Prior studies on the impact of the termination of overfunded defined benefit pension plans on shareholders' wealth have produced conflicting findings. The first study on the stock market reaction to pension plan termination was conducted by Alderson and Chen (1986); this study claimed that shareholders realize significant positive abnormal returns around the termination announcement date. A more recent study, by Moore and Pruitt (1990), disclaimed the findings of Alderson and Chen. Reexamination of these two studies with additional evidence and the use of the appropriate announcement date suggests that termination of pension plans is associated with significant wealth gain to shareholders. This study also analyzes samples from periods prior to and after the imposition in 1986 of a 10 percent excise tax on recaptured excess pension assets. The empirical results suggest that shareholders experience significant positive wealth effects for the pre-tax (1980-85) period and no wealth effects for the post-tax (1986-88) period. The primary purpose of this study is to determine the impact of stock market reaction upon shareholders' wealth under the partial anticipation hypothesis. The pre-tax sample is analyzed by isolating the expected terminators using the multiple discriminant analysis model. This study finds significant positive abnormal returns only for firms that are not anticipated by the investors as potential terminators. The results of this study do not lend support to either the "separation" or the "integration" hypothesis as proposed by Alderson and Chen (1986). Instead, the results are consistent with the information hypothesis that the market reacts to unanticipated events that provide new information. Cross-sectional regression analysis of unexpected terminators suggests that the abnormal performance of stocks of pension terminating firms is explained by the firms' debt ratio and the amount of surplus pension assets. It can be inferred that firms may resort to recapturing excess pension assets as a way of financing investments internally when faced with unfavorable credit markets.

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2015 / Section 37C of the Pension Funds Act was introduced primarily to ensure that death benefits are paid in accordance with the object of the Act and government policy. Its purpose is to make sure that the dependants of the deceased member are not left destitute upon the death of the member. In order to achieve this, the death benefits are placed under the control of the trustees who are tasked with the duty to distribute the benefits equitably among the beneficiaries. According to this section, death benefits do not form part of the deceased’s estate and as a result a beneficiary under the last will and testament of the deceased is not necessarily a beneficiary under section 37C of the Act. The board of trustees will consider a person as a beneficiary if the deceased member has nominated such a person in a valid nomination form. This section therefore overrides the deceased’s freedom of testation because the board of trustees are not bound by the deceased’s wishes as completed in the nomination form. A nomination form is one of the factors which the trustees have to consider in the exercise of their discretion to make an equitable distribution.

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2013 / The study will analyse section 37C of the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956. This section limits the deceased’s freedom of testate by placing the death benefits and the control of the board of trustees who are tasked to distribute such benefits equitably among the dependants and nominees of the deceased. Section 37C of the Act was enacted to protect dependency by ensuring that the dependants of the deceased are not left in destitute. In order to achieve this, three duties are placed on the board of trustees namely, to identify the dependants and nominees of the deceased member; to effect an equitable distribution of the benefit among the beneficiaries; and to determine an appropriate mode of payment. This section sees to all the interest of the dependants without discriminating consequently there are three classes of dependants that are created under section 37C namely; legal dependants, non-legal dependants, and future dependants.

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2013 / The study will analyse section 37C of the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956. This section limits the deceased’s freedom of testate by placing the death benefits and the control of the board of trustees who are tasked to distribute such benefits equitably among the dependants and nominees of the deceased. Section 37C of the Act was enacted to protect dependency by ensuring that the dependants of the deceased are not left in destitute. In order to achieve this, three duties are placed on the board of trustees namely, to identify the dependants and nominees of the deceased member; to effect an equitable distribution of the benefit among the beneficiaries; and to determine an appropriate mode of payment. This section sees to all the interest of the dependants without discriminating consequently there are three classes of dependants that are created under section 37C namely; legal dependants, non-legal dependants, and future dependants.