Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliography (p. 238-244) and index.

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This doctoral research has the purpose of articulating a consistent presentation of the Buddhist concept of selflessness as explained by the great Tibetan Buddhist scholar Tsongkhapa (Tibet, 13571419 CE), who composed some major philosophical masterpieces about this key Buddhist concept based on Ngrjuna´s (India, ca 150250 CE) famous Mla-madhyamaka-krik (MMK). Tsongkhapa presents himself as a follower of Ngrjuna, that is, as a proponent of the \'Middle Way\' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa) Buddhist philosophical school. As our study of the first treatise in which he presents his view on selflessness advanced, we realized that it was necessary to dedicate part of our research to the analysis of the epistemological theory that substantiates his explanation of selflessness, since his approach to the subject is based on the use of what he calls \'rational analysis\' and \'inferential knowledge\'. Therefore, a preliminary part of our thesis is dedicated to the clarification of Tsongkhapa´s conceptions of rational analysis and inferential knowledge, which are based primarily on the theory of \'valid cognition\' (pramna, tshad ma) elaborated centuries earlier by the great Indian scholar Dharmakrti (6th and 7th centuries CE). The next stage of our research was guided by the following question: since, for Tsongkhapa, not possessing a self means the same as not possessing a nature (svabhva, rang zhin), a concept upon which Dharmakrti´s explanation of inferential knowledge is based, how does Tsongkhapa combine his presentation of selflessness with Dharmakrti´s epistemology without generating internal contradictions in his system? We have concluded that, in Tsongkhapa´s presentation of selflessness as united with causation, that is, as one implying the other due to the introduction of the key distinction between \'inherent nature\' and \'mere nature\', there is no contradiction between his epistemological use of inferences based on the notion of mere natures (recognized as conventional) and his final ontological assertion that phenomena lack inherent natures. / A presente pesquisa de doutoramento tem por finalidade articular uma apresentação consistente do conceito budista de anatma (ausência de identidade) segundo a explicação do grande pensador tibetano Tsongkhapa (Tibete, 13571419 D.C.), que compôs relevantes obras filosóficas sobre esse conceito budista fundamental, baseadas no famoso tratado Mla-madhyamaka-krik (MMK) de Ngrjuna (Índia, ca 150250 D.C.). Tsongkhapa se apresenta como um seguidor de Ngrjuna, ou seja, como um proponente da escola de filosofia budista \'Caminho do Meio\' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa). À medida que nosso estudo do primeiro tratado em que ele articula sua visão da noção de anatma (ausência de identidade) se desenvolvia, percebemos que seria necessário dedicar parte de nossa pesquisa à análise da teoria epistemológica que fundamenta sua explicação da \'ausência de identidade\' (dos fenômenos), visto que sua abordagem baseia-se na utilização do que ele chama de \'análise racional\' e \'conhecimento por inferência\'. Dessa forma, a primeira parte de nossa tese é dedicada à compreensão das noções de \'análise racional\' e \'conhecimento por inferência\' usadas por Tsongkhapa, que se baseiam principalmente na teoria sobre as \'cognições válidas\' (pramna, tshad ma), elaborada séculos antes pelo grande pensador indiano Dharmakrti (séculos VI e VII). A etapa seguinte de nosso trabalho teve como fio-condutor a seguinte questão: visto que, para Tsongkhapa, a ausência de identidade (anatma, dak me) significa o mesmo que não ser dotado de uma \'natureza\' (svabhva, rang zhin), conceito sobre o qual a explicação de Dharmakrti do conhecimento por inferência se baseia, como Tsongkhapa elabora conceitualmente a articulação da epistemologia de Dharmakrti com sua explicação da ausência de identidade dos fenômenos sem gerar contradições internas em seu sistema? Concluímos que, na apresentação de Tsongkhapa, em que a noção de causalidade passa a implicar a de \'ausência de identidade\' devido à introdução da distinção essencial entre \'natureza inerente\' e \'mera natureza\', não há contradição entre seu uso epistemológico de inferências baseadas na noção de \'meras naturezas\' (reconhecidas como convencionais) e sua afirmação ontológica final da ausência de natureza inerente nos fenômenos.

In this thesis I provide an overview of Nietzsche's ethics with an emphasis on showing how his naturalistic approach to ethics leads him to advance an egoistic moral code. I argue that this, though radical in the light of conventional morality, is not irrational, unprincipled, or proscriptive of other-regarding moral considerations. On the contrary, it demands the highest degree of foresight and integrity. While Nietzsche's writings are meant for a select group of people, namely "higher men," whose flourishing may be undercut by their unwitting acceptance of a self-destructive morality. I explain that Nietzsche places the highest degree of value on the life of these individuals, the development of their character, and their flourishing. Further, I explain that Nietzsche extols as a great virtue "bestowing" or "gift-giving," and that he takes generosity to be more frequently practiced under an ethics of egoism.

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The work deals with the theme of faterhood from a historical, sociological, psychological and ethical perspective. The importance of the father in child care is defined as the general terms and in terms of specific developmental stages of the child and his female or male sex. The central part of the work consists of the basic characteristics of the ethical aspects that should be applied when the father is caring the child. Final summary is devoted to issue of gay fathers and the dilemma, which is associated with the possiblity to enable them to educate children.

This thesis investigates volunteering as performance. In exploring this topic I discuss a dynamic between self-interest and selflessness in the observable performance of service through the social mechanisms of volunteerism. I argue that self-interest is a prominent motivation for volunteering, but its overt performance is kept in check by norms that emphasize selflessness. My argument centers on addressing this lack of acknowledgement toward self-interest within vernacular culture. My research draws examples from an individual, organizational, and global volunteer perspective. Ethnographic research was conducted for this study with a student group that organizes one of the American Cancer Society’s Relay For Life fundraisers. Within this organization, I conceptualize volunteering as a performance that requires a social actor to not just “do” service, but also “show do” and/or “explain show do” their behavior in front of an audience. This presentation culminates in a cultural performance where participants at Relay For Life perform a narrative of selflessness. Expanding my discussion of volunteering to a global perspective, my last chapter addresses volunteer tourism. I argue that the self-interest of both volunteers and volunteer travel companies reduces the recipients of volunteer tourism to essentialized and exociticized cultural "Others." I advocate for the overt acknowledgement of self-interest not only because self-interest is present, but also because it is a central dynamic that constructs volunteerism as performance.