O propósito desta tese é explicar as relações civil-militares na Colômbia durante a década de 2000. Nesta perspectiva, considera-se, em primeiro lugar, o impacto da pressão externa por uma determinada conformação das FFAA. Ou seja, a influência da intervenção dos Estados Unidos da América através do Plano Colômbia. Em segundo lugar, avalia-se o impacto do contexto político interno da Colômbia na conjuntura 2000-2010 e, particularmente, a dinâmica do conflito colombiano durante a execução da Política de Segurança Democrática do governo Uribe, nas suas dimensões normativas, institucionais e operacionais. A pesquisa também desenvolve uma contextualização sócio-histórica para identificar os condicionantes estruturais das interações entre civis e militares na Colômbia desde o século XIX. Por fim, exploram-se as implicações do processo de fortalecimento, modernização e expansão das FFAA nos últimos anos para o controle civil democrático, como também para a inserção do estado colombiano em dinâmicas de cooperação regional no âmbito da segurança e defesa. / This research aims to explain the civilian-military relationships during the 2000 decade. First off, it considers the impact of external stress supporting a battle between the FFAA. I mean the influence from an American participation through the frame of Plan Colombia. In second place, it reviews the impact of the internal political context in Colombia in the juncture 2000-2010 and, specially, it focuses on the dynamics of armed conflict and the execution of the security policies during Uribe’s Government, within the normative, institutional and operational dimensions. Also includes the study of the historic and sociological context that represents the structural interactional conditions between civilians and militaries of the XIX century. Finally, it explores the consequences of the process of consolidation, modernization and expansion of the FFAA over the last years for the civil democratic control, as so as for the introduction of Colombia in regional cooperation policies of security and defense.

O propósito desta tese é explicar as relações civil-militares na Colômbia durante a década de 2000. Nesta perspectiva, considera-se, em primeiro lugar, o impacto da pressão externa por uma determinada conformação das FFAA. Ou seja, a influência da intervenção dos Estados Unidos da América através do Plano Colômbia. Em segundo lugar, avalia-se o impacto do contexto político interno da Colômbia na conjuntura 2000-2010 e, particularmente, a dinâmica do conflito colombiano durante a execução da Política de Segurança Democrática do governo Uribe, nas suas dimensões normativas, institucionais e operacionais. A pesquisa também desenvolve uma contextualização sócio-histórica para identificar os condicionantes estruturais das interações entre civis e militares na Colômbia desde o século XIX. Por fim, exploram-se as implicações do processo de fortalecimento, modernização e expansão das FFAA nos últimos anos para o controle civil democrático, como também para a inserção do estado colombiano em dinâmicas de cooperação regional no âmbito da segurança e defesa. / This research aims to explain the civilian-military relationships during the 2000 decade. First off, it considers the impact of external stress supporting a battle between the FFAA. I mean the influence from an American participation through the frame of Plan Colombia. In second place, it reviews the impact of the internal political context in Colombia in the juncture 2000-2010 and, specially, it focuses on the dynamics of armed conflict and the execution of the security policies during Uribe’s Government, within the normative, institutional and operational dimensions. Also includes the study of the historic and sociological context that represents the structural interactional conditions between civilians and militaries of the XIX century. Finally, it explores the consequences of the process of consolidation, modernization and expansion of the FFAA over the last years for the civil democratic control, as so as for the introduction of Colombia in regional cooperation policies of security and defense.

Cette recherche part de la volonté de comprendre et d'expliquer l'interaction entre la politique intérieure et la politique internationale dans les processus de construction étatique des pays les moins développés et avec une histoire de forte dépendance extérieure. Son objectif central consiste donc à étudier les transformations du phénomène de l'intervention internationale dans le contexte de la mondialisation à partir de l'analyse du cas colombien. C'est pourquoi, en premier lieu, y sont examinés les théories qui, selon les relations internationales, ont rendu compte de l'intervention comme partie de la dynamique de la politique internationale contemporaine. Un type spécifique d'intervention, la construction étatique, est analysé dans le cadre de la politique extérieure nord-américaine au XXe siècle. En second lieu, l'étude de cas présentée analyse l'intervention des États-Unis en Colombie lors de trois moments distincts : l'Alliance pour le progrès (1961-1972), la lutte contre les drogues (1975-1994) et le Plan Colombie (2000-2010). A travers ceux-ci est exposé de quelle manière l'intervention de la superpuissance dans le pays sud-américain a changé tant dans sa conception que dans sa mise en place au long d'un demi-siècle. L'examen détaillé de ces trois périodes permet d'identifier les point de comparaison afin d'établir s'il s'agit ou non d'une intervention orientée vers la construction étatique.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years