Beginning with a historical study of the human sciences' position between the natural sciences and the humanities, this dissertation examines the consequences of the fixation on questions of method that has characterized this positioning. Drawing on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, I illustrate how it is that methodological concerns can serve to obscure other, more fundamental concerns. Gadamer uses Aristotle's ethics to make this point about method, and I take the further step of bringing this intersection of Aristotelian ethics and Gadamerian hermeneutics to bear productively on the human sciences. The result of this work is an approach to the human sciences characterized less by attention to methods and more by appreciation of ends. I argue that in the development of what I call "political teleology" the human sciences exploit their particular strengths, and find their political import.

<p>Naturalism faces problems caused by a lack of agreement about whether there is or can be a meaningful and useful conception of naturalism as a general research position. Without a widely agreed upon account of what naturalism in general amounts to there is no clear and definitive way to adjudicate disputes as to what is consistent with naturalism; the absence of such an account also makes it impossible for specific projects in naturalistic inquiry to take guidance from naturalism in general. In the following, I develop a determinate account of naturalism in general, which I think could find acceptance among naturalists because it accounts for many of the features commonly associated with naturalism. To do this, I first lay out the problem to be solved, express its importance, and explain what a solution to the problem would involve. I then make appeal to an account of naturalism developed by Penelope Maddy and use this account to show that the published and unpublished work of Charles Sanders Peirce offers, prima facie, a more determinate account of naturalism than is commonly recognized and that goes beyond the account given by Maddy. With this Peircean account developed, I then measure it against the criteria I develop and conclude that a Pericean account of naturalism does promise to adjudicate various disputes in the naturalism literature and to offer guidance to the development and application of specific projects in naturalistic inquiry.</p> / Dissertation

The extended mind debate juggles the possibilities of whether or not the mind extends out into the world. Today, with the rise in technology, we have an additional claim that our tools are responsible for extending our minds. The internet, smart phones, and other tools give us a foothold in the extended mind debate by providing real world examples of how our mind is perceived as extending out into the world. In discovering where the divide between mind and environment exists we can come up with a conclusion whether or not the mind truly extends out into the world.

This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.

Theories of perception can broadly be divided into two groups: orthodox and heterodox theories (Noë & Thompson, 2002). Orthodox theories of perception consider perception as a neurological process, i.e. as a phenomenon which can be explained solely in terms of intracranial facts. Heterodox views expand this scope, maintaining that an understanding of perception must include extracranial facts, or facts about the environment in which a perceiver is situated (ibid.). This thesis will attempt to defend a particular exemplar of this heterodox approach, namely the enactive theory of perception proposed by Alva Noë. The thesis has two primary goals. First, I will attempt to offer an exegesis of Noë's theory, attempting to clarify the scope and strength of Noë's view. Secondly, I will consider the particular objections leveled against Noë, and heterodox theories more generally, by Ken Aizawa. I conclude that Noë's theory can better account for the nature of perception.

This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.

<p> Classical, scientific, and Abrahamic origin stories of knowledge establish grounds. Upon excavating these grounds, this dissertation has found repeated and entangled emphases on isolation related to a materially grounded cosmology. The core evidence for this position comes from their comparable displays of the psyche/mind/soul/spirit&rsquo;s entry into and/or imprisonment within body, the symbolic restraint of Classical and Abrahamic progenitors with stone, and the initiation of philosophy&mdash;according to Aristotle&mdash;with a theory of materialism. Symbolic interpretations of the religious myths are supported by commentary from within the respective traditions. </p><p> Following a consideration of the existential implications of a material ground and (fundamentally) isolated self-image, the work considers mythic liberations of progenitors from stone and Einstein&rsquo;s liberation of scientific traditions from material reductionism. As Einstein&rsquo;s labors included an integration of wave dynamics into the way matter is seen, Herakles&rsquo; and Christ&rsquo;s liberations of Prometheus and Adam are actuated by symbolic fluids. Later, their transcendence and atonement(s) are actuated by fluid. As is shown, Classical, Christian, and scientific knowledge narratives all contain reactions to a material ground of being contingent with the integration/imbibing of waves/fluids. The primary examples for this include the hydra-blood that freed Prometheus from stone and Herakles from life, the nectar of immortality he drank upon his death, the wine-blood of Christ that freed Adam from stone and his followers from mortality, and the form of waves and fields Einstein added to the theoretical particle. </p><p> This dissertation argues that the reason fluids have played such integral roles in the historical and symbolic transcendence of material/embodied isolation and Classical atoms (isolated matter) is because&mdash;unlike material particulates&mdash;fluids and waves are capable of union and harmony. My read of particle-wave duality is as a new foundation that challenges atomized cosmologies and worldviews leading many towards a vision of self as estranged from other. My final argument is that each of these prominent Western knowledge traditions present stories that follow a meta-narrative arc defined by an initial commitment to a materially grounded cosmology that is later enhanced&mdash;if not healed&mdash;by theoretical waves and symbolic elixirs. </p><p> <i>Keywords:</i> Mythology, Philosophy, Science, Religion, Wave</p>

I develop a novel metaphysical theory of the modal structure of the physical world, which has important consequences for debates regarding laws of nature, scientific explanation, the nature of physical properties, and the applicability of mathematics to science. The theory holds that modal properties of the physical world metaphysically depend on properties of mathematical structures. I show that the relation of metaphysical dependence is naturalistically acceptable by offering examples of non-causal scientific explanation that tacitly make use of such a notion. My view offers a non-Humean understanding of nomological necessity, a unification of the epistemology of modality with the epistemology of mathematics, and an explanation of the success of mathematics in predicting and explaining empirical phenomena. / text

<p> This dissertation examines the importance of geography, performance, and microscopy in the construction of theories of human difference in Europe in the eighteenth century, with a particular focus on "fringe groups" such as albinos with black parents and individuals with complexion disorders. It joins a growing discussion in history, the history of science and medicine, and critical racial theory about the social and philosophic bases of early-modern human taxonomic schemas. Collectively, the fields analyzed in this study share a common conceptual root in their dependence on transferable physical processes&mdash;techniques&mdash;as much as on the intellectual frameworks investing those gestures with meaning. The necessarily embodied processes of exploration, spectatorship, and microscopic visual analysis produced discrete ways of seeing human difference which influenced the conclusions that natural philosophers reached through those embodied experiences. Marginal groups of individuals with unexpected or "abnormal" complexions drew a disproportionate amount of attention in the eighteenth century, because they were not easily identifiable with pre-existing conceptions of human difference and consequently provided a strong impetus to reconsider those epistemic categories. Overwhelmingly, the perspectives of eighteenth-century natural philosophers were profoundly non-racial in nature; instead, they drew upon ideas as varied as monstrosity, morality, self-analysis, dramatic tragedy, entertainment, and imagination to position experiences of unexpected human diversity in a distinctly valuative and sensational understanding of human difference. Through the interrogation of new and underutilized sources, this dissertation argues for an enrichment of our understanding of the "history of race" by taking into account the diversity of the physical techniques that were used by eighteenth century thinkers to arrive at ideas about human difference, while simultaneously demonstrating the centrality of hitherto understudied groups&mdash;such as albinos with black parents&mdash;in the formulation of systems of human difference. </p>

Much of biology, especially evolutionary theory, makes assumptions about the individuality of living things. A population, for example, is made up of individuals. Those individuals sometimes reproduce, creating new individuals. The very use of these concepts requires that living individuals can be distinguished both synchronically and diachronically. There are many examples in nature, however, in which a living system is present, but it is not clear how to understand that system's individuality. Plants, fungi, colonial marine invertebrates, insect colonies, and symbiosis are all classic cases that have puzzled biologists interested in understanding their population structure and evolution. Scientific exploration of these issues has connections with traditional philosophical terrain, particularly the ontology of persistence and the nature of individuality broadly construed. A biologically informed philosophical literature has arisen in recent years, aimed at understanding the nature of biological individuality and its role in biological theorizing. My dissertation makes two kinds of contributions to this current literature. One contribution is theoretical, reframing our thinking about biological individuality. I distinguish between two categories of individuality and argue that they play different roles in theorizing about nature. One important kind of individual is that of the organism, understood as an entity that persists through space and time, takes in and processes resources from the environment, and maintains physiological autonomy. Another important kind of individual is that of the evolutionary individual, understood as an entity that has the capacity to participate in processes of natural selection. Distinguishing between these two types of individuality has theoretical utility, keeping clear the distinctive kinds of biological processes that individuals engage in. The other contribution of my dissertation involves detailed natural historical analysis of three kinds of problem cases. Using the framework articulated earlier in the dissertation, I assess the individuality of symbioses between larger organisms and their microbial associates, mushroom-producing fungi, and the classic case of ant colonies. The combined result of the assessments is a hierarchical pluralism about biological individuality. / Philosophy