Inaug.-diss.--Leipzig. / Autobiographical sketch. References: p. [73]-74.

Thesis (M.A.)--Cincinnati Christian Seminary, 1986. / Abstract. "#031-0026." Thesis originally submitted to Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1986, and accepted, with minor changes, by Cincinnati Christian Seminary for their M.A. degree in 1986, according to Trinity's librarian 3/87. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-151).

Inaug.-diss.--Leipzig. / Autobiographical sketch. Bibliography: p. [73]-74.

<p> Exploring the symbolism of the eye alongside the ancient religious concept of the omniscient Eye of God, this dissertation engages in a depth psychological analysis of consciousness, the God-image, and postmodern notions of the apocalypse. By considering all aspects of the eye as represented throughout mythology and religious texts, this study addresses everything from blindness to the comprehensive sight of mystical union. The one-eyed Cyclops, the Eye of Horus, the figure of the many-eyed Argus, and the third eye of the Buddha are examples that elucidate the range of eye types addressed. </p><p> The penetrating image of the eye as it emerges within the unconscious in dreams and visions is given ample consideration through the work of Carl Jung and other prominent depth psychologists. Theories regarding the archetypal dimension of the eye are discussed including Jung&rsquo;s contention that the eye acts as a regulating principle, or <i>yantra</i> within the psyche, restoring balance in times of psychological chaos, upheaval, and transition. As the nucleus of a psychic mandala, the eye serves as a centering force while simultaneously making its numinous presence clear and felt to the individual ego. Edward Edinger&rsquo;s contention that the eye marks the ego&rsquo;s encounter with an overwhelming other is given credence while the difference between a feeling-tone of judgment versus equanimity perceived by the observed is weighed.</p><p> Connecting eye symbolism to the God-image, this dissertation embarks upon an exegesis of the eye in religious texts and challenges the omniscient Eye of God in its traditional projected, sky-bound sense. Arguing for personal responsibility in relation to the God-image, this study advocates for a reengagement with <i>anima mundi</i> or the world soul through the advancement of consciousness on a personal level. The recognition of the immanence of divinity and the need for an earth-based religiosity is emphasized. This study points out that eye symbolism is cropping up with increasing regularity in our current, apocalyptically entranced culture in an effort to jolt us from an unconscious slumber and provide the necessary psychic objectivity required to survive a planetary transformation.</p><p> Keywords: Apocalypse, Consciousness, Depth Psychology, Eye, God-Image, Mythology, Objectivity, Postmodern, Self, Witness</p>

This thesis analyses why the practice of vivisection captured the imagination of a small section of late-Victorian society, and how these individuals articulated their concerns. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this study brings together the texts of both anti and pro-vivisectionists to place literary texts alongside medical textbooks and illustrations, essays and campaigning leaflets to suggest a representation of the vivisector throughout the different texts assembled. The first chapter explores the interaction, in print, between activist Frances Power Cobbe and physiologist, Elie de Cyon alongside the ways in which the antivivisectionists used images of vivisected animals, sourced from scientific manuals, to assist in constructing the movement’s identity. The second chapter analyses the lecture notes of two young medical students published as The Shambles of Science (1903) and how the authors strived to secure a literary representation for pain. These findings will then pave the way for an examination of how anti-vivisection rhetoric influenced fiction. The next chapter is concerned with the relationship between the ‘heart’ and ‘science’ and considers the more positive outcomes for those existing on the periphery of scientific experimentation. The fourth chapter examines the relationship between vivisection and hydrophobia, while simultaneously considering the implications of nurturing the young vivisector. The final chapter examines how the signature of the vivisectionist can be read through the incisions made on the surface of the opened body. By delving into these interactive, textual and imaginative bodies, this chapter explores the ways in which the vivisected body, traced by the scalpel and relayed by the instrumentation of the laboratory became a literary object.

This thesis seeks to examine to what extent certain Buddhist theories of causation are comparable with the causal theories of some British empiricist philosophers. The thesis starts with an introduction. Its first chapter critically analyses Hume's causal theory, while the second points out that its similarity with the causal theories of Buddhist logicians such as Santaraksita and Kamalasila. Both Hume and these logicians criticised the concepts of causal efficacy and production, and analysed causal connections merely as relations of unvarying sequence. The third chapter critically analyses Mill's causal theory (and, to a certain extent, that of Berkeley), indicating that cause' is a collective name for a complex set of conditions. The fourth chapter points out that the Buddhist 'Theravada' and 'Sarvastivada' schools anticipated Mill's theory of the multiplicity of conditions. Moreover, the 'Sarvastivadins' introduced concepts similar to that of Mill's 'negative conditions'. We also tried to compare and contrast Russell's theory of 'functional interdependence' with Buddhist causal theories. In addition, we suggested that by different devices the Buddhist philosophers and Mill saved themselves from the inconguity of admitting any arbitrary sequence as a causal sequence. Chapter V tries to prove that the Buddhist formula of the 'twelve-membered dependent Origination' contains the incipient attempts of analysing causation only in terms of 'necessary and sufficeint conditions. Chapter VI shows that the concepts of causation and production are co-extensive. Thus there is a dilemma of explaining causation without production. Realization of this probably led the 'Madhyamika' philosophers to deny causation from the Absolute standpoint. Chapter VII points out that the absence, in Buddhist philosophy, of any distinction - corresponding to that made by some recent Western philosophers - between reasons for actions and causes does not invalidate our comparative study. The appendix to chapter I reiterates Hume's thesis, viz., that causes and effects are not related by logically necessary connections, pointing out that its validity is not disapproved by the recent theories of some philosophers, e.g., Blanshard and Kneale.

The purpose of this enquiry is to determine what relation might exist between Doctrine, or statement about Supreme Reality, and Experience of It. To this end, teachings about deity, the claimed sources of knowledge of It and the content of such experience have been examined, prior to considering what relation might exist between the two. The thesis is, therefore, considered that knowledge of Supreme Reality is derived from the experiences of the self, whether objective or subjective, empirical or mystical, and especially from an increasing self-knowledge and the accompanying moral, social and spiritual awareness. The underlying assumption is that Doctrine is primarily an assertion and summary of such Experience and that, if it is to possess any degree of authority, it must clearly be related to experience. Doctrine is, therefore, considered to be centrally-initiated and involving the whole self, and, as knowledge of the self increases , so the Ood-concept grows and develops, from a philosophical Absolute, with basically metaphysical attributes, to a Personal God rooted in man's affective and volitional nature, as Creator perhaps, but more especially as Father, Helper and Friend. In his self-understanding, in particular, then, man discovers and comes to know the Reality which is immanent but yet transcendent, in a synthesis of experience and a progressive articulation of life as an orientation towards that which ultimately transcends* Doctrine, then, is subject to change and development but also to limitations necessarily imposed by a certain conceptual ambience and religious milieu; by the significance end relevance of an earlier or later illative process and by the standpoints and culture of the age in which any experient lives.

Philosophical theories of religion often appeal to supposed facts about the way religions change and, in particular, to the role of innovators. This, is true of theories that stress the priority of experience and the priority of language. In this thesis an historical case study of innovation in religion is used as evidence of the inadequacy of both these sorts of theories and to suggest that same form of 'institutional' theory would form a base for a more satisfactory theory of religion. Consideration is given to William James' and Alasdair McIntyre's accounts of religion and the implications of these for the roles of innovators. A case study of George Fox, wham they both invoke, is shown to validate neither, but to raise several general requirements for a theory of religion if it is satisfactorily to characterize innovation. The problems that arise in meeting these requirements in both empiricist theories and current theories derived fran Wittgenstein's ideas about language are surveyed. Problems encountered in attempts at setting up institutional theories in the field of aesthetics are considered. Any sort of essentialist theory or theories which see institutions solely in terms of bodies of people are rejected. Institutions are characterized'rather as repetitive forms of behaviour that have special representative or expressive meaning for a human community. It is demonstrated that the central concepts of religions - religious activities, religious objects and religious experiences - are institutional concepts. The criticisms that an institutional theory will inevitably lead to unacceptable forms of essentialism, relativism and naturalism, are faced and shown to be unfounded. It is concluded that it is possible to set up an institutional theory of religion that offers a satisfactory characterization of innovation in religion.

abstract: This project examines and challenges the West's generally accepted two category approach to the world's belief systems. That is, it will deconstruct the religion / science `paradigm' that has developed over the past two centuries. It will argue that the dichotomy between the two categories was created by modernity for the purpose of establishing an exclusive view believed to be based on knowledge. This exclusive view, philosophical naturalism (science), was set in opposition to all alternative views identified as religion. As the exclusive view, though constructed on a defective foundation of knowledge, philosophical naturalism, nonetheless, became the privileged interpreter and explainer of reality in the academy of the Western world. As a work in the area of epistemology and the philosophy of religion, this project will challenge philosophical naturalism's claim to knowledge. The approach will be philosophical and historical critically assessing both modernity's and postmodernity's basis for knowledge. Without a rational basis for exclusive knowledge the popular dichotomy dissolves. The implications of this dissolution for `religious studies' will be addressed by offering an alternative scheme that provides a more plausible way to divide the world's belief systems. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Religious Studies 2014

<p> Cartesian dualism is analyzed as a psychological image, instead of as a philosophical proposition. This is done by first arguing that elements of existing commentary are indicative of a psychological complex, acting unconsciously, in contemporary academic communities. As a hermeneutic study, these elements are then further interpreted through a Jungian lens, specifically cultural complex theory. Myth is used to highlight and identify the deep psychological structures that are active in what I am calling <i>the Cartesian Split complex.</i> In this new context, possible origins are explored in cultural history, as well as its purpose, with potential lessons offered for a wide range of academic fields, including depth psychology. Specifically, there is a call to refine terminology used for consciousness, as well as for the overall mind-body dichotomy. Also, a new approach is offered for the history of consciousness. Most importantly, a diagnosis is given concerning the present nature of consciousness, and a potential remedy is offered, in the form of a new reading of the original texts. Such a new reading, however, depends on a new perspective, that which is constructed by the present study.</p><p>