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Children's understanding of the normativity of beliefKoenig, Melissa Ann. January 2002 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-71). Available also in an electronic version.
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How can conceptual content be social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective? /Clausen, Andrea. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Konstanz, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.
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A thesis : a study of the concepts of Qing, Li, and Zhi, in pre-Qin Confucianism /Li, Wai-shing, January 2000 (has links)
Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 125-129).
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Using theory-of-mind to increase social competence in young children with autism : a model for praxis in early childhood special education /Garfinkle, Ann N. January 1999 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-102).
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Understanding metaphors, irony and sarcasm in high functioning children with autism spectrum disorders its relationship to theory of mind /Diaz, Stacy. January 2010 (has links)
Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 60--62).
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Theory of mind and the assessment of suggestibility in preschoolersKarpinski, Aryn C. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 69 p. Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-36).
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Varieties of affectArmon-Jones, Claire January 1990 (has links)
No description available.
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Content and computation : a critical study of some themes in Jerry Fodor's philosophy of mindCain, Mark January 1997 (has links)
In this thesis I address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology via a study of Jerry Fodor's hugely important contributions to the discussion of those issues. The issues in question are: (i) the nature of scientific psychology; (ii) the individuation of psychological states for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation; and (iii) the project of naturalising mental content. I criticise many of Fodor's most significant and provocative claims but from within a framework of shared assumptions. I attempt to motivate and justify many of these shared assumptions. Chapter 1 constitutes an overview of the key themes in Fodor's philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2 an account of scientific psychology within the orthodox computationalist tradition is developed according to which that discipline is concerned with explaining intentionally characterised cognitive capacities. Such explanations attribute both semantic and syntactic properties to subpersonal representational states and processes. In Chapters 3 and 5 Fodor's various arguments for the conclusion that scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological states individualistically are criticised. I argue that there are pragmatic reasons why scientific psychology should sometimes attribute contents that are not locally supervenient. In Chapter 4 I consider Marr's theory of vision and conclude that the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the visual module are locally supervenient. Inconsistency is avoided by stressing the continuity of scientific psychological content with folk psychological content. In Chapter 6 I develop an account of the project of naturalising mental content that vindicates that project. In Chapter 7 I address the question of whether Fodor's theory of content constitutes a successful engagement in that project. I argue for a negative answer before drawing some morals as to how we should proceed in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory.
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A defence of extended cognitivismGodwyn, Martin 05 1900 (has links)
This dissertation defends extended cognitivism: a recently emerging view in the
philosophy of mind and cognitive science that claims that an individual's cognitive
processes or states sometimes extend beyond the boundaries of their brain or their skin to
include states and processes in the world. I begin the defence of this thesis through a
background discussion of several foundational issues in cognitive science: the general
character of cognitive behaviour and cognitive processes, as well as the nature and role of
representation as it is standardly taken to figure in cognition. I argue in favour of the
widely held view that cognition is best characterised as involving information processing,
and that carriers of information (i.e., representations) are ineliminable components of the
most distinctively human and powerful forms of cognition. Against this background the
dissertation argues in stages for successively stronger claims regarding the explanatory
role of the external world in cognition. First to be defended is the claim that cognition is
often embedded in one's environment. I develop this claim in terms of what I call 'parainformation':
roughly, information that shapes how we tackle a cognitive task by enabling
the extraction of task-relevant information. Proceeding then to the defence of extended
cognitivism, I draw most significantly on the work of Andy Clark. In outline, and in
general following Clark, it is argued that states and processes occurring beyond the skin of
the cognitive agent sometimes play the same explanatory role as internal processes that
unquestionably count as cognitive. I develop this claim in two versions of differing
strength: firstly, in a general way without commitment to the representational character of
extended cognition, and secondly in a specifically representational version with special
attention to intentional explanation. Against each of these versions of extended
cognitivism are ranged a number of criticisms and objections, many of which stem from
the work of Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa. The dissertation examines these objections and
rejects each of them in turn. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
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Concepts and nativismAdamson, Nicholas January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
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