abstract: This is a study of scientific realism, and of the extent to which it is undermined by objections that have been raised by advocates of various forms of antirealism. I seek to develop and present a version of scientific realism that improves on past formulations, and then to show that standard antirealist arguments against it do not succeed. In this paper, I will first present my formulation of scientific realism, which conceives of theories as model-based and as fundamentally non-linguistic. I advocate an epistemic position that accords with indirect realism, and I review and assess the threat posed by theses of underdetermination. Next, I review and discuss three important views: the antirealist constructivist view of Thomas Kuhn, the realist view of Norwood Hanson, and the antirealist constructive empiricist view of Bas van Fraassen. I find merits and flaws in all three views. In the course of those discussions, I develop the theme that antirealists' arguments generally depend on assumptions that are open to question, especially from the perspective of the version of realism I advocate. I further argue that these antirealist views are undermined by their own tacit appeals to realism. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2013

It locally contains or heaven, or hell; There’s no third place in’t. (Webster 1993) Husbandry in its original sense is a ‘being together’, based on dwelling in a particular place. There is an intricate connection between modern science and industrialised agriculture, both of which developed on the basis of particular values associated with Good Husbandry – those which focused on individual innovation, profit-related productivity, quantitative measurement, objective, ‘puritan’ truth and control of nature. Ideals of the earth as a ‘commonwealth’, and of traditional stewardship, were down-played. The writings of Francis Bacon provide an example of a positivist, pioneering attitude which has continued to underpin modern science. In retrospect, however, these ideals sound rather one-sided. Nature herself is not well represented in the modern science relationship. In this thesis, Virgil’s Georgics and Lucretius’ de rerum natura are used to derive a poetics of Being and of Husbandry, which applies not only to the world of poetry, but to events which underlie scientific research. Virgil’s use of verbs verifies that life’s activities are shared by all living things. Lucretius asserts that even inanimate atoms both exist in themselves and are creative. ‘To be’ can be visualised as a dynamic, balancing act between striving to stay in being and longing to engage creatively with another. The basis of this thesis is that a shaping of research towards good husbandry involves a fair relationship with nature, which in turn involves the acknowledgement in writing that nature is active, dynamic and a good collaborator. Husbandry defined as a continually unfolding third place between extremes or between self and other – this holistic, concentric definition – applies at all scales, all levels of experience. This work was derived from practice-led research involving the writing of poetry and therefore the findings exist in parallel as a sequence of poems.

I aim to offer an innovative interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, first by examining how the various views that make up his ontology of individual substance involve a persistent rejection of atomism in natural philosophy and secondly, by exploring the significance of this rejection in the larger context of Seventeenth-century physics. My thesis is structured as a developmental story, each chapter analyzing the discontinuities or changes Leibniz makes to his views on individuation and atomism from his early to late years. The goal is to illuminate underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works and thus bring a clearer understanding of his philosophy. I, therefore, argue that the New System of Nature, published towards the end of Leibniz’s middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, a radical terminological and ontological shift in his metaphysics of substance. Once Leibniz elaborates the concept of “simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” the problem of individuation of his early and middle years (1663-1686) becomes secondary. The focus changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” and truly “one,” i.e., “metaphysical” atoms. I prove that this shift was marked by a two-tiered critical confrontation: a first, direct confrontation, 1) with Descartes’ physics, through the critique of the notion of extended matter and of Descartes’ principle of individuation through shared motion and, a second confrontation, 2) with different strands of Seventeenth-century atomism, including Cartesian Gérauld de Cordemoy’s quasi-“metaphysical” atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ individuating principle. I claim that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to formulate a more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology (1714). My analysis complicates a persistent scholarly assumption in recent Leibniz studies, claiming that, throughout his entire career, Leibniz continued to hold the same fundamental positions on substance, individuation and, implicitly, atoms. Against this type of general continuity thesis, I show that: 1) far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in what makes substances individual fades towards the end of his life (New Essays 1703, correspondence with Samuel Clarke, 1714); 2) I trace the changing fate of some of Leibniz’s early and middle period views on substance and the individual (the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, space-time as individuating properties) in his late works; and 3) I prove the claim that Leibniz really embraced atomism, either for a short time or all throughout his philosophy is problematic. While he does refer to some sort of atoms during his Paris period (1672-1676), this is insufficient proof of a commitment to atomism. Instead, the episode has to be understood in the broader framework of a bundle of interrelated issues, such as the problem of the cohesion of bodies and the problem of minds or mind-like principles individuating those bodies. Thus, as I show through an analysis of Leibniz’s arguments against atomism in the correspondences with his scientific contemporaries (Christiaan Huyghens 1692-1695, Nicholas Hartsoeker 1706-1714), rejecting physical atomism remains a fundamental and surprisingly constant point of his philosophy.

This thesis is a response to the increasingly widespread belief in the potential for technology and modern science to enable finite subjects to overcome the essential limitations constitutive of finitude and, hence, subjectivity. It investigates the truth and extent of such claims, taking as its focus quasi-miraculous technological developments in neuroscience, in particular Brain-Computer Interfacing systems and cognitive imaging technologies. The work poses the question of whether such emergent neurotechnologies signal a profound shift beyond receptivity and finitude by effectively bridging the gap between interiority and exteriority. Organised around a quadripartite division, the thesis pursues this idea firstly with regard to the act of artistic creation; secondly through an exegesis of Kant’s account of the original or infinite creativity of the Supreme Being; thirdly through readings of Freud and Jung and their respective models of the psyche; and finally through an interrogation into the possibility of telepathy and the various ways in which it can be conceived. Each chapter thus takes place as an extended thought experiment, exploring the consequences of a seemingly unprecedented proposition that promises to eradicate the finite gap between internal and external. This is followed to the limits of conceivability before asking in each case whether we may in fact need to rethink the very premises around which each proposition has framed the problem.

The recent surge in academic theorizing of the nation and nationalism has made it difficult to isolate the actual phenomena from their constructions as objects of theory. This is all the more difficult because most contemporary theories are grounded in unacknowledged political agendas that to a significant extent generate the theories independently of the phenomena. Chapter 1 focuses on “antinational-ist” theories of the nation—theories that deny the reality of nations or fundamentally delegitimate them as retrogressive or inherently oppressive political forms. Such a theory rejects the nation primarily because it is inconsistent with the theorist's uncritically assumed political ideology. In Chapter 2, I examine theories that do not reject the nation, but rather control its form—again in line with a particular political agenda or ideology. Such a theory allows the reality and/or legitimacy of nations, but only (1) after theoretically misconstruing them as consistent with (and possibly servants of) the theorist's specific ideology or (2) by limiting approval to only those nations that are in line with this ideology. I stress the important practical consequences of this: when backed by powerful institutions and forces, such a theory of the nation supports the coerced transformation of minor or post-colonial nations to fit it. These critiques expose the complexities of nations and nationalisms that most theories fail to register, due to their limiting assumptions. In Chapter 3, I develop an account of the nation sufficiently comprehensive to capture this complexity. Perhaps most importantly, my account does not reduce the nation to just one type of social force, political relation, identity characteristic, narrative structure, or “false consciousness”—which virtually all other theories do. All “unity” associated with the nation is partial: any presumed universal unity is always cut by gaps or discontinuities. A nation exists where the discontinuities are bridged by some alternate connector, by another type of relation. I then consider the relationship of nation to race, gender, and sexuality, as well as to state and ethnicity. Finally, I develop a novel concept of national “self-determination” as conceptual self- definition, not territorial control.

Media psychology involves the scientific examination of the cognitive processes and behavior involved in the selection, use, interpretation, and effects of communication across a variety of media (e.g., via the Internet, television, telephone, film). Media are central to people's lives, with projections indicating that an average person spent over 3,515 hours using media in 2012. New technologies are increasing the importance of media. Data from two content analyses demonstrate the underrepresentation of media psychology in mainstream psychological literature and in undergraduate and graduate psychology course offerings. We argue for the importance of a psychological approach to the study of media because of its presence in people's lives and because psychologists use it in their research and their choices may affect the external validity of their findings. We provide a useful framework from which psychologists can approach the study of media, and we conclude with recommendations for further areas of scientific inquiry relevant to psychological science.

I argue that a probabilistic logical language incorporates all the features of deductive, inductive, and abductive inference with the exception of how to generate hypotheses ex nihilo. In the context of abduction, it leads to the Bayes theorem for confirming hypotheses, and naturally captures the theoretical virtue of quantitative parsimony. I address common criticisms against this approach, including how to assign probabilities to sentences, the problem of the catch-all hypothesis, and the problem of auxiliary hypotheses. Finally, I make a tentative argument that mathematical deduction fits in the same probabilistic framework as a deterministic limiting case.

Purpose: This article provides an empirical identification of groups of marketing scholars who share common beliefs about the role of science and the logic of scientific discovery. Design: We use Topology Representing Network quantization to empirically identify classes of marketing researchers within a representative sample of marketing professors. Findings: We find six distinct classes of marketing scholars. They differ with regard to popularity (size) and productivity (levels of publication output). Comparing the sub-samples of German-speaking and US respondents shows cross-cultural differences. Value: The study enhances our understanding of the current scientific orientation(s) of marketing. It may help to motivate marketing scholars to ponder on their own positions and assist them in judging where they may belong. Future comparisons over time would give us indication about the future of the academic discipline of marketing.(author's abstract)

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This project foregrounds two undertheorized features of Heidegger’s philosophy of science: his critique of physicalism and the positive counterpart to his critiques of modern science. Chapters 1–2 examine Heidegger’s early work up to Being and Time. Chapters 3–4 focus on Heidegger’s post–Being and Time work. Chapter 1 refutes the widespread view (advanced, for instance, by Joseph Rouse, Hubert Dreyfus, and Robert Brandom) that the early Heidegger thinks science generally studies entities that instantiate a mode of being that he calls presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). I call this the Vorhandenheit claim; I reconstruct and refute three arguments on its behalf. I argue that Heidegger thinks modern physicalistic science, rather than science or natural science as such, privileges the study of present-at-hand things. Chapter 2 develops my positive interpretation of the early Heidegger’s philosophy of science. Heidegger’s “existential” conception of science (which, I argue, has roots in Aristotle’s ethics) posits a special connection between science, truth, and authenticity. Heidegger also thinks that modernity is physicalistic. I discuss physicalism’s negative consequences and trace Heidegger’s analysis of its roots in Aristotle and Descartes. I also compare Heidegger with key Anglophone philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn, W. V. Quine, and Helen Longino. Chapter 3 discusses Heidegger’s analysis of quantum physics and his dialogue with Werner Heisenberg. Many (such as Taylor Carman and Trish Glazebrook) interpret Heidegger as a deflationist on quantum physics’s historical significance vis-à-vis classical physics. But on my reading, Heidegger is ambivalent. I unpack Heidegger’s non-deflationary remarks about quantum physics. I then argue that his ambivalence about physics reflects and informs his ambivalence about the relationship between early modernity and the late-modern “technological” age. Chapter 4 asks how science might be reformed in response to Heidegger’s criticisms. I examine why Heidegger’s vision for science reform led him to support the Nazis. I then offer a sketch of a Heideggerian science consistent with liberal-democratic principles. Heideggerian science would promote pluralistic and philosophically-historically informed research at the potential cost of highly specialized research and technological development. I also compare liberal-democratic Heideggerian science with the accounts offered by Paul Feyerabend, Helen Longino, and Philip Kitcher. / 2025-01-24T00:00:00Z