No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 284-294) and index.

This thesis provides an original reading of Heidegger's 1929-30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Currently, the notoriety of FCM stems from controversy surrounding its description of human beings as 'world-forming,' and of animals as comparatively 'poor in world.' These propositions are interpreted within the secondary literature as a reinforcement of ontotheological and humanistic metaphysics. However, this standard interpretation misses the more complex and subtle significance of this material in the broader context of the lectures. I argue that Heidegger's 'comparative examination' forms part of a wider metaphysical project of interrogating a contemporary 'delusion,' a metaphysical division drawn between 'life' and 'spirit' engendered by an 'anthropological' worldview which pictures man as a composite of those two elements. Heidegger traces the manifestations of this delusion in Kulturphilosophie and biology, before attempting to recover a more genuinely metaphysical attitude, one founded not on anthropocentric 'worldviews' but on a direct, courageous 'confrontation' with ourselves. Heidegger argues that this confrontation must take its orientation from Greek thought, in which man is interpreted as that part of physis that apprehends physis as a whole. For Heidegger, this notion of the human as a kind of 'meta-physical' being enables us to grasp the coextensive essence of the human and of metaphysics. I argue that Heidegger's position can be extended and enriched if we consider it in conjunction with what he presents in the lecture course as one of its great adversaries; for the German tradition of philosophical anthropology, rather than being a straightforward articulation of the life-spirit divide that Heidegger wishes to eschew, actually harmonises with and deepens Heidegger's reflections in FCM concerning the nature of the human as a meta-physical being.

Different stimuli have been used for doing philosophy with children (P4C/PwC), either specially designed for this reason, such as Matthew Lipman's novels or not, such as picture-books and works of art. Nevertheless, there is a gap in justifying philosophically the role of stimuli with in the context of the theory and practice of a philosophical community of inquiry. This gap is the subject of my conceptual research which aims at constructing a theory of what a stimulus is and its particular role within a philosophical inquiry. In this thesis, philosophy is viewed as a way of life that contains both, generative and evaluative aspects and it is explored how it links with the epistemological presuppositions of philosophy with children. The nature of the stimulus is explained in a more pragmatic framework and it is fully distinguished from behavioristical use. It is argued that a stimulus is suitable for doing philosophy with children if the engagement of individuals with it generates catalepsy (a sense of grasping) and moments of epiphany, that can lead to Eros for further inquiry. It is claimed that this is possible when the narrative structure of the stimuli matches with the narrative understanding of the individual when engaging with the stimulus. Zymotic thinking, a new term introduced in this thesis which refers to a mixture of critical, creative and emotional thinking that matures through a fermentative process in time is a way to explain how stimuli are linked with philosophy as a way of life with generative and evaluative aspects. Consequences of zymotic thinking such as mapping of individuals' experiences, activating self-corrective thinking and adopting diatheses of openness and alertness are introduced as ways that explain how stimuli are linked with philosophy are also used to explain the connection between the stimuli and philosophy. The philosophical points of this thesis are illustrated and supported further by: a) empirical examples of philosophical inquiries with children and adults, b) the reflective analysis of existing stimuli for doing philosophy with children and stimuli that came from children's experiences, and c) the offering of a sample of the author's stories that could be used as stimuli for doing philosophy with children.

The purpose of this study was to define Philosophical Counselling (PC) or, more specifically, PC as practised in South Africa. This was done through allowing South African philosophical counsellors to tell their stories about PC. The epistemological framework was that of social constructionism. The study involved a series of in-depth interviews with three South African philosophical counsellors. The major themes that emerged from the participants’ stories seemed to centre around: the existential need for the other; the conceptual need for the other; engaging with the other methodically; and caring for the other. While their stories largely resonate with current and overwhelmingly European and North American conceptions of PC, they also seem to provide a uniquely South African impetus to revise these conceptions. Moreover, the findings of this study may facilitate a dialogue between philosophical counsellors and their colleagues in related professions, especially psychotherapists. / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)

The main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague objects and to imprecise designation. Evans's argument concerning indeterminate-identity statements is often regarded as a proof that vague objects cannot exist. In chapter I I try to argue that the argument may be refuted by vague objects theorists. In chapter II I present various accounts of what indeterminate identity between objects may consist in and three different characteristics of it. I argue that there are objects whose identity is indeterminate and that such indeterminacy is ontic in the sense that it concerns individuation and spatio-temporal boundaries of objects. I also formulate the argument showing that (independently of Evans's argument) terms designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators. Chapter III is devoted to problems concerning vagueness and identity-over-time. The indeterminate answer to the questions concerning diachronic identity in puzzling cases can be regarded as the correct response by both endurantists and perdurantists. However, while for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence conditions is a conceptual matter, for endurantists it deserves the name of "ontic vagueness". Chapter IV focuses on questions concerning vagueness and identity-at-a-time. I offer a new solution to the problem of the many, according to which in each case in which the problem arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one (vague) object present. The problem arises because each such object has many precisifications, which nevertheless have no ontological significance. I also propose a new account of what it takes for an object to be vague. Chapter V deals with indeterminate identity in the domain of quanta. The first part investigates the various problems concerning identity and individuation of quantum particles, whereas the second part is devoted to analysis and critique of E. J. Lowe's example of alleged indeterminate identity-over-time between electrons.

Ce projet, sous le contrôle et la responsabilité de M. le Pr. Carlos Lévy, Professeur de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, et de M. le Pr. Emidio Spinelli, professeur à l’Université de Rome La Sapienza, se propose comme objectif un travail approfondi, critique et comparatif des études de philosophie ancienne ayant Socrate comme sujet, en France et en Italie, entre 1900 et 1950. Il ne s'agit pas de poursuivre une coincidentia oppositorum, mais d'analyser une polarité dialogique en mouvement perpétuel et une altérité qui s’enrichit de la prise de conscience des différences spécifiques. Quatre leitmotive guident l'analyse des onze représentations socratiques: La Politique, introduite par un paragraphe sur Socrate et la ville d'Athènes et suivie par les interprétations de Léon Robin et George Bastide; l'Ethique, qui concerne la valeur morale du message de Socrate, développé par Antonio anfi, Jean Patocka et Piero Martinetti; la Religion, sur le problème de son « évangile avant la lettre », traité par Jean André Festugière, Michele Federico Sciacca, Ernesto Buonaiuti et Carlo Mazzantini; et le Dialegesthai, car sa façon de dialoguer devient fondamental dans les interprétations de Guido Calogero et Giuseppe Rensi. / Under the direction of Professor Carlos Lévy (Sorbonne University) and Professor Emidio Spinelli (Rome University) this dissertation provides a critical comparative study of ancient philosophy. It focuses on the perception of Socrates’s work in France and Italy between 1900 and 1950. Rather than limiting the analysis to the unity of opposites, the goal consists of exploring the perpetual, dynamic polarity inherent in the dialogue. Moreover, this study aims at emphasizing the contrast that is fueled by a growing awareness of the underlying differences. Four leitmotive guide the work of eleven Socratic representations: First, La Politique, which is introduced by a paragraph on Socrate et la ville d’Athenes and followed by the works of Léon Robin and George Bastide. Second, Etique, which focuses on the moral value of Socrates’ discourse and which is developed by Antionio Banfi, Jean Patocka and Piero Martinetti. Third, Religion, which deals with the issue of his “gospel before the written word,” discussed by Jean André Festugière, Michele Federico Sciacca, Ernesto Buonaiuti etCarlo Mazzantini. And last, Dialegesthai, because its way of communicating becomes fundamental in the works of Guido Calogero and Giuseppe Rensi.

D.Litt. et Phil. / The aim of this research was to examine the nature of the western self, using a grounded theory approach. The life narratives of a group of mid-life women were analysed utilising the method outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1990) and the data provided fertile ground for the development of a substantive theory of the self. In the past, midlife was considered a part of old age. Changes in western society have meant that midlife has become a significant life period. An examination of the nature of selfhood in historical periods as well as in Prehistory constituted the literature review. Modern and Postmodern approaches to the self were also examined. For the participants, the self occupied the area between identity and soul. The participants considered the soul to be the core of the individual. Identity was described in terms of gender, physical appearance as well as date and place of birth. Closely allied to the soul is said to be the individual value system. The participants regarded the self as having certain features including cognitive, affective, spiritual and physical components as well as unconscious elements. Moreover, the self is dynamic and has an inherent directorial capacity based particularly on individual thinking and feeling components. The substantive theory of the self suggests that the self constitutes a sense of existence resulting from conscious awareness of inherent personal capacity and awareness of the immediate present, personal past and projected future. The purpose of the self is to promote the survival of the individual. The core of the self is represented by the need to survive and is experienced as a feeling of continuity contained within the personal narrative. Survival is furthered by purposeful activity and the creation and development of meaning structures. The self rests on inter-related physical, cognitive, emotional-affective pillars, and responds to environmental currents. Thus the self is essentially a process and is given the feeling of form through the narrative capacity inherent in the individual. The self is situated in a self-space created by the interrelationship of the physical, cognitive and affective components in relation to the environment. Today, mainly through technological developments, the self-space has increased in size, and greater demands are placed on the individual self.

Meister Eckhart understands that human beings are thrown into meaning, that we live out our lives in meaning and that the source of this meaning is beyond our understanding. We always have an understanding of the world in which we live but we do not determine this understanding and we do not have the ability to understand the source of this understanding. This is the basic principal of philosophical hermeneutics which we also find in the work of Heidegger and Gadamer. However, there did come a time when human beings became arrogant enough to view the world as ‘n collection of objects which can be fully and finally known by manking. During the age of enlightenment man understood himself as the source of meaning and asserted his power over understanding. This arrogance would not last long. During the nineteenth century scalars like Dilthey recognized the fundamental historicity of human being. Dilthey understood that man is bound to the meaning of his age. However, he could not reject the arrogance of the scientific worldview which staked a claim on the possibility of absolute knowledge. Thus he chose to carry this prejudice into the sphere of the human sciences and constructed a new foundation for man’s power over meaning. We who study hermeneutics enjoy praising Heidegger for his insight and contribution towards hermeneutics. It is said that Heidegger discovered the absolute finitude and historicity of human being. This may well be true, but it is a shame that scholars mostly ignore the contribution of Edmund Husserl. In this document I claim that it was Husserl who laid the foundation for the new movement in hermeneutics in Germany of which Heidegger and Gadamer has been the major exponents. In the words of Gadamer, this movement may be called “Philosophical Hermeneutics” since it does not only include a method for understanding but also encompasses a way of thinking about human being in general. In my view the current discourse on the origin and development of philosophical hermeneutics represents a great injustice since the philosophy of Husserl is neglected in this discourse. In this writing I shall try to rectify this injustice by illuminating the contribution that Husserl has made to philosophical hermeneutics. Firstly I will show that Husserl’s philosophy is fundamentally about meaning. In his early distributive psychology he struggles with the question of the origin of concepts. With his concept of intentionally he rejects the traditional ontology of the object in order to make place for the ontological integrity of meaning. Unlike his predecessors he claim that objects are determined by meaning instead of the other way around. In his transcendental phenomenology he goes a step further by proclaiming that the Ego is nothing but pure existence and that consciousness in nothing but he existence of meaning. These insights are easy to overlook due to Husserl’s obsession with epistemology. His philosophy is all but consistent. But it is especially by means of this inconsistency that Husserl makes his contribution to philosophical hermeneutics. We may compare Husserl with Moses. Like Moses he reaches the top of the mountain Sinai where he can look upon the Promised Land. But, unlike Moses, he turns his back on this new land and stares back at the desert of epistemology. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Philosophy / unrestricted

No description available.