Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att ur ett ledningsperspektiv undersöka vilka belöningssystem småsom gare nämnde nämnde prestation. hur vi kommer in på just ett belöningssystem som främjar. lvis kopplingen emellan prestation företag använder och jämföra detta med företagens tillväxt och de anställdas prestation. Metod: Metoden använder en tvärsnittsdesign med induktiv karaktär. Primärdata består av kvalitativa intervjuer som kombineras med en kvantitativ enkätundersökning ur ett  företagsledarperspektiv. Urvalet baseras på företagens storlek, år de grundades samt  bransch. TeoriUppsatsskribenterna avser att använda agentteorin, Hertzbergs tvåfaktorteori, teorier kring belöningssystem och motivationsteorier som uppsatsen teoretisk ramverk. Resultat: Resultatet visar att fast lön och prestationsbelöningar är mest använt. De anställdas prestation har en avgörande roll för hur företaget presterar. Rörlig lön i form av provision och bonus är det som anses motivera de anställda mest till att prestera och företag med hög tillväxt föredrar prestationsbelöning. Analys: Belöningssystem måste vara kopplat till företagens målsättningar för att främja ett  företags prestation. Eftersom detta innebär att anställda då styrs att arbeta mot  företagsmålet. Slutsatser: En kombination av rörlig lön och fast lön verkar flest företagsledare att föredra när det gäller att främja ett företags prestation. Detta förutsatt att de är tydligt kopplade till  företagets mål. Företagsledare har olika belöningssystem för olika anställda inom företaget. / Purpose: From a managerial perspective examine which reward systems small Swedish businesses are using and compare it to the companies growth and  the employers work performance. Methodology: The method used a cross-sectional design with an inductive standpoint. Primary data is conducted with qualitative interviews combined with a structured survey study from the managers’ point of view. The selection is based on the companies’ number of employees, year of startup and type of business. Theory: The authors used theoretical models such as Agent theory, Herzberg two-factor theory, Reward system theory and motivation theories. Results: The result shows that salaried and pay-for-performance systems are used the most. The employees’ achievements determine how well the company is going to preform. Pay-for-performance in the matter of commission and bonus is what motivates the employees most to perform and high performance companies prefers pay-for-performance. Analysis: The reward system must correlate with the companies’ goals in order to control that the employee works in the same direction as the company. Conclusion: A combination of pay-for-performance and salaried wage seems to be most preferred by managers, to the extent that the rewards are explicitly correlated to the companies’ goals. Managers use different reward systems for varies employees within the companies.

Cette thèse s’intéresse à plusieurs questions posées par l’introduction et la généralisation, en France, d’incitatifs économiques de type P4P appliqués à la médecine générale. Ces schémas incitatifs (CAPI, ROSP) ont pour objectif d’améliorer la qualité des soins, mais ils sont débattus en termes d’efficience et d’effets indésirables potentiels. Dans un premier temps, nous évaluons l’impact du CAPI sur différents indicateurs de la qualité des soins : la durée de la consultation et le dépistage des cancers. Puis, nous étudions les modalités d’une meilleure implication du médecin généraliste (MG) dans le dépistage des cancers, en appliquant la méthodologie des choix discrets. Enfin, nous analysons la relation entre motivations intrinsèques et extrinsèques des MGs français. Nous montrons que le CAPI n’a pas eu d’impact significatif sur les indicateurs de qualité considérés et que les MGs seraient sensibles à d’autres dispositifs non monétaires potentiellement moins coûteux. Enfin, nous mettons en évidence une relation de substituabilité entre motivations intrinsèques et extrinsèques. Ces résultats invitent à davantage de prudence dans la définition des incitatifs économiques en médecine générale. / This thesis addresses several issues raised by the introduction in France of economic incentives such as pay-For-Performance applied to general practice. These incentive schemes are designed to improve the quality of care, but they are discussed both in terms of effectiveness and potential side effects. Initially, we assess the impact of the CAPI scheme on various indicators of quality of care: the consultation length and cancers screening. Then, using the discrete choice experiment methodology, we reveal general practitioners (GPs) preferences for devices aimed at improving the early detection of cancers. Finally, we analyse empirically the relationship between French GPs' intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. We show that the CAPI has not had a significant impact on the selected quality indicators. In addition, GPs would be sensitive to potentially less costly nonmonetary devices. Eventually, we highlight a negative relationship between GPs' intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Our results call for greater caution in the definition of economic incentives in general practice.

In this thesis, I apply the sophisticated tools made available by the econometrics of panel data and treatment models to a range of different issues. In the first Chapter, an ECM model is used to test on the existence of financing constraints in firms’ investment and R&D, taken a proxy for the efficiency of market institutions and governance rules in different countries. In the second chapter we test an agency model linking pay-performance contracts of CEOS to the financial situation of a firm by using a UK panel data. In the third chapter I use a sophisticated treatment model to evaluate the effectiveness of Italian public subsidies to R&D. Finally, in the fourth chapter I try to evaluate the efficiency of Italian regional systems of public healthcare by controlling for socio-economic factors and quality of healthcare in a composite model using panel data estimation and efficient frontier techniques.<p>The first Chapter analyzes the investment behavior of a sample of R&D intensive firms which are quoted on the stock market from USA, UK and Japan for the period 1990-1998. By using an error correction model we test the elasticity of investment and R&D to cash flow in these countries to see by which measure different market institutions and corporate governance rules affects the cost of external financing. Contrary to previous studies, we find significant differences in the sensitivity to cash flow of the two types of investment, with R&D expenditure being much less sensitive than ordinary investment. This is not surprising given the more long-term nature of R&D expenditures. For what concerns the comparison between the different systems/countries, the USA stock markets confirms as the most efficient market providing outside financing at a much lower cost compared to other markets, especially for young, smaller firms.<p>The second Chapter is a joint work with Biagio Speciale. It uses the data on a panel of quoted UK firms over the period 1995–2002 to study the effects of financial leverage on managerial compensation. The change in the investors’ expectations that caused the recent collapse of the stock market tech bubble is a perfect example of natural experiment that has been used as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in the firm’s debt. The estimates show that pay-for-performance sensitivity is increasing in financial leverage, with the exception of the 10% most levered firms, giving rise at the end to a non-linear (inverted U-shape) relationship between the two variables. The chapter includes also a theoretical model accounting for this relationship where an higher leverage increases both the expected returns and the expected variance of investment returns: the first effect (determining increased pay-performance sensitivity) prevails for low leverage values and the second effect (determining decreased pay-performance sensitivity) prevails for high leverage values.<p>The third Chapter undertakes an empirical estimation of the additionality of public funding on both the propensity to initiate R&D activity and the intensity of R&D spending of Italian enterprises for the period 1998-2000, using data from the Third Community Innovation Survey and from firms' financial accounts. The chosen methodology (Endogenous Switching Type II-Tobit) takes into account the possibility that decisions about both starting an R&D activity (sample selection effect) and applying for/obtaining public funding (essential heterogeneity) are influenced by private knowledge of enterprises' idiosyncratic propensities in R&D spending. The present analysis shows that both these effects are indeed important and that they contribute to explain most of the additionality found with less sophisticated models.<p>The fourth Chapter investigates the underlying causes of variability of public health expenditure per capita (SSPC henceforth) between Italian regions. A fixed-effect panel data estimate on the SSPC (for the period 1997-2006) is used in the first part of the paper to account for regional differences in terms of physical, demographic, socio-economic characteristics and in terms of other variables that affect demand and supply of health services. In the second part, we take the ‘adjusted’ SSPC and proceed to estimate an "efficient production function" of the quality of health services through Data Envelopment Analysis. This procedure allows us to separate the share of expenditure used for the improvement of the quality from the one that can be traced only to an inefficient use of financial resources. A comparison of regional SSPC after factoring out the socio-economic factors and the quality of healthcare shows that big differences still remain and are even exacerbated, signalling big pockets of inefficiency and correspondingly a huge potential for cost savings. Finally, a preliminary analysis shows a positive correlation between the efficiency of regional public spending in healthcare and the level of social capital. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished