In the present thesis, we attempt to explicate St. Thomas's understanding of prudence an all-important virtue. In the introduction, we demonstrate how prudence is an exigency of man's rational nature, showing that without it man is incapable of acting according to reason and attaining his end. Within our analysis, we identify the major influences on St. Thomas's conception of prudence, in descending order of importance, as: Aristotle, St. Albert the Great, Philip the Chancellor, and William of Auxerre and provide a commentary on the specific contribution of each of these authors. In the second section, we attempt to summarize the contemporary context of the debate on prudence. We look briefly at the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Josef Pieper, and Gilbert Meilaender. As well, we point out that with the recent publication of Daniel Nelson's book, The Priority of Prudence, new life has been injected into the present debate on St. Thomas's understanding of the relation between prudence and the natural law. In the third and final section, we outline in detail St. Thomas's actual conception of the nature and exercise of the virtue of prudence. In this regard, we show that St. Thomas considers prudence a good operative habit of the practical intellect. We remark how St. Thomas views the three principal acts of prudence as: deliberation, practical judgment, and command, with this last being the proper act of the virtue. Finally, in our concluding paragraphs, we return to the issues raised by the Nelson book mentioned above and propose our thesis in this regard. This is, simply, that although Nelson is perhaps wrong to portray the 'natural law tradition' surrounding Aquinas as so rigidly deductivist, he is right to emphasize that St. Thomas's ethical theory is fundamentally virtue and prudence-based and not natural law-based. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Jusqu'a recemment, il y avait unanimite chez les interpretes de Whitehead au sujet du concept metaphysique de Dieu elabore par celui-ci. Tous, en effet, consideraient qu'un seul concept de Dieu avait ete tenu par Whitehead au cours de sa periode metaphysique, soit de 1925 a 1941. Depuis la fin des annees 1970, mais surtout depuis 1984, annee de la parution de l'important ouvrage intitule The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics (1925-1929), cette perception de la pensee de Whitehead est mise en cause par le professeur Lewis S. Ford, de Norfolk (Virginie). Il soutient qu'au contraire, le systeme metaphysique de Whitehead a evolue de maniere significative non seulement au fil des ouvrages publies par celui-ci, mais aussi, chose surprenante, au cours du processus de composition de Process and Reality (paru en 1929), son magnum opus. Ford distingue treize moments compositionnels, donc autant de couches redactionnelles dans cet ouvrage. Et, ce qui est particulierement interessant pour notre propos, il fait allusion a une historicite du concept de Dieu dans le cadre de la composition de Process and Reality. Prenant le relais des recherches de Ford, notre these se veut une demonstration de ce qu'avant d'en venir a proposer son concept final de Dieu dans Process and Reality, Whitehead fut tenant, dans les premieres etapes de la composition de cet ouvrage, d'un concept initial de Dieu nettement distinct du concept final. De la sorte, l'essentiel de notre these est consacre a l'etude de tous les textes ou, dans Process and Reality, mention est faite du mot "Dieu" de meme qu'a la reconstruction des concepts de Dieu qui sont exprimes dans les textes en question. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Abstract Not Available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Recent books by Alan Bloom and Alasdair MacIntyre have argued that liberal individualism is inadequate to a full moral existence. Bloom claims that our lives could be so much richer if we recognized the creative force of 'prejudices' and acknowledged that culture needs just such a creative force if it is to flourish. MacIntyre claims that individual identity is embedded in the particular cultural tradition of which each individual is a part. He goes on to develop the argument that each person's moral understanding is necessarily bounded by his own tradition and that moral membership in some such tradition is a precondition of being able to understand the moral arguments of any tradition. MacIntyre also argues that the language of moral debate suffers from meaning incommensurability because the underlying rationale for the arguments that are framed within each tradition reflect different beliefs about rationality. Both Bloom and MacIntyre can be interpreted in a way that depicts them as complementary members of a school of thought known as 'communitarianism'. This paper takes the view that the version of communitarianism formed by the conjunction of the major premises of Bloom and MacIntyre is based on an epistemological error. It begins with a brief exploration of the genesis of the concept of modern individualism using De Tocqueville as the point of departure. The paper attempts to illustrate the Tocquevillean theme of "freedom as interdependency" of rational individuals. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Abstract Not Available.

The purpose of this thesis will be to defend R. G. Collingwood's claims about the existence, and the significance, of Absolute Presuppositions. This defense will fall into three main sections. In the first section, I will provide a detailed critical examination of the methods of metaphysical analysis prescribed by Collingwood for uncovering Absolute Presuppositions in the first place: the 'logic of question and answer'. In the second section, I will draw attention to what I take to be the main problem with the Essay on Metaphysics: the fact that this method of metaphysical analysis is never applied in any systematic, thoroughgoing way. In the third and final section of the thesis I will try and remedy this situation. I will do so by applying the method of analysis prescribed by Collingwood to his own historical inquires--specifically, those contained in Roman Britain. This application will produce two important results. (1) It will provide a much-needed demonstration of Collingwood's method in an applied setting. (2) It will reveal the operation of one of Collingwood's own absolute presuppositions, viz. the presupposition that the actions of historical agents and the artifacts left by them are expressions of rational, purposive thought. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The thesis which follows is concerned with developing a new approach to political theory as it is practiced in the Anglo-American tradition. This tradition has been characterized by certain assumptions regarding the foundations of political theory, the most important of which has been the primacy accorded to the individual and to the political rights which develop to protect this primacy. Recent political experience in the West presents a strong challenge to the individualist stance. The rise of political interest groups, which serves as the empirical starting point for this thesis, has brought out the shortcomings of our democratic theory into the open. Various critiques, from a feminist, Marxian, ecological or other point of view, have shown how the individualism of our tradition has reached certain limits. These also show the need for a new development in political thought. The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is diagnostic in nature: it seeks to isolate a specific question to be asked, a heuristic notion of representation that can serve as a template for further inquiry. This first part is made up of two chapters. The first chapter looks at representation from the point of view of the representative. The second chapter turns to the interests of the represented. In the second part, which is made up of three chapters, the work of Marsilius of Padua is studied to try to glean a possible solution to the heuristic notion developed earlier. Marsilius' understanding of politics is founded on a corporate notion of the individual, which is why his work is of interest. The chapters develop, in order, Marsilius' historical context, some key notions in his text, and finally some conclusions for our own theoretical enterprise. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)