There are few doubts about the significance of science and technology for modern human culture and society. But as historians, we are still struggling to find appropriate descriptive terms to capture the broad processes of transformation brought about by “techno-science,” the merging of technical production and modern institutionalized science. This dissertation argues that the term “experience” may serve as such an analytic lens in the specific historical setting of German aviation research from the 1920s through 1945. I reconstruct, on the one hand, the theorization of experience as a concept by the technical physicist Paul von Handel, influenced by the British astronomer Sir Arthur Eddington’s distinction between "scientific" and "everyday" experience. On the other hand, I use the term as a historian’s analytic concept to investigate practices in the context of flight experiments that I take to be constitutive of my historical actors’ experiences. These are recordings of experimental pilots’ cognitive judgements and bodily actions, some of them—such as in-flight note taking—continuous with older cultural technologies. On both of these levels of analysis, I explore the different resonances of “experience” as a term with a legacy as a central epistemological concept in the modern sciences, and as capturing the changing everyday reality in an increasingly technicized environment. My analysis of the textual theorization and simultaneous practical constitution of "techno-scientific experience" serves to read in a new light the story of the pilot and physicist Melitta Schiller-Stauffenberg. Of Jewish descent, Schiller chose to work for the Luftwaffe, the German air force, until her death in 1945 on a flight searching for her husband, Count Alexander Stauffenberg, who was imprisoned after his brother’s failed attempt to assassinate Hitler. The concept and practical reality of “experience” are key to understanding the two striking choices Schiller made as intrinsically connected: the professional choice of working simultaneously as a pilot and a physicist, and the political choice of supporting the Reich’s war effort. Schiller’s story may be understood as exemplifying the fragile identity of the experiencing and the knowing self in 20th-century techno-scientific modernity. / History of Science

<p> One of Carnap&rsquo;s overarching aims was to set philosophy on a firm scientific footing. He relied primarily on two ideas to achieve his ideal of a scientific philosophy: verificationism, according to which only empirically testable or logically determinate sentences are meaningful, and the Principle of Tolerance, which held that we are free to choose whichever system of empirical knowledge is most expedient. The logical empiricism embodied in these views is is widely believed to have been decisively refuted by a variety of objections. </p><p> My dissertation seeks to clarify the content and aims of Carnap&rsquo;s tolerance and verificationism, and to defend the resulting view against some of the most influential objections to logical empiricism. I argue that both tolerance and verificationism are manifestations of Carnap&rsquo;s fundamentally pragmatic conception of scientific language; for Carnap, precise formulations of scientific theory&mdash;&ldquo;languages for science&rdquo;&mdash; are to be viewed as instruments for the derivation of intersubjective observational knowledge. </p><p> Verificationism, on my interpretation, is the decision to narrow one&rsquo;s options for a language for science to those languages in which every sentence is either empirically testable or logically determinate. This decision is motivated by Carnap&rsquo;s pragmatism: any sentence that is neither empirically testable nor logically determinate makes no contribution to the aim with which the pragmatist uses scientific language. </p><p> I use this pragmatist account of verificationism to respond to two objections. The first is Hilary Putnam&rsquo;s version of the argument that verificationism is neither empirical nor analytic, and is therefore meaningless by its own lights. According to Putnam, Carnap&rsquo;s construal of verificationism as significant in a practical, but non-cognitive, sense, in response to the objection, presupposes verificationism. Carnap&rsquo;s response is therefore viciously circular. I respond that Carnap&rsquo;s non-cognitive conception of verificationism presupposes pragmatism, and not verificationism, and thereby avoids Putnam&rsquo;s circularity. Second, there is a widespread belief that verificationism requires a criterion of empirical significance in order to demarcate the empirically testable sentences, but that no such criterion can be formulated. I reply that by adopting the pragmatic conception, the verificationist can select her favored language in the case-by-case manner described by Goldfarb and Ricketts, without a criterion of empirical significance. </p><p> Carnap&rsquo;s pragmatism maintains that the goal of scientific language is the derivation of observation reports. It therefore helps itself to a notion of observation report, of observation language. This notion is another major source of skepticism about logical empiricism. I argue that Carnap&rsquo;s account of observation language in &ldquo;Testability and Meaning&rdquo; is sufficient for the purposes of his pragmatism. On this account, a term is observational to the extent that it can be applied on the basis of minimal observation and inference. A degree of observationality can then be arbitrarily designated sufficient and necessary for a term&rsquo;s being observational in the language. I show that this approach to fixing the observation language is not vulnerable to van Fraassen&rsquo;s objections. </p><p> Finally, pragmatism helps to clarify Carnap&rsquo;s Principle of Tolerance. According to a widely held view, Carnap&rsquo;s tolerance rests on &ldquo;relativity to language&rdquo;: since a language for science provides the rules for inquiry&mdash;be these semantic or evidential rules&mdash;language cannot itself be subject to such rules. So interpreted, the Principle of Tolerance is able to provide a critique of what I call &lsquo;first philosophy&rsquo;, i.e., the doctrine that the choice of concepts or rules in science can be constrained by considerations external to these rules. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)</p>

<p> Over the past several decades, science advocacy organizations have increasingly participated in discussions of the relationship between science and religion to the public, mainly to counteract the resurgence of anti-evolution activities across the country, to address misconceptions and misunderstandings about science and religion, and to help make science more palatable and less threatening to religious believers. These engagements with religion have primarily involved four organizations: the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the National Center for Science Education (NCSE), and the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History (SNMNH). In their engagements with religion, each of these organizations has simultaneously employed two distinct lines of operation: (1) defending science against anti-science religions and movements and (2) engaging science-friendly religions and the religious public. These lines of operation are driven by key objectives and supported by specific strategies and tactics to achieve those objectives, which this paper seeks to explore and analyze. Key findings and recommendations for science advocacy organizations' ongoing and future engagements with religion are provided.</p>

<p> This study examines the loss of original principles that distinguish ancient Western philosophy as a valid conceptual framework for political theory and practice. I explore how the Philosophic Tradition as a centuries-old foundation of inquiry and discourse loses its significance and finally its authority in the postmodern world. With the exclusion of metaphysical reflection and reason as a basis for understanding human existential and political phenomena, the transition to Historicism and Philosophic Positivism effectively redefined the nature and application of politics. Critical to this research and serving as a focal point of this study are the works of theorist and originator of the Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte. I analyze the author's several volumes, these dedicated to establishing a new foundation of political thought, one in which scientific inquiry would serve as the ground for seeking truth and knowledge and as a basis for methodologically directing social and political reorganization. Essentially, Positive politics would as the theorist proposed, be free of abstract speculation (metaphysics) and work to reframe human nature by achieving a universal social state defined by `Order and Progress' and a futuristic system of advancement alike to no other period in human history. As this study examines this prophesy, it takes into view the rise and popularity of the Positive Philosophy from ancient perspectives to modern and postmodern Western thought. It further illustrates the resistance to and eventual replacement of traditional theoretical foundations leaving an indelible imprint on political philosophy which had experienced a profound transformation from its pre-scientific origins. Once as truth-seeking, self-critical and reflective as to moral values and ethical considerations of justice, prudence, and the public good, the Positive Philosophy would serve instead as the ground and authority for, as Comte envisaged, a modification of human existence. Thus politics reformulated was set to task in ordering the social world into its mission of productivity and progress and reconciling its vision of human perfectibility with a proposed end to political conflict.</p>

<p> The emergence of transnational practices of publicity challenges the established political theories of democracy, which presuppose a national citizenry and a national democratic state. The subjects of transnational public spheres lack a common citizenship status to develop legitimate public opinion, as well as corresponding decision-making institutions to address their demands. However, by creating solidarity, building legitimate public opinion and communicating their demands on the base of alternative premises, transnational public spheres defy Westphalian assumptions. The World Social Forum serves as a paradigmatic case: while it develops new types of solidarity "among strangers" through horizontal debate and articulation, it unfolds antagonistic forms of communication with global neoliberal institutions of power. </p><p> This dissertation aims to contribute to the debate on the critical function of the notion of publicity in the context of globalization. Drawing on Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy and Mouffe's democratic theory of "agonistic pluralism," I examine the World Social Forum's forms of communication, creation of solidarity and legitimation of alternative discourses. Agonistic and deliberative theories of democracy have been traditionally regarded as antithetical, since the former stress conflict and dissent, while the latter emphasize dialogue and consensus. However, the analysis of political experiences like the World Social Forum not only shows that both perspectives are not fully incompatible, but also that they are both necessary to grasp the complexity of actual transnational publicity. In particular, I argue that the combination of these theories reveals one of the main characteristics of the WSF: the merging of antagonistic and consensual practices of communication.</p>

<p> This dissertation investigates Platonic political philosophy as a possible means for understanding the relationship between knowledge and power. Via a close reading of Heinrich Meier's early work on Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, it attempts to articulate how political philosophy in Meier's sense works, as well as to carry out <i>in actu</i> a piece of interpretation in accord with its characteristic approach. It finds that Meier "purifies" (<i>kathairo</i>) the figures of Schmitt and Strauss into the exemplars of political theology and political philosophy, respectively; that he traces postmodern relativism back to its roots in a moral-theological view associated with revelation; that he is able in this way to sharpen the distinction between political theology and political philosophy, and, more generally, between the orders of knowledge and of power; and that these orders, despite much obvious interpenetration, are incommensurable in view of their extreme cases. Further, it finds that political philosophy operates in the interrogative mode for questioning the assertions and commands of political and theological authorities, and the hypothetical subjunctive mode for protecting itself, and philosophy generally, from persecution at the hands of such authorities; in addition, it employs these modes to gain insight into its own possibility and necessity, or to progress in self-knowledge. Finally, it finds that political philosophy makes a characteristic turn (<i>periagoge</i>) toward the good, and that this is only justified if the good sticks to the real or if truth is somehow primary or if not everything is possible.</p>

<p> My dissertation lies at the philosophical intersection of the American pragmatist tradition and contemporary epistemology. By treating truth, justification, and belief as matters of degree, I develop a measure of knowledge that captures all of our fundamental intuitions while providing answers to the problems of epistemic luck, skepticism, and scientific pessimism. </p><p> Traditionally, knowledge is understood as justified true belief that is not due to luck. My project follows this general outline. First, I describe the pragmatist understanding of truth first articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce in the late nineteenth century. My first chapter offers Peirce's understanding of truth as the best explanation of our intuitive understanding of what it is for a proposition to be the case and shows how we can understand Peirce's theory as compatible with contemporary theories of truth. </p><p> In my second chapter, I develop a theory of belief such that an agent believes a proposition when she acts as if that proposition were a rule governing her behavior. On this view, beliefs are theoretical entities posited to make sense of other agents' actions. Following this account of belief, I describe what it is for a belief to be true and argue that sense of truth in which beliefs are true is best understood as an approximation of the full descriptive truth. </p><p> My third, fourth, and fifth chapters are an account of justification. Chapter 3 is a descriptive account of synchronic justification: we all reject or accept propositions in accordance with maximizing the coherence of our belief-networks. Chapters 4 and 5 articulate and then defend a new measure of diachronic justification, which is a measure of the degree to which a belief is appropriately revisable and therefore embeddable in an ongoing process of fallibilist inquiry. I develop a novel formal quantification of methodological justification and show that it gives plausible results when applied to popular cases. </p><p> My final chapter brings justification, truth, and belief together into a scalar knowledge measure. I locate my theory in ongoing epistemic inquiry, describing its conceptual advantages over rival theories as well as its ability to replicate their successes.</p>

<p>This dissertation presents some of the first work written and published on the Zero Force Evolutionary Law (McShea and Brandon 2010). It is a collection of four philosophy of biology papers, which together, illustrate the importance of the Zero Force Evolutionary Law (ZFEL) spanning evolutionary studies. In particular, this dissertation includes issues in the history of philosophy of science (chapter 1), group formation and network theory (chapter 2), biological hierarchy and the major transitions in evolution (chapter 3), and the Price equation and quantifying evolutionary change (chapter 4). While these four chapters may differ in focus, they make the same general claim: evolutionary methods and explanations are improved when the underlying tendency of biological systems is characterized correctly as exhibiting increasing variance.</p> / Dissertation

Evolution by natural selection began as a biological concept, but since Darwin it has been recognized to have broader application than biology. Applying evolutionary ideas beyond biology requires that the principles of evolution by natural selection be abstracted and generalized from the biological case. The received view of evolution by natural selection in biology is itself seriously flawed, which understandably renders the project of abstracting it and applying it elsewhere challenging. This thesis develops a generalized account of models of evolution by natural selection which is used to resolve various outstanding issues in the philosophy of biology. This also clarifies the methods and prospects of applying evolution by natural selection to non-biological domains. It does so by analyzing models of evolution both within biology and outside it, relying in particular on the contrast provided by models of firm competition in evolutionary economics. This analysis highlights those aspects of the classical view which must be abandoned or revised, and leads to the development of a neo-dynamical model of evolution, which is developed, explained, defended, and applied to problems in evolutionary biology and multi-level selection theory.

Thesis (PH.D.) -- Syracuse University, 2007. / "Publication number AAT 3281766"