como guia a colisão entre os princípios processuais da efetividade e da instrumentalidade em face do devido processo legal. Tem-se por premissa que o percurso do devido processo deve servir como ferramenta para a busca pela decisão final de mérito e consequente pacificação social. Caso contrário, em nada serviria todo o aparato do judiciário disponibilizado para a população. Desse modo, o presente estudo propõe uma análise sobre a atuação do Estado-Juiz no que tange ao ativismo processual. Diante do objetivo maior, qual seja a necessidade de efetivação dos direitos fundamentais e sociais, o fenômeno do ativismo judicial às vezes esquecido, às vezes exacerbado, se mostra como ferramenta necessária no contexto destacado. / The Federal Constitutional of 1988 introduces at the legal system a series of fundamental rights and guarantees. Among them, its significant the division of powers, which distributed in the Constitution the role of each state entity, above all, for this study, the judiciary function. Thus, it can be said that both the rules promulgated in the period after 1988 as those received by the new system, have been analyzed through the principles spectrum prism. The procedural rules coordinate the application of law to the cases and the creation of law for abstract case. However, it is necessary to mitigate any regular applicability with the principles orientation. This research tries are the collision between the procedural principles of effectiveness and instrumentality in the face of due process of law. As premised the route of due process should serve as a tool to the final decision and consequent social peace. Otherwise, it would be unnecessary the entire legal apparatus available to the public. Lastly, this study proposes an analysis about the performance of the Judge-State regarding the judicial activism. Looking to a larger goal, the need for enforcement of fundamental and social rights, the judicial activism phenomenon sometimes forgotten, sometimes exacerbated, shown itself as a necessary tool in the context highlighted.