Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2008. / Vita. Advisor : Ernest Sosa. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 188-195).

Inaug.-diss.--Erlangen. / Lebenslauf. "Litteratur": p. [v]-vi.

I provide an explanation of moral understanding. I begin by describing decisions, especially moral ones. I detail ways in which deviations from an ideal of decision-making occur. I link deviations to characteristic critical judgments, e.g. being cavalier, banal, courageous, etc. Moral judgments are among these and carry a particular personal gravity. The question I entertain in following chapters is: how do they carry this gravity? In answering the question, I try “external” accounts of moral understanding. I distinguish between the ideas of a person and a life. The idea of a life essayed is of a network of relations to others. The character of those relations, e.g. friendship, is the object of our understanding of ourselves and our lives. I argue that one’s understanding of oneself conditions the context of decision-making. I elaborate one way of making moral understanding answerable to truth using Plato’s metaphysics in the Philebus. Truth is valued and truth is essential to the independence of the moral such that seeming right and being right are distinct. However, truth is neither primary nor exhaustive of morality, because we have additional distinct resources for morally judging others. I turn instead to an “internal” account of moral understanding to answer the question regarding the personal gravity of moral criticism. Using Winch’s work on universalizability and fellowship, I argue that our conception of others must be sufficient to reflect their individuality within our moral understanding. Second, using Gaita’s work on remorse and the lucidity of self-reflection, I argue that the truth about ourselves and the wrong we do others can arrest and constrain our moral understanding and our authority. Moral understanding operates in a social milieu: argument, conversation and rationality. Arguments are grounded in meanings with primary (shared) sense, but solicit agreement in secondary sense—of what is similar, of what follows. Meaning in the secondary sense can be necessarily practical, creating practical necessities within points of view. Accounting for the consequences and understanding of disagreement is identified as pressing. An original contribution is the idea of critical authority. One’s articulation of moral meaning is controlled via the critical authority expressed using critical vocabulary. Accepting another ’s critical authority is based, in differing domains, on our relation to them, e.g. friendship, trust, fellowship. The nature of inter-personal relations are delimited by the critical authority characteristic of those relations. Critical authority explains the independent and personal force of moral criticism. To be intelligible depends on accepting some critical authorities, though I allow for the intelligible repudiation of morality in some circumstances. Wronging someone is explained as denying his critical authority, thus denying his relation to oneself, and thereby undermining his place in the moral world. The consequence of wrongdoing is the disintegration of the moral world. I defend against Nagel’s realism and Korsgaard’s constructivism. Both are committed to judging individuals but their accounts of morality undermine the intelligibility of the personal gravity of moral criticism. Developing the idea of Moral Consensus, I defend myself against the related charge of relativism.

No description available.

<p> This thesis dissects the category of "waste," examining conventional modes of response to the people, places, and things considered waste, and challenging the patterns of both linear disposal and cyclical recycling. I argue that both ways of thinking about "waste" actually share the same problematic roots and reproduce the same problematic logics, and that both oversimplify the diverse spectrum of potentials and histories contained within "waste." </p><p> Using a methodology that links personal narrative with historical analysis, I decompose the very idea of waste to understand the constellation of factors and processes that actively produce "waste" in contrast with "value," discussing histories of recycling and disposal in tandem with histories of capitalism, colonialism, and industrialization. With recent composting work at Northern Arizona University serving as both metaphor and example throughout this thesis, I build an alternative to the existing paradigm of waste, offering a more complex, diverse, dynamic, and interconnected framework for relating to and redefining "waste." </p><p> To do this, I explore not only theoretical and conceptual strategies for revealing and amplifying the hidden diversity of alternate values, benefits, and relationships around (non)waste, but also transition theory to practice by mapping out ways to physically implement these ideas through specific projects and actions that actively shift the ways people think about and interact with "waste" on a daily basis. By mapping out the theory and action involved in re-shaping human interactions with the things considered "waste," this thesis hopes to inspire others to keep working with these ideas and to continue developing projects that transition from a state of waste to (non)waste by creating a more socially and ecologically ethical paradigm of relationships beyond "waste." </p>

Thesis (M.A.)--University of London. / List of books consulted: p. 3-4.

Inaug.-diss.--Erlangen. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur": p. [vii]-viii.

No description available.

No description available.

<p> Water is one of the most precious elements on Earth. Yet we find ourselves in a global water crisis, struggling to address freshwater scarcity, pollution, climate change, and the need for safe drinking water and sanitation. Given the urgency of the global water crisis, it is imperative that we reinvent our relationship to water and cultivate an integral water ethic.</p><p> This dissertation, and the ethic it explores, is grounded in an integral approach to ecology that studies phenomena across multiple perspectives (e.g., natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities). Relating to water in an integral mode entails acknowledging that water has not only exterior, objective dimensions but also interior, subjective qualities. Thus, an integral water ethic holds that water is not a mere passive object to be exploited for human purposes; instead, this approach recognizes that water is an intrinsically valuable, vital member of the Earth community. An integral water ethic encourages humans to learn to cultivate love and compassion for water and for those suffering from the global water crisis. Through the cultivation of love and compassion for water, humans will be better able to see water not as a mere resource and commodity, but rather as a loving and compassionate member of the Earth community who nourishes all beings.</p><p> This dissertation explores three world religions (Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism) and considers the following contributions to an integral water ethic: sacramental consciousness of baptism, loving service of the Yamuna River, and compassionate wisdom of the bodhisattva. Contemplative practices for developing love and compassion for water are also shared. The purpose of this study is to draw attention to creative avenues for cultivating mutually enhancing relations between humans and water and thereby to help overcome destructive attitudes toward the natural world.</p><p>