The question this contribution sets out to address is whether law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone‟s proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow‟s characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature also attempted to define the terms “science” and “research”, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This “test” is then applied to activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practicing “science”. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

<p>The aim of this project is to examine the relationships between two approaches to the measurement of life history strategies. The traditional method, termed here the biodemographic approach, measures developmental characteristics like birthweight, gestation length, inter-birth intervals, pubertal timing, and sexual debut. The alternative method under exploration, termed here the psychological approach, measures a suite of cognitive and behavioral traits such as altruism, sociosexual orientation, personality, mutualism, familial relationships, and religiosity. Although both approaches are supported by a large body of literature, they remain relatively segregated. This study draws inspiration from both views, integrating measures that assess developmental milestones, including birthweight, prematurity, pubertal timing, and onset of sexual behavior, as well as psychological life history measures such as the Mini-K and a personality inventory. Drawing on previous theoretical work on the fundamental dimensions of environmental risk, these measures are tested in conjunction with several scales assessing the stability of early environmental conditions, including both &ldquo;event-based&rdquo; measures that are defined with an external referent, and measures of internal schemata, or the predicted psychological sequelae of early events. The data are tested in a three-part sequence, beginning with the measurement models under investigation, proceeding to an exploratory analysis of the causal network, and finishing with a cross-validation of the structural model on a new sample. The findings point to exciting new directions for future researchers who seek to integrate the two perspectives. </p>

<p>Martin Heidegger is generally regarded as one of the most significant—if also the most controversial—philosophers of the 20th century. Most scholarly engagement with Heidegger’s thought on Modernity approaches his work with a special focus on either his critique of technology, or on his more general critique of subjectivity. This dissertation project attempts to elucidate Martin Heidegger’s diagnosis of modernity, and, by extension, his thought as a whole, from the neglected standpoint of his understanding of mathematics, which he explicitly identifies as the essence of modernity. </p><p> Accordingly, our project attempts to work through the development of Modernity, as Heidegger understands it, on the basis of what we call a “mathematical dialectic.“ The basis of our analysis is that Heidegger’s understanding of Modernity, both on its own terms and in the context of his theory of history [Seinsgeschichte], is best understood in terms of the interaction between two essential, “mathematical” characteristics, namely, self-grounding and homogeneity. This project first investigates the mathematical qualities of these components of Modernity individually, and then attempts to trace the historical and philosophical development of Modernity on the basis of the interaction between these two components—an interaction that is, we argue, itself regulated by the structure of the mathematical, according to Heidegger’s understanding of the term. </p><p> The project undertaken here intends not only to serve as an interpretive, scholarly function of elucidating Heidegger’s understanding of Modernity, but also to advance the larger aim of defending the prescience, structural coherence, and relevance of Heidegger’s diagnosis of Modernity as such.</p> / Dissertation

Darbe pristatoma žinojimo augimo problema mokslo filosofijoje, pasirinkus Lakatoso ir Kuhno diskusiją šiuo klausimu. Lakatosas yra vienas iš žymiausių falsifikacionistų, labai prisidėjęs prie Popperio teorijų falsifikavimo metodologijos tobulinimo. Žinojimo augimas yra pagrindinė falsifikacionizmo koncepcija. Falsifikacija Kuhnui yra nepriimtina. Įvykus mokslo revoliucijai, senas žinojimas atmetamas. Nauja paradigma kaupia naują žinojimą. / The discussion between Lakatos and Kuhn is chosen to represent the growth of knowledge in philosophy of science. Lakatos is one of the best-known falsificationists, he improved Popper's methodology of falsification. The growth of knowledge is a key concept in falsificationism. Kuhn did not reject the growth of knowledge, but he had different approach to it. During scientific revolution old knowledge is abolished. There is no continuity from the old paradigm to the new one.

Introduction: I lay out the broad contours of my thesis: a defence of mathematical nominalism, and nominalism more generally. I discuss the possibility of metaphysics, and the relationship of nominalism to naturalism and pragmatism. Chapter 2: I delineate an account of abstractness. I then provide counter-arguments to claims that mathematical objects make a di erence to the concrete world, and claim that mathematical objects are abstract in the sense delineated. Chapter 3: I argue that the epistemological problem with abstract objects is not best understood as an incompatibility with a causal theory of knowledge, or as an inability to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, but resides in the epistemic luck that would infect any belief about abstract objects. To this end, I develop an account of epistemic luck that can account for cases of belief in necessary truths and apply it to the mathematical case. Chapter 4: I consider objections, based on (meta)metaphysical considerations and linguistic data, to the view that the existential quantifier expresses existence. I argue that these considerations can be accommodated by an existentially committing quantifier when the pragmatics of quantified sentences are properly understood. I develop a semi-formal framework within which we can define a notion of nominalistic adequacy. I show how our notion of nominalistic adequacy can show why it is legitimate for the nominalist to make use of platonistic “assumptions” in inference-making. Chapter 5: I turn to the application of mathematics in science, including explanatory applications, and its relation to a number of indispensability arguments. I consider also issues of realism and anti-realism, and their relation to these arguments. I argue that abstraction away from pragmatic considerations has acted to skew the debate, and has obscured possibilities for a nominalistic understanding of mathematical practices. I end by explaining the notion of a pragmatic meta-vocabulary, and argue that this notion can be used to carve out a new way of locating our ontological commitments. Chapter 6: I show how the apparatus developed in earlier chapters can be utilised to roll out the nominalist project to other domains of discourse. In particular, I consider propositions and types. I claim that a unified account of nominalism across these domains is available. Conclusion: I recapitulate the claims of my thesis. I suggest that the goal of mathematical enquiry is not descriptive knowledge, but understanding.

Questions concerning the ethics of terraforming Mars have received some attention from both philosophers and scientists during recent decades. A variety of theoretical approaches have been supplied by a number of authors, however research pursuant to this thesis has indicated at least two major blindspots in the published literature on the topic. First, a broad category of human considerations involving risks, dangers, and social, political, and economic inequalities that would likely be associated with efforts to terraform Mars have been woefully overlooked in the published literature to date. I attempt to rectify that oversight by employing the interpretive lens of environmental justice to address questions of environmental colonialism, equality in terms of political participation and inclusion in decision making structures, risks associated with technological progressivism, and responses to anthropogenic climate change. Only by including the historically marginalized and politically disenfranchised "voices," of both humans and nonhumans, can any future plan to terraform Mars be deemed ethical, moral or just according to the framework provided by environmental justice. Furthermore, broader political inclusion of this sort conforms to what ecofeminist author Val Plumwood calls the "intentional recognition stance" and provides an avenue through which globally societies can include nonanthropocentric considerations in decision making frameworks both for questions of terraforming Mars and also for a more local, contemporary set of environmental issues. The second blindspot I seek to correct concerns motivations for attempting terraforming on Mars previously inadequately philosophically elaborated in the published discourse. Specifically, the nonanthropocentric considerations postulated in the second chapter by various authors writing about terraforming, and elaborated in third with regard to environmental justice, reach their culmination in an ecofeminist ethic of care, sustainability, reproduction, and healthy growth which I uniquely elaborate based on a metaphorical similarity to the relationship between a gardener and a garden. Although at first glance, this metaphor may appear overly domineering, or uncritically paternalistic, I argue a deep understanding of its implications will be eminently beneficial for discussions of what is moral, good, right, and just to do regarding not only whether or not to terraform Mars, but for contemporary environmental concerns as well. Ultimately, extreme caution and a robust precautionary principle are the moral prescriptions arrived at in this thesis for the near term future. Until a sustainable civilization and just society can be established and effectively maintained, efforts to terraform and colonize another planet are practically certain to produce as much that is undesirable as that which might be good.

<p> This dissertation explores the interface between reflecting on ideals and the action or physical transformation that occurs in the world. Rephrased as a question: What are the appropriate and necessary epistemological pre-requisites for scholars that will increase the likelihood that their praxis succeeds in transforming society away from capitalism towards something that does a better job of assuring social justice? This question is good to organize around but makes for a poor research question because its answer is near infinitely debatable. My research questions then, come down to the following: In what ways can a researcher participate in a deliberate cultural intervention through the utilization of technological systems? What makes these interventions successful and what makes them fail? How does a researcher &ldquo;step back&rdquo; from such a project and draw out lessons for future interventions?</p><p> In service of answering these questions I have developed three &ldquo;sense-making tools&rdquo; to work through this difficult position. A sense-making tool is an epistemological framework that comes short of a theory of causation and instead prioritizes a change in perspective on the part of the individual engaging in praxis.</p><p> Those three tools are 1) capitalism is an emergent phenomenon, 2) recursivity is an epistemology that prioritizes organized complexity over rationalized efficiency, and 3) once decoupled from its main usage in reference to the Internet, the term &ldquo;online&rdquo; is a useful means of describing and understanding humans&rsquo; relationships to networks of communication and economic exchange. These three sense-making tools are applied to two case studies, an open source condom vending machine and a mesh Wi-Fi network. Both projects employed an &ldquo;inverted critical technical practice&rdquo; methodology that brought together engineering&rsquo;s tacit ways of knowing and critical theory&rsquo;s analytic tools to foster a symbiotic working relationship between the two. I fortify this experimental approach with some classic interview and participant observation techniques to ensure sufficient data collection. Taken together, this work tells a story about the importance of thinking deeply about what we as researchers bring to our field sites, both metaphorically and literally.</p><p> By evaluating my own projects and sharing what worked and what didn&rsquo;t I aim to increase the likelihood of achieving successful projects in the future. I have prioritized understanding my case studies and subject position in terms of how to do better work in the future, not necessarily painting a perfect picture of how the world works or even should work.</p>

Thesis advisor: Peter Ireland / In Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court ruled that judges are the gatekeepers of scientific evidence, thereby bringing the debate about economic methodology to the bench. Debate about the admissibility of scientific evidence, contentious even in the natural sciences, is amplified if the discipline incorporates numerous methodological approaches. In this paper, I will consider three different approaches to economic questions—theory, experiment, and econometrics—and examine how a judge can evaluate these approaches as evidence in the courtroom. The expansion of economic reasoning in law means that this question needs to be answered in a number of areas of law, but to give a thorough examination of the different methodological approaches, this paper will limit discussion to economic evidence in tying law. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

Thesis advisor: Daniel J. McKaughan / When you learn that you disagree with an epistemic peer, what should you believe about the proposition you disagree about? The epistemology of peer disagreement has made considerable progress in answering this question. But to this point, we have largely neglected a significant resource which can help us to determine how peers who disagree can rationally respond to their disagreement. Closely examining actual disagreements in scientific and nonscientific contexts can help us to understand why peers find themselves in disagreement. And knowing why you disagree with your peer can help you to understand how you can rationally respond to your disagreement. Examining specific scientific and nonscientific disagreements shows us that some peers disagree because they disagree about what evidence is relevant to the proposition they disagree about. Dual disagreements about propositions and evidence can be found in numerous areas of disagreement, including ethical, political, philosophical, and scientific arenas. When you find yourself in these dual disagreements, you can rationally believe that your belief is rational and that your peer’s belief, though it diverges from yours, is also rational. But some philosophers have suggested that this situation in which you and your peer have rational beliefs and recognize each other as holding rational beliefs is impossible. A primary motivation for thinking that at least one of you must be believing irrationally is the thesis of Uniqueness about rationality, which states that at most one doxastic attitude can be rationally held given a body of evidence. However, when you consider the epistemic context of your actual disagreements with your peer carefully, you need not think that at least one of you is believing irrationally, even if Uniqueness is true. In response to your disagreement with a peer who disagrees with you both about what evidence is relevant to the proposition you disagree about and the proposition itself, you can even rationally hold a belief which splits the connection between your evidence and your evidence about your evidence. When we consider their epistemic contexts in full relief, peers in disagreement can simultaneously be believing rationally, even if only one of them is right. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2019. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Orientador: Jézio Hernani Bomfim Gutierre / Banca: José Carlos Pinto de Oliveira / Banca: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez / Resumo: Este trabalho resulta de uma reflexão acerca do convencionalismo na filosofia da ciência de Karl Popper. O mote central é dado pela tentativa de se compreender a crítica de Popper ao convencionalismo clássico e uma concomitante defesa popperiana do emprego de convenções na ciência. Primeiramente, ocupamo-nos da crítica ao convencionalismo. Com o fim de detectar os elementos que teriam levado Popper a rejeitar essa visão de ciência, procedemos a um exame da corrente convencionalista clássica, aqui circunscrita às obras de Henri Poincaré e Pierre Duhem, em suas contribuições à filosofia da ciência. Nesse exame, encontramos evidências que ensejam o questionamento da imagem de convencionalismo fornecida por Popper. A seguir, detivemo-nos na filosofia da ciência popperiana, comumente denominada falsificacionismo, cuja análise revela o importante papel nela desempenhado por certo convencionalismo. A contraposição das duas visões de ciência, falsificacionismo e convencionalismo, mostra que a visão popperiana da corrente convencionalista merece questionamentos e permite a afirmação de que o convencionalismo está muito menos distante do falsificacionismo do que Popper faz supor. Por fim, sugerimos que a análise do convencionalismo clássico não só se mostrou uma fonte para o tratamento de questões centrais da filosofia da ciência como também de abordagens esclarecedoras para a explicitação do método científico defendido por Popper. / Abstract: Our research is related to the discussion of conventionalism within Karl Popper's philosophy of science. Our central aim is that of understanding Popper's critique of classical conventionalism as well as his acceptance of conventions in science. In the first part of the dissertation, the Popperian attack against conventionalism is discussed. Trying to detect the elements that ground Popper's rejection of that approach, we proceed to an evaluation of the classical conventionalist proposal, here restricted to Henri Poincaré's and Pierre Duhem's contributions to the philosophy of science. In such an inquiry, we find evidences that threaten the Popperian image of conventionalism. In the sequence, we focus upon the specifically Popperian philosophy of science, usually labeled "falsificationism", and reveal the relevant role that conventionalism assumes within that philosophy of science. The resultant parallel between those different visions of science, falsificationism/conventionalism, paves the way to the conclusion that the Popperian interpretation of conventionalism is at least questionable and provides evidence to the impression that conventionalism is much closer to falsificationism than Popper would be ready to admit. Finally we maintain that the analysis of classical conventionalism, more than just a valuable tool for the treatment of central questions of the philosophy of science, provide crucial elements for the understanding of Popper's methodology of science. / Mestre