Technological mediation| The implications of technology on the human experience

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li Taiwan da xue, 1965. / Reproduced from typescript, on double leaves. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 145 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Louise M. Antony, Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 142-145).

<p> This dissertation compares Trinitarian and Buddhist epistemologies relative to the benchmark of scientific knowledge. To this end, it first develops a methodological framework for this comparison and then derives a comparative benchmark from the post-positivist philosophy of science. The methodological framework is developed by combining Francis Clooney's comparative theology with Robert John Russell's method for the Creative Mutual Interaction (CMI) of theology and science. The comparative benchmark is given by the Peircian triadic circuit since this circuit emerges as a methodological invariant within the post-positivist philosophy of science.</p><p> Trinitarian and Buddhist epistemologies are therefore compared in terms of their respective abilities to ground the Peircian circuit. However, since the Peircian circuit involves a harmonious integration of three distinct operations within a single noetic process, the ability to ground this circuit presupposes a solution to the one-and-many problem. Thus, Trinitarian and Buddhist epistemologies are <i>ultimately</i> compared in terms of their respective approaches to the one-and-many problem.</p><p> To this end, Theravada, Zen, and Tibetan Buddhist epistemologies are compared with Trinitarian epistemology. These Buddhist Schools have been chosen due to their active participation in the Buddhism-and-science dialogue. Prior to making this each tradition receives a detailed philosophical exposition in which its epistemology is derived from its metaphysical commitment to oneness, manyness, or some combination of the two. Finally, these systems are compared in terms of their respective abilities to solve the one-and-many problem and hence to ground the Peircian circuit.</p><p> This comparison shows that Trinitarian theology can ground the Peircian circuit because it has a both/and approach to the one-and-many problem and also supports an exhaustive cosmic personalism. By contrast, Theravadin Abhidhamma fails outright because its radical pluralism dissolves the human mind and hence all three Peircian operations. Between these two extremes, Tibetan Madhyamaka and Zen provide a dialectic of oneness and manyness in which the Peircian circuit is neither grounded nor destroyed. For these last two systems, therefore, the Peircian circuit emerges as a <i>de facto</i> structure of conventional knowledge.</p>

<p> Philosopher of science Wilfrid Sellars argues that there are two mutually exclusive images of human-in-the-world that philosophy ought to unify: the "manifest image" of common, shared experience and the "scientific image" of imperceptible objects. Process philosophy, as a metaphysical framework, is in a unique position to allow both images to sit together in dynamic tension, rather than allowing one image to collapse into the other. Not only do I maintain that process philosophy is logically robust, but I also argue that there are several instances of empirical verification of process as an ontology.</p><p> Taking a process ontology seriously, however, requires that we re-articulate an understanding of the two grand narratives that are utilized to explain our origins: the socio-cultural evolution of consciousness and the objective evolution of the universe. I call these the <i>history of science</i> and the <i>science of history,</i> respectively. In Western academia, the <i>science of history</i> is usually given ontological priority; but within a process metaphysic, neither can be said to be explanatorily primary. That which holds these two narratives together, and that which produces spacetime itself, I refer to as "pretemporal origination." The mode through which this process elicits evolution is through creative-discovery, wherein creation and discovery are not two separate modes of mind-universe interaction, but unified on a continuum of constraints.</p>

Scientific realists and non-realists disagree over the reach of scientific knowledge: does it extend beyond the observational realm. Intuitions about abductive inferences are at the heart of many realist positions, but are brought into question by the non-realists' contention that theories are underdetermined by data, and the alleged circularity of realist attempts to show that such inferences are reliable. Some realists have tried to circumvent this problem by constructing methodological arguments for realism: if realism is embedded in scientific practice, the realist's picture of science might provide the best explanation of scientific success. Some non-realists reply by again pointing to the circularity of this strategy, which relies, again, on an abductive inference. Others deny that scientists do adopt realist stances. A methodological realist position is constructed: realist constraints on the acceptance and pursuit of theories-for instance requirements of intertheoretic coherence, and the avoidance of ad hoc explanation-have often contributed to progress in science. The position is immune to non-realist worries about the circularity of realist arguments, for it is a thesis about how science is practised, not the kind of knowledge it provides. The argument is pursued within a diachronic account of theory appraisal: Imre Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) examines the principles that govern the construction of theories, and provides criteria-achievement of progress-for the appraisal of research programmes. Although Lakatos may have seen these selection criteria, when fulfilled, as symptoms of something else-the fulfilment in the theory's development of some ideal of scientific honesty-achievement of Lakatosian progress can Serve as an end in itself. The realist methods mentioned in the last paragraph are then appraised as means to this end. Since the position has a methodological formulation and background, it is applied as a historical thesis to case studies in line with Lakatos' metamethodology. These comprise two explanatory forays into history: the consistency of Bohr's 1913 model of the atom, and the construction by Heisenberg and Schrodinger of the two original formulations of quantum mechanics. There follows one contemporary application: the construction of explanations in quantum chemistry using approximate models of molecules.

<p> Models of memory in cognitive science and philosophy have traditionally explained human remembering in terms of storage and retrieval. This tendency has been entrenched by reliance on computationalist explanations over the course of the twentieth century; even research programs that eschew computationalism in name, or attempt the revision of traditional models, demonstrate tacit commitment to computationalist assumptions. It is assumed that memory must be stored by means of an isomorphic trace, that memory processes must divide into conceptually distinct systems and phases, and that human remembering consists in inner, cognitive processes that are implemented by distinct neural processes. This dissertation draws on recent empirical work, and on philosophical arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, to demonstrate that this latent computationalism in the study of memory is problematic, and that it can and should be eliminated. Cognitive psychologists studying memory have encountered numerous data in recent decades that belie archival models. In cognitive neuroscience, establishing the neural basis of storage and retrieval processes has proven elusive. A number of revised models on offer in memory science, that have taken these issues into account, fail to sufficiently extricate the archival framework. Several impasses in memory science are products of these underlying computationalist assumptions. Wittgenstein and other philosophers offer a number of arguments against the need for, and the efficacy of, the storage and retrieval of traces in human remembering. A study of these arguments clarifies the ways that these computationalist assumptions are presently impeding the science of memory, and provides ways forward in removing them. We can and should characterize and model human memory without invoking the storage and retrieval of traces. A range of work in connectionism, dynamical systems theory, and recent philosophical accounts of memory demonstrate how the science of memory can proceed without these assumptions, toward non-archival models of remembering.</p>

Evolutionary psychology has recently developed out of dissatisfaction with the Standard Social Science Model utilised by mainstream psychology. This model focuses on culture and reason as the underlying cause of human behaviour and proposes that the mind is a 'general purpose learning device' (Siegert & Ward, 2002). Here the mind is seen as a blank slate at birth, which is subsequently influenced by experience, environment and culture. Biological variables are minimised or ignored. However it seems that all human behaviour cannot fully be explained by the focus on nurture in the Standard Social Science Model; sexual jealousy, parental investment, and mating preferences are examples which are not fully explained by learning or environmental experience. On the other hand, evolutionary psychology, founded on the principles of cognitive science and evolutionary biology, argues that a person's nature is the primary cause of their behaviour, with the influences of nurture being of lesser importance. According to these principles, evolutionary psychology has been very successful in providing explanations, for example in the areas of human mate selection and parental investment. However evolutionary psychology has received criticism on a number of counts, including its supposed reductionism, and, its reliance on 'just so' stories which are untestable, hypothesised scenarios which look to the past in order to explain the evolution of human behavioural features. With the above mentioned matters as background, this thesis investigated whether evolutionary psychology offers a new paradigm for integrating psychology with science, and if so, how it accomplishes this. In investigating this, conceptions of science, psychology, and evolutionary theory, in particular evolutionary psychology, were examined. More specifically, issues addresses included why evolutionary psychology is dissatisfied with the SSSM, the notion of the mind as blank slate, the nature-nurture paradigm, and the mind as a general purpose learning device. Two aspects of evolutionary theory are described, natural and sexual selection, in terms of their importance to evolutionary psychology. The main arguments of evolutionary psychology as a discipline are outlined, looking at its aims, and the ways in which it combines the disciplines of evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology toward a new integrative model for studying human behaviour. A case study demonstrates how evolutionary psychology offers a useful explanation of mate selection. This thesis then turns to the philosophy of science, setting out the differences between Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos' theories, and focusing on the latter's theory as a model of scientific philosophy which could be useful for evolutionary psychology, including discussing how this could be best achieved. This thesis then sets out various criticisms of evolutionary psychology, including the critique of domain-specific modularity, the focus on the Pleistocene period as problematic, the over-reliance on natural selection, just-so stories, the reductionism of evolutionary psychology, and that it is politically conservative. This thesis concludes that the attempt of evolutionary psychology to combine cognitive science and evolutionary theory has been successful in showing how the integration of psychology into the sciences is not only possible but inevitable.

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li Taiwan da xue, 1965. / Reproduced from typescript, on double leaves. Includes bibliographical references.

<p> Utilizing a postphenomenological lens, in this study, I analyze Human Security Era (1990s&ndash;2010s), techno-futurist films as case studies to explore how humans and technology can and do co-shape a more harmonious world, resulting in TechnoHumanity. To build a techno-humane world, humans must find a way to spur technological innovation and advancement, embedding ethics in design to avoid a dystopian path to dehumanization. Films, and specifically the content or text of the films, provide case studies for a postphenomenological analysis to explore designed, in-design, and future technologies and their interrelationship with humanity.</p><p>