Since the end of the Cold War, traditional justifications for war have diminished in relevance and importance, while the use of Humanitarian Military Interventions (HMI) has proliferated, to the point that formerly traditional wars – e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq invasions – have become retroactively redefined as HMIs. While HMI suffers from a number of problems, from international law to historical track record, its proponents have managed to turn aside all arguments by claiming they represent either statistical outliers, improper implementation, or at best indicate a need for a certain degree of fine-tuning. Crucially, the validity of the HMI practice is never brought into question. In order to attempt to break this dialectic stalemate, this dissertation recasts HMI as a Kuhnian paradigm. Doing so provides for a better understanding of HMI as a holistic Weltanschauung, and allows the problems of HMI to be understood as anomalies. Unlike arguments, anomalies need not engage with every discrete position held by the paradigm. Instead, they serve as a direct demonstration of the untenability of a position, as evidenced by systemic failure to produce the desired results. Consequently, the paradigm approach allows for a binary resolution to the problems of HMI: either the anomalies can be explained by the paradigm, or the paradigm has failed. The present analysis begins with an examination of paradigms and their structures, and then follows the history and context of HMI is considered from a philosophical and historical perspectives. Then, the structure of HMI as a paradigm is unpacked, with the attendant ends, means, justifications, and implications. Finally, four categories of HMI anomalies are presented, leading to the conclusion that the HMI paradigm is a failed one.

Over the last two decades, the international community has taken on the task of rebuilding societies in the aftermath of mass-atrocities. Through a combination of trial and error and vigorous academic research, a relatively clear (and semi-malleable) blueprint of post-atrocity peacebuilding has developed. This includes setting up a temporary international transitional authority, establishing democracy, facilitating economic development, and holding war crime trials. Though there are volumes of studies which address the pragmatic strengths and weaknesses of these key elements of peacebuilding, to date political theorists have not critically analyzed the moral legitimacy of these policies. My thesis aims to fill this gap. The overarching question of this thesis is this: What moral duties does the international community have to post-atrocity societies? To answer this question, I critically examine the normative issues involved in the four key aspects of peacebuilding (identified above). Using the framework of just war theory and a cosmopolitan theory of fundamental human rights, I argue that, in most post-atrocity cases, the international community has duties to remove atrocity-committing regimes from power, occupy the target-state and act as a transitional authority, help facilitate the creation of democracy and economic development, and hold war crimes trials. These duties, of course, are extremely complicated and limited and these qualifications are examined and developed throughout. Running through the construction of my theory of post-atrocity duties is a clear message: we – the international community – have obligations to the victims and survivors of atrocities. In other words, providing assistance in the wake of mass-atrocities is not a supererogatory act of charity, rather, it is a duty which we owe to the victims of these horrible crimes.