This study examines the Śrāvakabhūmih of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra with the aim of identifying the doctrines of spiritual praxis from Abhidharma to Mahāyāna Yogācāra. The hypothesis posited is that the spiritual praxis of the Mahāyāna Yogācāra is modified from the practice of the Śrāvakayāna yogācāra-s, the early meditation practitioners whose practices were closely related to the Abhidharma. Two questions have been set for this investigation; the first question being: Is the spiritual praxis of the Śrāvakayāna yogācāra-s actually related to the Abhidharma tradition, and if so how? The second question is: How much influence did the practice of the Śrāvakayāna yogācāra-s have on the evolution of the spiritual praxis of the Mahāyāna Yogācāra and what new developments, if any, were there? Together, the answers to these two questions will reveal how far the hypothesis set for this study is justified. This research starts with accumulation of knowledge around the identity of the yogācāra-s as meditation practitioners in early Buddhism, the different phases of the Mahāyāna Yogācāra school, the structure and contents of the Śrāvakabhūmih and the current reports on the relationship between the practice of the Śrāvakayāna yogācāra-s and the Mahāyāna Yogācāra. In order to bring out the profound practice of the Śrāvakabhūmih, an English translation of the important teachings in the Yogasthāna III of the Śrāvakabhūmih has been attempted. A key section of this research is the analysis and discussion of the findings with appropriate passages from two major groups of texts: (a) the Abhidharma texts and (b) the Mahāyāna Yogācāra texts. These texts include: (a) the Abhidharmasangītiparyāya-pāda-śāstra ( 阿毘達磨異門足論), the Abhidharma-dharmaskandha-pāda-śāstra (阿毘達磨法藴足論), and the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhā āśāstra ( 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論); (b) the Samāhitābhūmi_ ( 三摩呬多地), Cintāmayībhūmih ( 思所成地), Bodhisattvabhūmih ( 菩薩地) and the Viniścayasamgrahanī ( 攝決擇分) of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra (解深密經), liu men jiao shou xi ding lun (六門教授習定論) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhā yam-śāstra (大乘阿毘達磨雜集論). The findings of this preliminary study show that the practices of the Śrāvakayāna yogācāra-s are indeed systematic re-organizations of Abhidharma materials with elaborated details and the Mahāyāna Yogācāra did establish their spiritual praxis on the foundation of these practices of the early meditation practitioners modified with new theories and explanations. Thus, it can be concluded that the spiritual praxis of the Mahāyāna Yogācāra was indeed modified from the practices of the Śrāvakayāna yogācāra-s, the early meditation practitioners whose practices are closely related to the Abhidharma. / published_or_final_version / Buddhist Studies / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Mipam ('ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846-1912), an architect of the Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition of Tibet in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, articulates two distinct models of the two truths that are respectively reflected in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Buddhist traditions. The way he positions these two models sheds light on how levels of description are at play in his integration of these traditions. Mipam positions one kind of two-truth model as the product of an ontological analysis while another model can be seen as resulting from a phenomenological reduction. He accommodates both models into his systematic interpretation, and for him, each one has an important role to play in coming to understand the nature of the Buddhist truths of emptiness and Buddha-nature. Since each model reflects a different style of analysis, or a different perspective on truth, his presentation reveals how neither model alone has the last word on the nature of what is and how it is experienced. This paper analyzes the means by which he lays out these two models of the two truths, and explores the implications of their integration in his philosophical works. A primary concern for Mipam, and a factor that guides his attempt to integrate these two approaches to truth, is his aim to both induce authentic experience and true knowledge on the one hand, and represent reality and the experience of it on the other. These competing and complimentary objectives are a central focus around which both styles of critical reflection, and both models of the two truths, revolve.

In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti's explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and "deconstructive" negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam's ('ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846-1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the "content" of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika), the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.

The culminating philosophy and practice for Buddhist traditions in Tibet is what is found in tantra, or Vajrayāna. Yet Tibet is unique in the Buddhist world in that it is a place where not only the traditions of tantra are practiced, but where the epistemological traditions of valid cognition and what came to be known as Prāsangika-Madhyamaka also took root. This chapter briefly surveys a range of ways in which Madhyamaka is represented in Tibet. Madhyamaka takes the place of the highest philosophical view among Tibetan Buddhist sects, and seeing how different traditions formulate the view of Madhyamaka is an important part of understanding how these traditions relate to tantra and negotiate the relationship between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna. Vajrayāna in Tibet is pantheist to the core, for, in its most profound expressions all dualities between the divine and the world are radically undone.

The culminating philosophy and practice for Buddhist traditions in Tibet is what is found in tantra, or Vajrayāna. Yet Tibet is unique in the Buddhist world in that it is a place where not only the traditions of tantra are practiced, but where the epistemological traditions of valid cognition and what came to be known as Prāsangika-Madhyamaka also took root. This chapter briefly surveys a range of ways in which Madhyamaka is represented in Tibet. Madhyamaka takes the place of the highest philosophical view among Tibetan Buddhist sects, and seeing how different traditions formulate the view of Madhyamaka is an important part of understanding how these traditions relate to tantra and negotiate the relationship between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna. Vajrayāna in Tibet is pantheist to the core, for, in its most profound expressions all dualities between the divine and the world are radically undone.

This doctoral research has the purpose of articulating a consistent presentation of the Buddhist concept of selflessness as explained by the great Tibetan Buddhist scholar Tsongkhapa (Tibet, 13571419 CE), who composed some major philosophical masterpieces about this key Buddhist concept based on Ngrjuna´s (India, ca 150250 CE) famous Mla-madhyamaka-krik (MMK). Tsongkhapa presents himself as a follower of Ngrjuna, that is, as a proponent of the \'Middle Way\' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa) Buddhist philosophical school. As our study of the first treatise in which he presents his view on selflessness advanced, we realized that it was necessary to dedicate part of our research to the analysis of the epistemological theory that substantiates his explanation of selflessness, since his approach to the subject is based on the use of what he calls \'rational analysis\' and \'inferential knowledge\'. Therefore, a preliminary part of our thesis is dedicated to the clarification of Tsongkhapa´s conceptions of rational analysis and inferential knowledge, which are based primarily on the theory of \'valid cognition\' (pramna, tshad ma) elaborated centuries earlier by the great Indian scholar Dharmakrti (6th and 7th centuries CE). The next stage of our research was guided by the following question: since, for Tsongkhapa, not possessing a self means the same as not possessing a nature (svabhva, rang zhin), a concept upon which Dharmakrti´s explanation of inferential knowledge is based, how does Tsongkhapa combine his presentation of selflessness with Dharmakrti´s epistemology without generating internal contradictions in his system? We have concluded that, in Tsongkhapa´s presentation of selflessness as united with causation, that is, as one implying the other due to the introduction of the key distinction between \'inherent nature\' and \'mere nature\', there is no contradiction between his epistemological use of inferences based on the notion of mere natures (recognized as conventional) and his final ontological assertion that phenomena lack inherent natures. / A presente pesquisa de doutoramento tem por finalidade articular uma apresentação consistente do conceito budista de anatma (ausência de identidade) segundo a explicação do grande pensador tibetano Tsongkhapa (Tibete, 13571419 D.C.), que compôs relevantes obras filosóficas sobre esse conceito budista fundamental, baseadas no famoso tratado Mla-madhyamaka-krik (MMK) de Ngrjuna (Índia, ca 150250 D.C.). Tsongkhapa se apresenta como um seguidor de Ngrjuna, ou seja, como um proponente da escola de filosofia budista \'Caminho do Meio\' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa). À medida que nosso estudo do primeiro tratado em que ele articula sua visão da noção de anatma (ausência de identidade) se desenvolvia, percebemos que seria necessário dedicar parte de nossa pesquisa à análise da teoria epistemológica que fundamenta sua explicação da \'ausência de identidade\' (dos fenômenos), visto que sua abordagem baseia-se na utilização do que ele chama de \'análise racional\' e \'conhecimento por inferência\'. Dessa forma, a primeira parte de nossa tese é dedicada à compreensão das noções de \'análise racional\' e \'conhecimento por inferência\' usadas por Tsongkhapa, que se baseiam principalmente na teoria sobre as \'cognições válidas\' (pramna, tshad ma), elaborada séculos antes pelo grande pensador indiano Dharmakrti (séculos VI e VII). A etapa seguinte de nosso trabalho teve como fio-condutor a seguinte questão: visto que, para Tsongkhapa, a ausência de identidade (anatma, dak me) significa o mesmo que não ser dotado de uma \'natureza\' (svabhva, rang zhin), conceito sobre o qual a explicação de Dharmakrti do conhecimento por inferência se baseia, como Tsongkhapa elabora conceitualmente a articulação da epistemologia de Dharmakrti com sua explicação da ausência de identidade dos fenômenos sem gerar contradições internas em seu sistema? Concluímos que, na apresentação de Tsongkhapa, em que a noção de causalidade passa a implicar a de \'ausência de identidade\' devido à introdução da distinção essencial entre \'natureza inerente\' e \'mera natureza\', não há contradição entre seu uso epistemológico de inferências baseadas na noção de \'meras naturezas\' (reconhecidas como convencionais) e sua afirmação ontológica final da ausência de natureza inerente nos fenômenos.

日本學界曾針對緣起的意涵，引起一場論爭。例如宇井伯壽等人主張緣起是同時的邏輯關係，木村泰賢等人則認為緣起還有異時的因果面，另外上田義文還指出了緣起的寂滅面。 　　本文依據印順法師的主張，亦即因果不能分割為同時或異時，並且徵引龍樹的論文，重點地批評上述日本學者的意見。依阿含經，所謂緣起的定義是：此有故彼有，此無故彼無。而龍樹的空義是不二的，可以說無彼亦無此。而且，《大智度論》有法性不待因緣的說法，在龍樹那□，空性是等同於法性的，因此，向來所說緣起與空為同義的說法，有必要再釐清。本論文的第四章就做了這方面的嘗試。關於二諦，日本學界曾經提出許多關於語源學的研究，本論文則從《大智度論》尋找論據，證明龍樹所謂的世俗諦就是語言，亦即緣起的假名面；而勝義諦則是語言的寂滅性，亦即是空。二諦之間的關係則是相即。根據以上的研究成果，本文檢討了英美學界對於龍樹空性及二諦的詮釋。大致地區分，英美對於龍樹空義的詮釋經歷了三個階段：虛無主義，絕對主義及語言哲學的詮釋，本論文重點地評破了虛無主義的詮釋，對於後兩種詮釋則有所取捨。本文的貢獻在於提出《大智度論》中法性不待因緣的說法，從而使緣起與空的關係得到更多的理解。

Proponents of Middle Way (Sanskrit: Madhyamaka) Buddhist philosophy argue that all phenomena lack inherent nature. This dissertation provides an analysis of the meaning of inherent nature and the lack of inherent nature in the basic physical character of non-living physical phenomena as indicated by certain interpretations of ancient and contemporary Middle Way Buddhist philosophy, contemporary Western analytic metaphysics, philosophy of science, and physics. The primary intellectual focus in the dissertation is Madhyamaka. I explicate an interpretation of Madhyamaka that is both amenable to discourse and dialogue with the other disciplines, and also consistent with at least some extant Madhyamaka interpretations. The discourse and dialogue with other disciplines results in a revision of some of the arguments of Madhyamaka—specifically making it consistent with modern physics. However, that revision does not deny the foundational view of Madhyamaka that there is no inherent nature in phenomena, but rather supports it within the revised interpretation. Additionally, I also find that this foundational view provides at least heuristic guidance in development of a generic interpretive framework (‘contextualization’ and Physics Pluralism) that I then apply in criticism and revision of some arguments in modern analytic metaphysics and in philosophy of science.That generic interpretive framework is used within this dissertation in examination of Western analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science. While I find independent support for that framework within contemporary philosophy, the framework also reflects an interpretation of Madhyamaka that I develop as a variation of the classic two truths view of Madhyamaka. My interpretation of the classical expression of the two truths is that there is relative existence of inherent nature that may be reflected in our conventions of discourse and habit, while ultimately no inherent nature can be found when the phenomena are analyzed more fully. In my modified interpretation of the two truths that corresponds to modern physics, for some phenomena inherent nature is found within specific (‘local’) contexts of discourse or domains of physics theory applicability, yet when we take a ‘global’ view that acknowledges many domains and relationships between domains we find an ultimate relationality rather than inherent nature.

The interactions between Chinese religions has occupied an enormous amount of scholarly attention in many fields because there have been direct and indirect consequences resulting from the interactions among Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. These religious traditions have obviously influenced each other in many respects such as rituals, doctrines, textual materials, philosophy and so on. Accordingly, I will, in this paper, critically analyze the implications of the interactions between Buddhism and Daoism by examining Twofold Mystery. Since Twofold Mystery is heavily dependent on Madhyamaka Buddhist concepts, this study will, on the one hand, examine the influence of Madhyamaka Buddhism on the development of Twofold Mystery. On the other hand, it will critically survey how Twofold Mystery remained faithful to the Daoist worldview.

There have been recent explosions of interest in two fields: Madhyamaka-Pyrrhonism parallels and Pyrrhonism itself, which seems to have been misunderstood and therefore neglected by the West for the same reasons and in the same ways that Madhyamaka traditionally has often been by the West and the East. Among these recent studies are several demonstrating that grounding in Madhyamaka, for example, reveals and illuminates the import and insights of Pyrrhonean arguments. Furthermore it has been suggested that of all European schools of philosophy Pyrrhonism is the one closest to Buddhism, and especially to Madhyamaka. Indeed Pyrrho is recorded to have studied with philosophers in Taxila, one of the first places where Madhyamaka later flourished, and the place where the founder of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, may have received hitherto concealed texts which became the foundation for his school. In this dissertation I explore just how similar these two philosophical projects were. I systematically treat all the arguments in the Pyrrhonist redactor Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against Dogmatists and compare them to the most similar arguments available in the Madhyamaka treatises and related texts. On this basis, I ask whether the Pyrrhonists and the Buddhists would satisfy each other’s self-identifying criteria, or what characteristics would disqualify either or both in the other’s eyes. I also ask what questions arise from the linguistic and historical evidence for interactions between the Pyrrhonist school and the Madhyamaka school, and how sure we can be of the answers. Did Pyrrho learn Buddhism in Taxila? Was Nāgārjuna a Pyrrhonist? Finally I bring the insights of the living commentarial tradition of Madhyamaka to bear on current scholarly controversies in the field of Sextan Pyrrhonism, and apply the subtleties of interpretation of the latter which have developed in recent scholarship to Madhyamaka and its various difficulties of interpretation, to scrutinize each school under the illumination of the other. With this hopefully illuminated view, I address for example whether Sextus was consistent, whether living Pyrrhonism implies apraxia, whether Pyrrhonism is philosophy at all, and whether Madhyamaka is actually nihilism.