Since Plato's time, there have been attempts to show that the generally altruistic way of life is superior to the totally selfish way of life. Drawing upon the conclusions of philosophers and social psychologists, I argue that it is better to have a fairly moral character than a totally selfish one. I first argue that it is possible to have genuinely altruistic motivations (rather than disguised selfish motivations). I then show that both the altruistic and the selfish way of life are genuine choices for rational beings. Next I argue that the nature of values is such that they require reinforcement from others in order for us to verify that what we believe to be values are indeed values. I further argue that values are unattainable for the totally selfish person. Subsequently, I point out that values are necessary for an agent to have a meaningful life, and very likely necessary for a human to be able to have a sense of self. Since most people desire to have a meaningful life and a sense of self, I argue that the benefits possible to the fairly moral person outweigh the benefits possible to the totally selfish one, even if the latter can disguise her selfishness completely. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy, 1975 / Includes bibliographical references. / by Ken Siegel. / Ph. D. / Philosophy

Thousands of women in Canada continue to be diagnosed every year with breast cancer, many undergoing surgical mastectomy as part of their treatment to eradicate or control the spread of disease. At present, the recommendation for breast conserving surgery (BCS) and breast reconstruction dominates discourse in oncological settings, limiting conversations about alternative options for women to consider following the removal of their breast(s). Interesting however is the decision, made by some women in contemporary society, to undertake unconventional practices such as being inscribed with tattoos where breasts once occupied space. Unfortunately, little is known about the experiences of women who have foregone reconstructive surgery and chose to be tattooed post mastectomy. A Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutic approach was used to explore the phenomenon of being tattooed post mastectomy. Six women with mastectomy tattoos were interviewed to learn about the experiences of being tattooed where breast(s) once occupied space. Participants in this study were between 48 and 65 years of age and tattooed from one month to five years after surgery. Meanings about being tattooed post mastectomy surfaced through conversation and photographs. Gadamer’s hermeneutic teachings were engaged to analyze women’s thoughts, feelings, and photographed images of participant tattoos, surfacing meaning about being tattooed where breasts once existed. To establish a passage for understanding, three publishable manuscripts constitute the body of the dissertation. The first manuscript presents my personal narrative [in part] of being diagnosed with breast cancer and undergoing a mastectomy without reconstruction. In the second manuscript, the socio-cultural context of why the mastectomized female body is considered abject in contemporary society is examined. Further, I explore how a mastectomy tattoo may be an emerging alternative for some women following the loss of their breasts(s). In the third manuscript the key interpretive discoveries through hermeneutic analysis of interviews and photographs are presented and include: (1) Feeling sad and damaged post mastectomy (2) Reclaiming self: Taking back power and control; and (3) Transformation: Embodying the tattoo as a novel representation of self. These interpretive findings suggest aesthetic options such as tattooing embolden participants to reclaim power and control lost to cancer and transformed their self perceptions of beauty, femininity, and sexual identity post mastectomy. This dissertation contributes to women’s health, specifically within the field of oncology by offering what I understand to be the first phenomenological study interpreting lived experiences of being tattooed post mastectomy. Understanding how women may feel sad and damaged following surgery opens avenues for empathetic questioning and therapeutic supports from nurses. Sharing experiences of women who found the process of designing and being tattooed transformational and empowering may introduce new options post mastectomy that include aesthetics and beauty. Gaining insight into this unique phenomenon can help make meaning about how aesthetic options such as tattooing can empower some women who may be searching for alternatives to breast reconstruction post mastectomy. Furthermore, challenging dominant discourses specific to how women’s bodies should look can create spaces for discursive conversations and optimistically expand options beyond those currently offered post mastectomy. / Graduate

The culminating philosophy and practice for Buddhist traditions in Tibet is what is found in tantra, or Vajrayāna. Yet Tibet is unique in the Buddhist world in that it is a place where not only the traditions of tantra are practiced, but where the epistemological traditions of valid cognition and what came to be known as Prāsangika-Madhyamaka also took root. This chapter briefly surveys a range of ways in which Madhyamaka is represented in Tibet. Madhyamaka takes the place of the highest philosophical view among Tibetan Buddhist sects, and seeing how different traditions formulate the view of Madhyamaka is an important part of understanding how these traditions relate to tantra and negotiate the relationship between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna. Vajrayāna in Tibet is pantheist to the core, for, in its most profound expressions all dualities between the divine and the world are radically undone.

The culminating philosophy and practice for Buddhist traditions in Tibet is what is found in tantra, or Vajrayāna. Yet Tibet is unique in the Buddhist world in that it is a place where not only the traditions of tantra are practiced, but where the epistemological traditions of valid cognition and what came to be known as Prāsangika-Madhyamaka also took root. This chapter briefly surveys a range of ways in which Madhyamaka is represented in Tibet. Madhyamaka takes the place of the highest philosophical view among Tibetan Buddhist sects, and seeing how different traditions formulate the view of Madhyamaka is an important part of understanding how these traditions relate to tantra and negotiate the relationship between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna. Vajrayāna in Tibet is pantheist to the core, for, in its most profound expressions all dualities between the divine and the world are radically undone.

Many philosophers have worried about what philosophy is. Often they have looked for answers by considering what it is that philosophers do. Given the diversity of topics and methods found in philosophy, however, we propose a different approach. In this article we consider the philosophical temperament, asking an alternative question: what are philosophers like? Our answer is that one important aspect of the philosophical temperament is that philosophers are especially reflective: they are less likely than their peers to embrace what seems obvious without questioning it. This claim is supported by a study of more than 4,000 philosophers and non-philosophers, the results of which indicate that even when we control for overall education level, philosophers tend to be significantly more reflective than their peers. We then illustrate this tendency by considering what we know about the philosophizing of a few prominent philosophers. Recognizing this aspect of the philosophical temperament, it is natural to wonder how philosophers came to be this way: does philosophical training teach reflectivity or do more reflective people tend to gravitate to philosophy? We consider the limitations of our data with respect to this question and suggest that a longitudinal study be conducted.

In this work I first develop, motivate, and defend the view that mereological composition, the relation between an object and all its parts collectively, is a relation of identity. I argue that this view implies and hence can explain the logical necessity of classical mereology, the formal study of the part-whole relation. I then critically discuss four contemporary views of the same kind. Finally, I employ my thesis in a recent discussion of whether the world is fundamentally one in number.

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