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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Certitude, évidence et vérité chez Descartes : La question du fondement cartésien de la connaissance / Certainty, evidence and truth in Descartes : The question of the cartesian foundation of knowledge

Peretti, François-Xavier de 01 March 2014 (has links)
Une des interprétations dominantes de la philosophie de Descartes consiste à considérer que Dieu garantit une parfaite correspondance entre l'ordre des raisons et l'ordre des choses, de sorte que nos idées peuvent être tenues pour conformes à la réalité telle qu'elle est hors de notre pensée. Nous suggérons que Descartes n'a jamais espéré faire jouer ce rôle à Dieu dans sa théorie de la connaissance et qu'il n'a pas plus prétendu que nous soyons assurés de disposer d'idées adéquates à ce qu'est la réalité hors de notre pensée. Pour cela, nous soutenons que l'importance accordée par Descartes à l'hypothèse d'un Dieu trompeur, est largement surestimée par les commentateurs, et qu'elle ne sert qu'à justifier, par contrecoup, le rôle que la véracité divine ne joue pas dans sa philosophie première. Nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle le fondement de la vérité revient, en ultime instance, chez Descartes, à l'"ego cogitans", de sorte que la vérité, du point de vue de l'esprit humain, n'est pas ce à quoi la pensée doit d'être conforme, mais ce qui ne peut qu'être conforme à notre pensée. Par conséquent, nous suggérons que l'ego joue, par défaut, dans la philosophie première de Descartes, le rôle trop souvent accordé à Dieu par ses commentateurs. / One of the dominant interpretations of Descartes' philosophy consists in considering that God assures a perfect conformity between the order of reasons and the order of things, in such a way that our ideas can be regarded in accordance with the reality such as it is out of our thought. We suggest that Descartes has never hoped that God could play this part in his theory of knowledge and that he has no more claim that we would be certain of having adequate ideas according to the reality as it is out of our thought. In this aim, we argue that the importance conceded by Descartes in favour of the deceiving God argument is widely over-valued by the scholars, and that it is used only to justify, by repercussion, the part that the veracity of God doesn't play in Descartes' first philosophy. We defend the thesis from which the foundation of the truth in Descartes' philosophy is, in the final analysis, built on the "ego cogitans" in such a way that the truth, for the human mind, is not what the mind has to conform to, but what is necessary conformed to our mind. Consequently, we suggest that the ego, in Descartes' first philosophy, plays, in absence, the role too frequently awarded to God by the scholars.
2

Individuation : Ontogenes : Prolegomena till Gilbert Simondons genetiska ontologi

Sehlberg, Johan January 2011 (has links)
The following text constitutes an attempt to present the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon's genetic ontology through an account of his reconfiguration of the problem of individuation in his doctoral thesis from 1958, L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme, information, potentiel, métastabilité. The intention is to show how Simondon through this reconfiguration of a classical philosophical problem – in which concepts and schemas from contemporary physics and technology is utilised in a critique of the bi-polar hylomorphic schema as its traditional, substantialistic solution – becomes able to articulate an anti-substantialistic and anti-reductionistic ontogenesis as first philosophy. A systematic philosophical conception that according to Simondon precedes every critical investigation of the subject as well as every scientific ontology – not by establishing a pre-critical position, but by exceeding Kant's critical position: that is, through a displacement toward a conception of the transcendental conditions for the genesis of being and thought as real conditions, rather than conditions of mere possibility. A displacement that in turn appears to respond to the question that frames this basic account of important concepts and schemas in Simondon, namely: in what sense and to what extent is it necessary for philosophical thought to be thought and developed in relation to other forms of thought?

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