This work argues that youth and student organizations in Senegal and Congo became the primary catalysts for mass social struggles that challenged new national governments between 1958 and 1974. From the mid-1950s, young activists in both countries (along with many trade union leaders) debated emerging African political leaders over what constituted “independence.” These debates sharpened after the control of political institutions was devolved from French to African authorities between 1958 and 1960. As I show, rather than celebrating formal independence, many youth, student, and trade union organizations claimed that new African state leaders were complicit in the ongoing foreign domination of politics, education, and their national economies. Young activists contrasted formal independence with their demands for “real independence,” which included criteria such as the expulsion of French troops, an end to French and missionary influence over the education system, and the nationalization of foreign-owned businesses. In the context of this conflict, a subset of activists in each country became known as “radicals” due to their demands for “real independence” and their call to reorganize the state along Marxist principles. This work is based on archival research in Senegal, Congo, and France, as well as fifty-six interviews with Senegalese and Congolese militants of the period. The new presidents of Senegal and Congo, Léopold Senghor and Fulbert Youlou, both moved to consolidate control of their respective states after 1958. They attempted to isolate rival political organizations and young critics through a combination of repression and cooptation. “Youth Radicalism” explores how student, youth, and trade union organizations defended their autonomy from the new regimes and became centers of political opposition. I show that these organizations sparked urban rebellions in the capital cities of Brazzaville and Dakar, most notably in 1963 and 1968, respectively. In Congo, the protests in 1963 overthrew the government of Fulbert Youlou and allowed radical youth and student activists to declare themselves the leaders of a “revolution.” By building mass youth organizations, they were able to assume positions of authority and to successfully push for elements of “real independence” and “scientific socialism.” In Senegal, the strike in 1968 did not overturn Senghor’s government, but prompted a myriad of labor, educational, and democratic reforms in the years that followed. This work ends by looking at how the independent youth and student organizations of the 1960s were eliminated in both countries in the early 1970s due to internal divisions and state repression. Considering Congo and Senegal in the same study illustrates that youth and student leaders’ political strategies intersected through shared connections within the Francophone world, as well as Third World and Communist networks. The demands raised by young radicals emerged in response to specific local and national political conflicts, but this work argues that they were also fundamentally shaped by their links abroad. Finally, “Youth Radicalism” assesses how young radicals’ ability to create lasting structural change in Senegal and Congo was affected by the common political frameworks that guided their actions.

The existence of stark and enduring gender inequalities in political participation and representation around the world is a well-documented phenomenon. What constrains women from participating in politics? How can we encourage more women to participate? What are the substantive implications of nominal equality in participation? In this dissertation, I explore these questions in the context of Pakistan: a developing democracy with high levels of gender inequality on various dimensions. An overarching goal of this work is to center the role of the household -- and the sexual division of household labor -- in our understanding of gender roles and gendered inequalities in political participation. In Paper 1, I develop an original behavioral measure of preference expression, embedded in a survey with 800 respondents in Faisalabad, to demonstrate that even when women participate in political communication, they overwhelmingly opt to communicate their spouse's political preferences to a political representative, rather than their own. The ability to express and communicate preferences is key to many definitions of democracy. While existing work studies external constraints on preference expression in the public sphere, in this paper I demonstrate the persistence of internal constraints on women's preference expression that operate in the private sphere. In Paper 2, coauthored with Ali Cheema, Asad Liaqat and Shandana Khan Mohmand, we use a field experiment conducted in 2500 households in Lahore to study what works to mobilize women's turnout. The design of the experiment relies on the understanding that women's participation in this context is shaped by household level constraints. We test whether targeting a canvassing treatment prior to the 2018 Pakistan National Election emphasizing the importance of women's vote works best when targeted to women, men, or both. We find that it is insufficient to target women, and necessary to target men, in order to increase women's electoral turnout. In Paper 3, I draw on the conceptual framework of role equity and role transformation to understand variation in public attitudes towards gender equality. I use survey data collected in Faisalabad and Lahore to demonstrate how abstract support for gender equality in various domains breaks down in the face of material costs and circumstances that pose a threat to status-quo gender roles.

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The purpose of this study was to identify the strategies and tactics community college presidents used to influence state legislators. Selected State Board for Community and Technical Colleges staff and legislative staff members were asked to independently name 3-5 presidents whom they perceived to be most influential with legislators. Ten names were nominated; however, only five presidents were invited to participate in the study. The research identified five strategies and supporting tactics presidents used to influence state legislators. The strategies and tactics were: Strategy One: Build and Maintain a Relationship with Legislators and the tactics were: cultivate the relationship, make the interactions worthwhile, make personal contact, and invite legislators to campus; Strategy Two: Know the Players and the Process and the tactics were: contact legislative staff, know the legislative structure and protocol, and know legislators' issues. Strategy Three: Become a Resource for Legislators and the tactics were: be factual and knowledgeable, be broader than the college, be an advisor, and be accessible. Strategy Four: Broaden your "Sphere of Influence" and the tactics were: involve the community and staff, work with other legislators, and be bipartisan. Strategy Five: Communicate and Frame the Issue and the tactics were: use State Board staff expertise, ask for legislators' support, make the message meaningful, and testify at hearings. The findings suggest that successful community college presidents must develop personal and professional relationships with legislators based on honesty, trust, respect, care, and genuineness. Presidents should devote time to learning the legislative process to determine when and how decisions are made and by which political leaders. Because political work is time consuming, presidents must involve others, such as community leaders, faculty and staff, in the college's legislative activity. All the presidents in this study exhibited similar viewpoints on particular issues that the researcher contributes to these presidents' ability to influence. The presidents shared common viewpoints related to how they viewed legislators, themselves, the college, and the community. Community college presidents must be actively involved in influencing public policy decisions that affect the mission, finances, curriculum, support services, facilities, and overall operations of the college. / Graduation date: 2002

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The Canadian Union of Students (CUS) was Canada's national postsecondary student organisation from its founding in September 1963 as the successor to the National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS), until its dissolution in October 1969. This thesis recounts the political history of CUS by tracing the development of CUS policies on access to higher education and on student involvement in the governance of postsecondary institutions. The central argument of this thesis is that over time CUS policies and activities became increasingly "left wing," causing CUS to become ever more isolated from the mainstream students who constituted its membership. The loss of confidence by the members resulted in campus student associations withdrawing support from the organisation, leading to the dissolution of CUS in October 1969. This thesis is not strictly an historical policy analysis, although such an analysis appears throughout. This thesis also offers comparative discussions, recounting developments in the Quebec student movement, in the Canadian anti-nuclear and social justice movements, and in the American civil rights and student movements. To a lesser extent, this thesis also contains elements of social history, collective biography and organisational history. This variety of approaches helps in more fully explaining CUS's changing politics. As demonstrated by the developments in policies on access to higher education and institutional governance, CUS was not content with merely treating the symptoms of educational inequity, but increasingly sought to identify the causes of such inequity and eliminate them. This put the organisation in conflict with prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and divided the CUS leadership from its membership. Although a significant minority of disaffected youth and students challenged the norms of the day, they were unable to bring large numbers of people to their cause and thus unable to sustain pressure for change. The CUS leadership's attempt to reverse the course of the organisation to save it from collapse was unsuccessful and CUS folded under the weight of a rapidly declining membership.