Patent trolls have changed the innovation and patent policy landscape. This thesis is an empirical event study that focuses on two landmark cases of patent troll litigation, RIM v. NTP and eBay v. Mercexchange, to determine whether pro-troll litigation outcomes significantly impact the market values of the firms in the high-tech industries they target. I find that the Supreme Court ruling in eBay v. Mercexchange did seem to significantly impact a proportion of firms in the market. The decisive factors in distinguishing affected vs. unaffected firms include a firm's R&D to Sales ratio, market value, and NAICS code specification.

近年來在美國有一種”新興產業”崛起，部份非專利權實施者NPE，專門尋找實際生產商品或提供服務的知名企業為對象，以提出專利侵權訴訟的方式，加上持有法院核發之禁制令，威脅被告以達到強迫授權或合解的目的，一般稱之為「Patent Trolls」。 按專利制度的二大政策目標，一為提供發明人發明的誘因，一為鼓勵發明人揭露其發明技術內容，而Patent Trolls投機性授權模式所造成的問題，是否會破壞專利法之立法目的，而降低企業投資創新研發的誘因，乃值得觀注且為有待解決的議題。 故本文之主要目的乃從美國與台灣之專利改革與實務判決，探討Patent Trolls之解決之道。 / Recently there is a “new industry” in the U.S., some NPEs brought patent infringement suits against famous enterprises, which manufacture product or supply service and threatened with injunction, commonly called “Patent Trolls”. Among the two policy objects of patent law, one is giving the inducement to invent, the other is encourage inventors to disclose their inventions. Whether the problems caused by the opportunistic licensing models of Patent Trolls would cause damage to the object of patent law and decrease the driving force to invent of the enterprises is an issue worth observing and solving. Consequently, the object of this thesis is to discuss the solution of the Patent Trolls issues in light of Patent Reform and cases in the U.S. and Taiwan.

懲罰性賠償金為英美法傳統下之制度，其目的在於以超越實際損害數額之賠償金，制裁主觀惡性程度特別重大之侵權人，與一般用以填補損害之補償性賠償金有本質上之差異。昔日多適用於被害人尊嚴遭嚴重侵犯之案件，然隨現代經濟社會之發展，亦漸用於處罰公司法人、制裁經濟犯罪。 我國侵權行為法主要繼受德國之體系，以損害填補為原則，故僅於特定領域之立法中承認懲罰性賠償金制度。現行專利法採取懲罰性賠償金之立法例，而目前經濟部之修法草案則擬廢除。 本研究首先介紹美國法發展趨勢、實務重要案例與晚近之專利改革法案，歸納其趨勢為「嚴格限制故意侵權之構成、提高專利權人舉證責任、限縮懲罰性賠償金之適用範圍」；其次，以實證方式分析台灣智慧財產法院歷年相關之判決結果，認為實務運作有「大多數請求懲罰性賠償金之案例，連侵權責任都尚未構成，有請求浮濫、逼迫被告和解之嫌」、「法院認定侵權人故意，實質上往往僅論及侵權人『知悉系爭專利存在』即可，相較於現行法標準實過於寬鬆」；最後，綜合美國法發展趨勢、我國實務情形、懲罰性賠償金功能論與法律經濟分析觀點，認為我國尚不宜廢除專利侵權懲罰性賠償金制度，惟應將其限縮適用於「搭便車」與「專利有效性毋需再確認」之故意侵權情形，以降低社會研發成本、賦與從事研發者挑戰垃圾專利之機會，方切合專利法促進研發之本旨。 / Punitive damages, a traditional system under the common law, aims to sanction those infringers having substantially subjective malice by awarding enhanced damages beyond the actual damages. It is naturally different from compensatory damages. Punitive damages were originally used to dealing with serious violations of the victims’ dignity of the cases. With the development of economic society, this system was gradually used to punishing corporations and sanctioning economic crimes. Since Taiwanese tort laws are mainly inherited from German laws, which only permit plaintiffs claiming for compensatory damages. Punitive damages were only adopted in several specific kinds of tort laws, as in the patent law. However, the provision of punitive damages was revoked in the current patent reform act drafted by Ministry of Economic Affairs. This study starts out by introducing the trend of American law, the essential practical cases, and the recent patent reform acts. It concludes the trend to have the following three characteristics: 1. Strictly limit the constitution of willful infringement; 2. Increase patentee’s burden of proof; and 3. Restrict the scope of awarding punitive damages. The study then empirically analyzes the related judgments of Taiwan Intellectual Property Count over the years. It finds that in majority of the cases claiming punitive damages, most plaintiffs can even not to prove that defendants have infringed their patents, yet force defendants to settle. Also, the court in Taiwan usually award patentees punitive damages loosely only if they can prove that infringers had known the existence of the patent . This phenomenon makes the standard in practice not strict as the standard in law. Lastly, this study sums up the aspects from the development trend of American patent law, current practice in Taiwan, the theory of punitive damages function, and economic analysis of law, and finds that it would be inappropriate to revoke the provision of punitive damages in patent infringement cases. This study suggests that punitive damages should be awarded only in two types of willful infringement: 1. when the defendant is a “free rider, or 2. when the validity of the patent need not be challenged anymore. This way, it may lower the cost of research and development, give developers more chance to challenge junk patents, and finally reach the purpose of patent law – encourage innovation.