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Mental causation : investigating the mind's powers in a natural world /Harbecke, Jens. January 2008 (has links)
Univ., Diss--Lausanne, 2007.
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Children's beliefs about what it means to have a mindDavis, Debra Lee. Woolley, Jacqueline, January 2004 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Jacqueline Woolley. Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Also available from UMI.
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Externalism, self-knowledge and explanationFlockemann, Richard 11 June 2013 (has links)
In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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The energy of the mind : the activity of mental processesBreen, Vincent January 1984 (has links)
No description available.
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The pure intentionalist theory of perceptual experienceO'Callaghan, Richard January 1996 (has links)
No description available.
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The Role of Judgment in the Epistemologies of Immanuel Kant & Bernard Lonergan: A Critical StudyHorne, Barrett 01 January 1984 (has links)
A critical explication and comparison of the notion of judgment in the epistemologies of Immanuel Kant and Bernard J. F. Lonergan is developed with a view to exploring the nature and limits of human knowing. The study reveals that Kant is forced to ground his epistemology in immediate intuition and rigid, a priori concepts because he fails to distinguish between mere animal extroversion and rational inquiry, and because he overlooks the role of the virtually unconditioned. He therefore relegates to judgment a merely mechanical function limited in its scope exclusively to empirical employment. He is furthermore forced (because of his oversights) to the drastic distinction between phenomena and noumena, with all knowledge being restricted to phenomena. In contrast to Kant, Lonergan's epistemology is found to be far more promising. His explication of the virtually unconditioned as the sole grounds for judgment gives full rein to our desire to know and his critical distinction between mere extroversion and rational inquiry enables us to maintain a significant meaning to the notion of objectivity. Loneraan's account imposes no restrictive limits to the range of our knowing while yet being able to account for all its various dynamics and departments.
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Action and interaction : the reality of reasons and limits of physicalism /Gunderson, Jonathan Robert, January 2003 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 198-205).
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Theory of mind deficits and paranoid delusions in schizophrenia : a game theoretical investigationChan, Ka-shing, Kevin, 陳家承 January 2010 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Psychiatry / Master / Master of Philosophy
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Virtually explained : Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness : explanation and implementation.Edwards, Stephen James. January 2003 (has links)
This paper is an analysis of aspects of Daniel Dennett's theory of human consciousness.
For Dennett, the reasons why human consciousness is so unique among earthly creatures,
and so manifestly powerful, are not to be found in the differences between our brains and
those of other higher mammals, but rather in the ways in which the plasticity of our
brains is harnessed by language and culture. According to Dennett, the best way to
understand the enhancements and augmentations that result from enculturation is as a von
Neumannesque virtual machine implemented in the parallel-distributed processing brain.
This paper examines two questions that arise from the latter hypothesis: (1) If nonsymbolic,
parallel-distributed networks accomplish all the representation and
computation of the brain, what kind of explanation of the functionality of that brain, can
legitimately maintain descriptions of procedures that are symbolic, serial, and real? (2)
What kind of structural design, training, and resultant processing dynamics could enable
a (human) brain to develop a competency for symbolic, serial procedures? Through
addressing these questions, I argue that Dennett's theory of consciousness is broadly
correct, investigate some other theorist's ideas that are highly compatible with Dennett's
work, and consider some criticisms that have been levelled against it. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2003.
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Relationship between theory of mind performance in a nonverbal task and functioning level of children with autism /Grenda, Michael J., January 2009 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Specialist in School Psychology)--Eastern Illinois University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-36).
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