The recent reemergence of theories that emphasize the semantic and conceptual aspects of emotions has also brought to attention questions about their rationality. There are essentially two standard senses in which emotions can be assessed for their rationality. First, emotions can be said to be categorically rational (i.e., not intrinsically a-rational) insofar as they presuppose our psychological capacities to be clearly conscious of distinctions, to engage and manipulate concepts, and hence to provide intentional (in the technical sense) descriptions as reasons for what we feel and are moved to do. For this "cognitive" rationality we can apply the usual standards intrinsic to the processes of belief formation such as coherence, consistency, inferential validity, and appropriateness of evidence. Secondly, and derivatively of "rationality" as a teleological or strategic notion, emotions can be thought of as rational or irrational depending upon their function (i.e., their success or lack of it) in fulfilling certain specified human purposes. While neither adhering to nor dismissing what these two mainstream perspectives afford, the following thesis is an alternative, yet complementary, project. Its aim is to "rationalize" emotions through insights obtained in programmatic examinations of their relationship to a number of critical features of being human: intentionality, expression and language, sense of self, responsibility, self-deception, and value cognition and moral agency. The idea is less to fit emotions within some formulaic description of rationality and more to let its potential definition emerge subsequently to these investigations. This reflects a conviction that rationality is not a unitary property of our minds but a complex stance towards the world. It also exhibits an awareness that, as evidenced by current debates, "rationality" is very much a contested notion.

As the title says, the thesis is "a critical interpretation of Kierkegaard's Philosophiske Smuler" (Philosophical Fragments). The thesis intends thus to read this work "critically". It goes through the text chapter by chapter, but does not limit its analyses to direct reading of the texts. The reading is "intentional" in the sense that it attempts also to take into account the states of mind which must have produced the text. In this way the method is "phenomenological". It attempts ultimately to approach the "phenomena" behind the texts, i.e. the experiences corresponding to the textual manifestations. Given this phenomenological intention, it appears that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author of Philosophiske Smuler, Johannes Climacus, shares spiritual experiences with religious mystics. The thesis attempts to express these experiences in a language which can suit comparative purposes with Climacus. In order to show how mysticism enters Climacus' mind, one could refer to examples on almost every page throughout Philosophiske Smuler. If we approach mysticism from a purely psychological perspective, we will also find a clear correspondence between Climacus' description and what psychologists of religion say about the highest mystic states of consciousness. The well-known psychologist in the Freudian tradition, James Henry Leuba, calls the ultimate experience of mystics a "sweet bliss", in which "sex organs participate, tormented by an insufficient stimulation". Chapter 1 of the thesis contains a detailed explanation of mystic concepts. But in order to avoid any misunderstandings on this important issue, the reader should consult the glossary in the end of the thesis. This glossary explains the most important mystic concepts and gives references to the pages in the thesis where they occur. The glossary also points out the most important places in Kierkegaard's text of Philosophiske Smuler where the mystic concepts are most relevant. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The issue addressed in this thesis is one in the absolute idealism of Spinoza. It is one of specifying an interpretation of substance-attribute identity as a solution to the problem of reconciling it with the diversity of the attributes and the oneness of substance. As a testing ground for any proposed solution, a list of questions is generated. Given the countable diversity of the attributes, can we conceive of the identity of each of them with the one substance? Why, if I am identical to a mode of each of infinite attributes, do I perceive only a body? What is the rational explanation for the infinite countable diversity of the attributes and our being directly acquainted with only two? In what manner can we reconcile the divisibility of substance with the activity of thought? How does one reconcile the order of extension seeming to be one of external relations with the essentially internal order of any finite thinking thing? How does one reconcile the independent being of modes of extension with the truth-functionality of ideas? In what manner is it possible to understand the appearance of the uniqueness of the one thing conceived under the idea of the body and the one-among-severalness of the same thing conceived under the idea of the individual's mind? In what manner can it be said that substance, consisting of infinite attributes, is accurately and completely conceived through any one of them while each is conceptually independent of every other? How can the one thing which is mind and body be wholly and accurately conceived to be a mode of either of their respective attributes while modes of differing attributes are also conceptually independent? The interpretations of substance-attribute identity given by John Clark Murray, T. L. S. Sprigge, and Errol E. Harris, in their writings in which they advocate reading Spinoza as an absolute idealist, are argued to be disadvantageous in dealing with the evident parallelism of the attributes. Finally, a proposed solution, offered by an alternative absolute idealist interpretation of substance-attribute identity, is developed in response to each of the above questions.

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I think that Mikel Dufrenne should be praised for his Phenomenologie de l'experience esthetique. The reason why I think this is that he attempts to describe aesthetic experience in terms which are wholly amenable to the experience of art itself from a phenomenological point of view. However, I believe that despite his attempts, Dufrenne ventures into an area which is not phenomenologically accessible, namely ontology. In general, it is the purpose of this thesis to show that Dufrenne's venture into the realm of ontology is beyond the phenomenologically given. And more so, that in attempting such a venture, Dufrenne neglects phenomenologically accessible data, namely, the acts which the spectator deploys when he confronts the aesthetic object. Specifically, it is the purpose of this thesis to show this neglect on Dufrenne's behalf by way of identifying the most simple acts contributed by the spectator. This thesis has three main divisions. The first two divisions are primarily expository, although not without criticism. The last division concretizes the criticism of the first two parts and shows my specific point of criticism regarding Dufrenne's text. In effect, the third part could be read as a supplement to Dufrenne's work itself. The first division consists in two chapters. The first chapter of this division is purely expository. It recounts Dufrenne's account of the a priori or the accord between man and world which grounds straightforward perception. The second chapter shows how the subjective moments of perception deploy themselves such that this accord is pregnant with, and capable of reading, meaning. There is, however, a critical overtone to the second chapter. This consists in noting that Dufrenne does not recognize the full extent in which the subject arrests and constitutes the meaning of straightforward perception. The second division consists in three chapters, all of which are expository and firmly delineate the subject matter as properly 'aesthetic'. For Dufrenne, aesthetic perception is demarcated from straightforward perception on the basis of objective as well as subjective content. With this in mind, this second part examines the a priori accord between spectator and aesthetic object, the nature of the aesthetic object itself, the subjective moments which realize its proper meaning, and the ontology by which (1) the aesthetic object has meaning and (2) this object is capable of expressing the reality of Being itself. The critical exposition makes clear that here, as in Dufrenne's notion of straightforward perception, there is a lack of attention paid to the subjective aspects of perception itself, or to say the same thing, the contribution on behalf of the subject by which he recognizes aesthetic meaning proper.

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