Thesis (Ph. D.)--New York University, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-245).

China’s state-led finance to overseas projects becomes increasingly important, represents a growing financial trend among emerging market economies, and leads to the puzzle: to what extent are state-owned (policy) bank driven by state or by its own interest. The project compares China’s practice of overseas energy finance with Japan – a well-studied case of state-supported development – to highlight the characteristics of Chinese public financiers and integrate their practice into development theories. The project speaks to three major development theories: the market model, in which banks pursue profit; the state model, in which banks are commanded by state; and the interest group model, in which conflicting goals clash in the repeating game between stakeholders. The project argues that banks balance their self-interest and state assignments depending on the regulator-bank and bank-client bargains. In the project, the first research article compiles publicly available data on policy bank loan and calculates the influence of various determinants on loans granted by policy banks. The findings are that Chinese and Japanese banks are driven by both profit and non-market goals and tend to invest in recipients with high risks. Going beyond large-N statistical modeling, the second article uses archives and interviews to investigate to what extent do investment in risky projects are driven by state goals. The article develops an interest-group bargaining model, in which the analysis focuses on four sets of actors in the process of project formation, crisis emergence, and resolution/or lack of resolution. While projects with innate high risk are often considered as economic diplomacy, evidences suggest the projects are mostly driven by recipient governments and for-profit banks. The third, and final, research article relies on elite interviews and archival analysis to investigate the domestic politics of policy bank regulation and the formation of loan policies. Between China and Japan, the article formulates two different institutional structures that govern the effectiveness of policy bank regulation. In Japan, the structure is vertical, with paired ministry-bank regulations. In China, the institutional structure is more like umbrella-shaped joint regulation. This leads to more interactions between the leading regulator and banks and occasionally more efficient policy implementation.

This research has studied bank risk management in relation to efficient bank regulation in the form of optimal bank financial reorganization. Efficient banking regulation can be achieved only if it includes closure policies which prevent moral hazard behaviour; in turn, they should enhance bank regulators' accountability. Yet, Basel II gives more discretion to domestic banking authorities and focuses more on the implementation of best practices of risk management. This creates a gap between the needs of efficient banking regulation and the objectives of Basel II, on the one hand, and Indonesian bank regulation on the other. To fill the gaps, the Fries, Mella-Barral, Peraudin (FMP) model, under a robust regulatory regime concept, is used to provide a framework for banking regulation. Optimal bank reorganization aims at achieving efficient bank regulation, where bank regulators are assumed to act as social planners. In this thesis, optimal bank reorganization is analysed within the concept of a "robust regulatory regime". Optimal bank reorganization comprises closure rules and bailout policies arising endogenously through the interaction of two factors, namely regulators' attempts to minimize discounted, expected bankruptcy costs, and equity-holders' incentives to recapitalise banks. The shareholders will be allowed to continue to control the bank if the bank is well capitalized. The cash flow approach to optimal bank financial reorganization is adopted. The subsidy policies for financially ailing banks consider the implementation of socially-optimal closure rules at minimum financial cost to regulators and which reduce moral hazard. The FMP model implies that optimal bank reorganization requires a deposit insurance scheme. The FMP model involves capital and risk management as crucial factors. This research includes an empirical study of the implementation of the FMP model in Indonesia using the American call option approach. Maximum likelihood estimates in VAR and GARCH are applied to monthly data on the market return and equity and deposit values for relatively-large Indonesian banks, including regional banks and foreign banks. The results indicate that the authorities can establish an optimal closure rule for each bank, levy fair deposit insurance premiums that can be adjusted to take account of quantitative and qualitative factors, estimate optimal subsidies at different deposit insurance premiums, and identify the banks' imminence to bankruptcy. (Continues...).

The diploma thesis deals with credit financing of the company. The aim of the thesis is the analysis of credit policy in a specific company, summarize the major findings of the most importatnt credit instruments, outline the course of the credit process and explain the issues of the security for a debt. The partial aim of the thesis is to analyse specific situation of the providing the bank guarantee. The first half of the thesis is focused on the comparison the differences in a bank overdraft and specific loan. In the second half of the thesis there is a matching of the credit products for small and medium enterprises in terms of Czech banks following the planned acquisition of fixed assets in the company. In the final part of the work is done and a summarized evaluation of the data and proposal of measures to streamline the credit financing.

Zombie banks are banks that are practically insolvent but continue to exist through hiding bad loans on their balance sheet. This can be achieved by rolling over bad loans instead of writing them off, a process known as forbearance lending, zombie lending or evergreening. Zombie banks have received increased attention of late, not least because of the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe. This follows other banking crises in the US and Japan which have equally seen an increased number of bank failures, and where insolvent companies have been kept alive by banks. This study aims to give a theoretical assessment of the phenomenon around zombie banks and forbearance lending. Although zombie banks are the focus of a wide public debate, the existing research has not been able to fully explain many aspects around them, such as the several motives for forbearance lending, the impact of forbearance lending on the overall portfolio of zombie banks, or the right policy response in dealing with them. In light of this, the study presents three models that simulate the behavior of banks when rolling over bad loans. These models offer insights into the causes and effects of zombie banking, and also allow us to analyze the context of policy measures by the government and the central bank. To put the models into the right context, the study also provides a detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature as well as the practical experience with zombie banks and forbearance lending in Japan and Europe.

Questa tesi analizza un tema fondamentale e nello stesso tempo controverso: il rischio di liquidità che, dopo la crisi del 2007-2008, sta diventato sempre più importante. Le banche centrali forniscono la liquidità necessaria per ridurre la probabilità di un collasso del sistema finanziario, utilizzando una vasta gamma di strumenti. La tesi in oggetto propone un’analisi della politica quantitativa della Banca Centrale Europea: un’analisi in cui sono state considerate le condizioni di mercato e la loro coerenza con la domanda di liquidità da parte del sistema bancario. Il quadro normativo internazionale Basilea III ha introdotto nuove regole per la gestione del rischio di liquidità. Questo lavoro presenta una serie di azioni che possono essere applicate per migliorare le capacità di gestione del rischio di liquidità della banca stessa. Applicando al processo decisionale il metodo della simulazione, è stata utilizzata un'analisi di sensitività per determinare l'impatto delle decisioni manageriali sull’indice di liquidità. Questa tesi mette in evidenza l'importanza del rischio di liquidità e presenta l'analisi empirica che ha permesso l'indagine della relazione che intercorre tra il nuovo requisito introdotto dal Basilea in materia di liquidità (NSFR) e la stabilità del sistema bancario, i fattori macroeconomici e dei mercati finanziari, e le operazioni della banca centrale. / This thesis focuses on a crucial and controversial issue - liquidity risk. After the 2007-2008 crisis it became increasingly important. The Central Banks provide required liquidity to minimise the probability of a financial system meltdown by using a wide array of instruments. This thesis proposes an analyses of the European Central Bank quantitative policy, market conditions in which these measures have been taken, and their consistency with the demand for liquidity by the banking system. The Basel III international regulatory framework introduced new liquidity regulations for managing liquidity risk. This study introduces a number of actions that can be performed to improve a bank’s liquidity risk management capabilities. By applying the simulation-based approach to decision making, a sensitivity analysis was used to determine the impact of managerial rulings on liquidity ratio. The present work highlights the importance of the liquidity risk and presents the empirical analysis that allowed the exploration of the relationship between the Basel’s new liquidity requirement (NSFR) and banking stability, macroeconomic and financial markets factors, and central bank operations.