伍文亮. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2002. / 參考文獻 (p. 161-166). / 中英文摘要. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Wu Wenliang. / Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / Lun wen (Zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2002. / Can kao wen xian (p. 161-166).

Düsseldorf, Universiẗat, Diss., 2002.

Pei Kong-ngai. / Thesis submitted in: September 2002. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves i-vi). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter One: --- Introduction / Chapter 1. --- Intentional States and Folk Psychology --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- "Eliminativism, Externalism, and Individualism" --- p.5 / Chapter 3. --- Overview of The Thesis --- p.8 / Chapter Chapter Two: --- Mental States and Externalism / Chapter 1. --- The Distinction between Intrinsic and Relational Properties --- p.11 / Chapter 2. --- Supervenience --- p.14 / Chapter 3. --- Externalism --- p.18 / Chapter 4. --- The Classical Arguments for Semantic Externalism: The Twin Earth Thought Experiments --- p.19 / Chapter 5. --- From Semantic Externalism to Mental Content Externalism --- p.23 / Chapter 6. --- Externalism and Physicalism --- p.26 / Chapter 7. --- The Common Concept Strategy Objection to Externalism --- p.28 / Chapter Chapter Three: --- Stich's Argument for Individualism: The Argument from Below / Chapter 1. --- Stich's Argument for Individualism --- p.34 / Chapter 2. --- Narrow and Wide Behaviour --- p.37 / Chapter 3. --- Refining the Argument --- p.39 / Chapter 4. --- Is Replacement Argument Successful in establishing Individualism? --- p.44 / Chapter 5. --- Fodor's Argument for Premise 2*: Narrow Behaviour and Crazy Causal Mechanisms --- p.46 / Chapter 6. --- Causal vs. Non-Causal (Constitutive) Causal Powers --- p.51 / Chapter 7. --- Conclusion: Stich's Unsuccessful Argument from Below --- p.53 / Chapter Chapter Four: --- Fodor's Argument for Individualism: The Argument from Abo --- p.ve / Chapter 1. --- Fodor's Explanan Argument --- p.56 / Chapter 2. --- A Response to Individualism: Rendering Intentional States Individualistic --- p.65 / Chapter 2.1 --- Fodor's Account of Narrow Content --- p.69 / Chapter 2.2 --- Criticisms of Fodor's Account of Narrow Content --- p.71 / Chapter 3. --- Examining Global Individualism: Fodor's A Priori Argument --- p.74 / Chapter 3.1 --- Counterexamples to Global Individualism --- p.76 / Chapter 3.2 --- Can Global Individualism be Reconciled with Relational Taxonomies? --- p.81 / Chapter 3.3 --- Two Senses of Causal Relevance of External Conditions --- p.83 / Chapter 3.4 --- The Failure of The Argument from Above --- p.89 / Chapter Chapter Five: --- Conclusion --- p.91 / Bibliography --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.vi

The problem of reconciling the subjectively known mind with the objectively known brain has puzzled philosophers and scientists for centuries. When attempting to solve this problem in recent times, the focus has been on explaining how the mind is born from the brain, how the two are related, and how we can best understand them. This problem is of particular relevance to clinical psychology because it attempts to both understand and explain pathological presentations by appealing to both subjective personal experience and objective knowledge of the physicality of the brain. In this respect, clinical psychology straddles the gap between mind and brain. This thesis investigates the implications of the mind/brain problem for theory and practice in clinical psychology. Chapter one identifies the tension between knowing the world subjectively and knowing the world objectively and discusses the importance of understanding this tension when investigating the mind/brain problem. Chapter two sets out the foundational concepts of cognitive behavioural approaches in clinical psychology, looking in particular at how cognitive behavioural approaches conceptualise mental events like thoughts and beliefs. It is concluded that while cognitive behavioural approaches to clinical psychology regularly incorporate both mentalistic and physical concepts in its theory and practice, it does not address the inherent problems in their combined use, as revealed by the mind brain/problem. In order to improve the use of mentalistic concepts within the theory and practice of cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology, chapter three explores the major conceptualisations of mind from the discipline of philosophy of mind. To achieve this improvement, chapter four, suggests that refining of mentalistic concepts in clinical psychology, through the application of philosophical concepts of mind, can be made possible through the use of a framework that captures the different explanatory levels at which the mind/brain operates. The levels-of-explanation framework is put forward for this purpose. Of particular relevance to clinical psychology is the ability to retain the importance of autonomous, subjectively experienced, and causally efficacious mental events, while at the same time, being able to give a realistic account of how these mental events are linked to the physical brain. The levels-of-explanation framework is judged to be a suitable approach with which to achieve this. In chapters five and six, the implications of clinical psychology's use of mentalistic concepts are explored in relation to evidence-based practice and case formulation. It is shown that through a greater understanding of both the nature of mind and the relationship between the mind and the brain, improvements can be made to both the theory and practice of cognitive behaviourally base clinical practice. This is achieved through the application of philosophical concepts of mind, via a levels-of-explanation framework, while both researching and undertaking clinical practice in clinical psychology.

No description available.

In describing the mind’s place in the physical world, philosophers have produced a diversity of views. On the far right of the spectrum we find substance dualists, who think that there is in addition to physical substance, mental substance. A little to the left strong property dualists claim that while there is only physical substance, there are in addition to physical properties, mental properties. These two views broadly represent accounts of mind on which physicalism is explicitly considered false. Among those who think physicalism is true, are reductionists and non-reductionists. The former sit on the far left, claiming that there is only physical substance and that mental properties just are physical properties. Non-reductionists are at the center; rejecting the possibility of reduction, claiming that mental properties are distinct from physical ones, while resisting anti-physicalist claims about mental properties and substance. In this paper I will argue that this spectrum needs to be substantially revised. In particular I will argue that non-reductive views are unavailable and that strong property dualist views are problematically related to views that are dualistic about substance. I will present an alternative physicalist view that does not appear on the above-mentioned spectrum. I will not provide an outright defense of the view, but I will argue that it is worth further consideration because it enables us to avoid many of the difficulties commonly associated with the abovementioned views. Ultimately the view’s success will be determined by the possibility of accounting for subjective properties of phenomenal experience in terms of objective physical ones. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pronounce on this matter, but I will argue that if one thinks that the difference between the subjectivity of experience and the objectivity of physical properties is due to anything more than shortcomings in human explanatory capabilities, one is really endorsing a non-physicalist position. In this way, I hope to show that the best chance for a future physicalism lies in the alternative view that I offer here.

Tang, Ki Yuen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 36-40). / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

When humans use the mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions) and the emotional states of others to predict or explain another person�s behaviour, they have demonstrated their theory of mind understanding. Theory of mind is "one of the quintessential abilities that makes us human" (Baron-Cohen, 2000, p. 3). Emotion understanding has been considered by some to be an aspect of theory of mind understanding. There are several theories proposed to explain the development of theory of mind, from changes in representational abilities (Perner, 1991), to having an innate domain specific module (Fodor, 1992; Leslie, 1994), to social linguistic influences (Nelson et al., 2003). One facet of theory of mind understanding, understanding false belief, has been consistently found to develop at around 3 or 4 years of age (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Another cognitive ability that develops at the approximately the same time is that of autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory has been defined as "memory for information and events pertaining to the self" (Howe & Courage, 1993, p. 306). There are also several theories explaining the onset of autobiographical memory. Two similar theories by Perner (1991) and Welch-Ross (1995) proposed that until a child possesses dual representational abilities (or theory of mind), they cannot form autobiographical memories. Nelson (1993) and Fivush (2001) have both proposed that autobiographical memory is developed through shared narratives with more experienced others (e.g., parents). There are several factors that have been found to contribute to theory of mind, emotion understanding, and autobiographical memory. Language abilities have been related to all three cognitive abilities (e.g., Slade & Ruffman, 2005; Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Harley & Reese, 1999). Factors such as maternal talk, gender of the child, and the number of siblings the child has, have all been related to at least two of these abilities. In the current study, I addressed the relation between theory of mind understanding, emotion understanding, and autobiographical memory in three studies. The first study investigated the relations between language, theory of mind, emotion understanding, and mother-child talk about past events in 61 children at three 6- month intervals from 42- to 54- months of age. The second study also investigated these factors and the children�s pretense in 59 children at 48- months of age. In the second study, the mother�s theory of mind and emotion understanding were also measured. In the third study, I investigated the relations between theory of mind, emotion understanding and early memory recall in 73 adults, with an average age of 20 years. One key finding was that, despite theoretical predictions, there was no clear relation between theory of mind understanding and autobiographical memory in either children or adults. Results showed that theory of mind and emotion understanding are related but distinct abilities. The number of siblings, or the gender of the participants were not strongly related to theory of mind, autobiographical memory, or emotion understanding. Language abilities and maternal talk were the strongest factors related to the development of theory of mind, autobiographical memory and emotion understanding.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from file title page. Andrea Scarantino, Eddy Nahmias, committee co-chairs; Sebastian Rand, committee member. Electronic text (84 p. : ill.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Dec. 13, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 80-84).

Konstanz, Univ., Diss., 2009