This project is an analytical and comprehensive study of the music of Venezuelan composer Paul Desenne, concentrating on his sonata, 'Jaguar Songs' for cello solo, written in the year 2002. The sonata, 'Jaguar Songs,' was written for French cellist Iseut Chuat and received the premiere performance by the composer Paul Desenne the following year in London. This sonata is a perfect tool for understanding Desenne's work and what I call his musical hybridization, which I consider to be a groundbreaking compositional style that will shape not only Venezuela's, but also Latin America's musical identity. After several personal interviews with the composer, I was able to deepen my understanding of his work. In the following pages I have analyzed 'Jaguar Songs' for cello solo and explained the influences and characteristics of Desenne's music.

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The problem of this investigation is the combining of the spatial concepts of Paul Cezanne and the Analytical Cubists in a single painting.

Gal. 3:10-14 is still one of the most controversial and challenging passages in Paul's letters. The logic of Paul's rhetoric is that which mainly baffles. Study of this text has been hampered by an inadequate appreciation of the ranges of possible meanings, at all semantic levels. We seek to redress this lack m chapter 2. We survey the science of logic. We discover overlooked semantic possibilities for three key word-groups in Paul's rhetoric. and could be "discourse" lexical concepts. By Paul very possibly intends "accomplishments" rather than "endeavour." Chapter 3 finds the indicated senses Paul’s. Effectively multiplying our data via sociolinguistic cognizance that identical words may denote different "realities" for speaker and hearer, we discover that Paul's usage implies a three-fold working semantic hypothesis: For Paul "faith" believes in a covenantal condition besides itself, namely obedience (endeavour to fulfil God's commands); Paul is basically denying that justification depends upon any particular amount of accomplishment of God’s commands; and the issue Paul is addressing is not that of die true means of justification, but that of the true meaning of ("righteousness" and thereby of) "justification" in the context of God’s covenant. The remainder of the thesis confirms and elaborates this overall meaning for Gal. 3:10-14. In verse 10 Paul points out that logically those who hold to the theory of "justification" have circumstances which contradict that theory; thus he is arguing by a "circumstantial" ad hominem type of argument. In verses 11-12 he circumstantially undermines his opponents' "accomplishments" righteousness-criterion by its incompatibility with Hab. 2:4. In verses 13-14, the "rescue" works entirely by causa cognoscendi: it is not a means of propitiation or repayment, either for man or for God. Our findings support our hypothesis.

Thesis advisor: Thomas D. Stegman / Thesis advisor: Christopher R. Matthews / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

In this thesis, I make the following case. (1) While instances of the imago Dei in biblical and second-temple Jewish sources are diverse and pluriform, they are nonetheless illuminating for Paul's imago Dei theology. (2) However, this theology is best explained on the hypothesis that Paul, like Philo and the author of Wisdom, made use of ‘intermediary speculation' in which the kosmos came into being via an intermediary ‘figure': in the latter's case sophia and/or the logos and in Paul's case the pre-existent Jesus. (3) In this connection, while the resources of the Jewish wisdom tradition (e.g. Prov. 8; Sir. 1; 24; 1 En. 42; Wis. 7; and Bar. 3–4) did not provide Paul with the precision afforded by the ‘prepositional metaphysics' of the philosophical tradition (cf. 1 Cor. 8.6; and Col. 1.15–20; cp. John 1.3, 10; and Heb. 1.2), the general contours of that tradition—in which sophia attended to the creation, maintenance and salvation of the kosmos—were appreciated and appropriated in Paul's imago Dei theology. (4) Beyond this, a few features of Paul's imago Dei theology—especially his collocation of εἰκών (‘image') and πρωτότοκος (‘firstborn') (cf. Rom. 8.29; and Col. 1.15) and his ‘teleological' construal of the imago Dei conception, in which Jesus serves as the archetypal ‘image' to which believers will ultimately be conformed (2 Cor. 3.18; Rom. 8.29; cp. Phil. 3.21)—strongly suggest that Paul was here influenced (directly or indirectly) by Middle Platonic intermediary doctrine. (5) On the basis of points (2) through (4), therefore, it is wisdom christology, rather than Adam (and/or ‘imperial') christology, which serves as the principal background of Paul's ‘image christology'. This ‘image christology', furthermore, in which Jesus serves as the protological and cosmogonical image of God, is an instance of ‘christological monotheism'. In this regard, Jesus is included in the one activity (creation) which most clearly demarcates the ‘unique divine identity' in second-temple Jewish thought. (6) Finally, my argument concerning the way in which Paul adapts certain features of the philosophical imago Dei tradition encourages a fresh reading of two major Pauline texts: 2 Corinthians 2.17–4.6; and Colossians 1.15–20; 3.10. In these texts, I contend, Paul casts essentially inner-Jewish debates in philosophical dress. While the substantive issues are ‘inner-Jewish' issues, Paul presents his opponents and/or opposing views as bound up with a futile and/or deceitful philosophy, while he presents himself and his sympathisers as people who attain to the telos of true philosophy: the image of God (2 Cor. 3.18; and Col. 3.10; cp. Rom. 8.29).