The use of the term “sophist” in Plato’s Statesman has been understood to apply to all rulers who are not statesmen. They do not have the statesman’s expert knowledge but they all imitate the statesman. This seems to be consistent with the idea that a sophist is a false imitator. I argue against this interpretation and instead insist that only the tyrant in the Statesman is a sophist. I base this argument on the final definition of the sophist in Plato’s Sophist and the discussion of imitation in the Sophist. The tyrant is an important figure in the Statesman, even though he is only mentioned briefly. He is the ruler who pretends to be a statesman so that he can rule with the statesman’s power which is above the law. I use my narrower interpretation of the term “sophist” in the Statesman to argue that Plato’s purpose in the discussion of laws and regimes in the Statesman is to protect the city from the tyrant as a sophist. This requires that the people of the city recognize their own ignorance and completely forbid any type of political leadership that would make the city vulnerable to the false statesman. Instead, they imitate the statesman by their complete obedience to the law. The idea of complete obedience to the law, without any room for modification or change, is not politically appealing. However, it is important that part of Plato’s solution to the problem of tyranny is self-awareness of our lack of political knowledge. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / The use of the term “sophist” in Plato’s Statesman has been understood to apply to all rulers who are not statesmen. Instead, I argue that only the tyrant in the Statesman is a sophist. I base this argument on the final definition of the sophist in Plato’s Sophist and the discussion of imitation in the Sophist. I use my narrower interpretation of the term “sophist” in the Statesman to argue that Plato’s purpose in the discussion of laws and regimes in the Statesman is to protect the city from the tyrant as a sophist. This requires that the people of the city recognize their own ignorance and completely forbid any type of political leadership that would make the city vulnerable to a false statesman. This argument is important as it shows that part of Plato’s solution to the problem of tyranny is self-awareness of our lack of political knowledge.

Philip Pettit argues that freedom is best defined as non-domination, where domination is understood as subjection to uncontrolled interference. Pettit further argues that government is legitimate when it succeeds in preventing citizens from dominating each other without dominating them in the process, as this allows citizens to enjoy the protection of government without surrendering their freedom. Since Pettit argues that democratic (popular) control over government prevents government from dominating its citizens, Pettit argues that a legitimate, non-dominating state is possible. In this paper I argue that popular control cannot prevent government domination unless one accepts controversial, substantive value judgments about freedom and equality that Pettit claims his theory avoids. / Master of Arts / Philip Pettit argues that freedom is best understood as non-domination. By this, Pettit means that we are free when we have a strong degree of control over our choices and actions. He uses this definition to argue that democracy maintains the freedom of citizens because it means that the actions of government are under the control of citizens. This paper argues, contra Pettit, that citizens lack sufficient individual control over the actions of the government to maintain freedom as Pettit understands it. It further argues that one can only accept that government interference is not freedom reducing if one accepts certain substantive claims about freedom and equality.

While there is an abundance of philosophical literature on justice, there is far less literature within political philosophy on the topic of injustice. I think one common assumption these approaches share is that injustice is simply the absence of justice; call this the absence thesis. This assumption becomes more peculiar juxtaposed to social and political struggle for justice, which quite commonly begins with cries of injustice. Injustice is an importantly distinct philosophical notion from justice – it can explain how justice fails to be realized in interesting and sophisticated ways, and, I argue, track our efforts to realize just social worlds, in ways that paradigmatically ideal and nonideal approaches to justice by themselves cannot. In this essay, I focus specifically on the question of how theories of justice can guide action in social worlds with systematic oppression. I ultimately argue that action-guiding theories of justice that evaluate worlds with systematic oppression must represent features of injustice. If a theory fails to represent features of injustice, it will fail to guide action in these worlds. That representation of such features is necessary gives us reason to think, in certain circumstances, that the absence thesis is false. / Master of Arts

Consider the following scenario: A mother chooses to marry off her 10 year-old daughter, not because she doesn’t know the harmful effects of child marriage, nor because she thinks that it is good that her daughter marries when she is 10 years old. Rather, she is unable to feed her daughter and realizes that her daughter’s survival depends upon her marrying a financially stable man. This is an apparent example of what human development practitioners and political philosophers call an adaptive preference (AP): a preference, formed under oppressive circumstances, that seems to perpetuate the agent’s own oppression. Prevailing opinion is that forced tradeoffs—especially following Serene Khader’s taxonomy—, like the case presented above, are a type of AP: one in which a person makes a decision because of a limited option set. In this paper I argue that no paradigm cases of forced tradeoffs should not be classified as APs. Instead, I offer a revised definition of adaptive preferences where I argue that adaptive preferences are psychological traits that cause the agent with adaptive preferences to make irrational or uninformed decisions that perpetuate their own oppression. I defend this new definition by exploring the implications of changing the definition. In particular, forced tradeoffs involve different kinds of interventions from other kinds of adaptive preferences and including forced tradeoffs risks committing testimonial injustice against those who have limited option sets. / Master of Arts

In Martha Nussbaum’s book Frontiers of Global Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, she presents the capabilities approach, a new theoretical framework that in her view better responds to the urgent problems of social inequality than existing theories of social justice. This thesis evaluates her descriptive claim by applying the capabilities approach to the French burqa ban and assessing whether the ban is unjust, and if so, what forms of intervention are most appropriate. In doing this, I will argue that Nussbaum’s theory is unsatisfactory unless she extends it to include the obligation to criticize in cases where we are certain that an injustice is being committed.

The conversation to which my dissertation belongs is that which preoccupied John Rawls in Political Liberalism, namely: (1) how it is possible that a religiously and morally pluralistic culture like ours lives cooperatively from one generation to the next, and (2) The extent to which religious or moral convictions are appropriate bases for political action. My three-essay dissertation is about aspects of this investigation that affect minority or non-mainstream religious and cultural groups, since legal institutions, and theoretical models of them (such as Rawls’s and Ronald Dworkin’s) are in many ways ill-suited to accommodate their ways of life. In the first essay, I consider Rawlsian obstacles to developing a religiously impartial conception of “substantial burdens” on religious free exercise within First Amendment jurisprudence. I apply this question to federal cases in which Native American tribes sought to prevent government uses of land that would be, they claimed, catastrophic to their cultural survival and all citizens’ safety. I propose a jurisprudential model that places a heavier burden on judges to listen and perhaps translate such views, counting non-mainstream forms of reasoning as legally cognizable and sufficient to create a prima facie constitutional case, where current models would not. In the second essay, because few conceptions of justice require that law be cognizable and justifiable to everyone, I review liberal conceptions of what makes a cultural group or person “irrational” or “unreasonable.” With a focus on public education, and cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins in mind, I argue that approaches to “unreasonableness” from the likes of Rawls, Charles Larmore, Jonathan Quong, and Stephen Macedo are well-intentioned but unduly restrictive, insofar as they tend to, by definitional fiat, exclude citizens who embody widely recognized civic virtues, or who at least pose no threat to a stable democracy. In doing so, I argue that they instantiate the sort of social circumstance that Herbert Marcuse calls one-dimensionality. In the third essay, I consider whether a meaningful and practical model for “group rights,” which would include the right of peoples to preserve their cultures, can be developed within American jurisprudence. This argument is largely inspired by a paper from political scientist Vernon van Dyke, and considers overcoming challenges to this notion wrought by contemporary forms of liberalism and vehement public disagreement over recent, pertinent Supreme Court decisions involving associational rights, like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Citizens United v. FEC.

In this thesis, F.A. Hayek's argument is against social justice is given context, discussed, and evaluated. Hayek was one of the leading voices of libertarian ideology in the Twentieth Century. While Road to Serfdom is his most popular work, Hayek's philosophy is most fully expressed in his three volume set, Law, Legislation and Liberty. His thoughts against social justice are found the in the second volume, entitled The Mirage of Social Justice. It is the conclusion of the author that Hayek's argument against social justice, in the form of redistribution, falls short as it depends on a presupposition that an evolutionary moral and legal process will necessarily end in securing a libertarian style of government. The only possible means of salvaging the argument would to accept inherent and inviolable human rights, which Hayek fundamentally rejects as he claims the Kantian tradition.

I argue against the claim that normative political theory is 'autonomous' with respect to moral philosophy. I take the simple view that political theory is a form of moral philosophy, and is differentiated by pragmatic rather than theoretically significant criteria. I defend this view by criticizing arguments for the autonomy thesis. In the first three chapters I introduce and analyse the autonomy thesis and provide a framework for understanding the various claims that are made in the literature. In Chapters 4 to 8 I proceed to criticize a series of arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 4 I explain why Kant's division of morality into ethics and right is not as useful as it may seem to those who wish to defend the autonomy thesis, and argues that Arthur Ripstein gives no reason to think that political philosophy is autonomous that can be endorsed independently of commitment to a Kantian normative theory. In Chapter 5 I examine the political liberal argument for the autonomy thesis, concluding that even if a freestanding political conception of justice can be regarded as autonomous, it does not follow that political philosophy can also. Chapters 6 to 8 tackle various political realist arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 6 I argue that political theory is not required to deal with empirical facts in any way that distinguishes it from moral philosophy, and any argument for its autonomy that is based on a prior claim about the purpose of political theorizing would be question-begging. In Chapters 7 and 8 I provide various arguments against the idea that there is a distinctively political form of normativity, and diagnose some of the mistaken assumptions about morality that I take to lie at the heart of the realist case. In Chapter 9 I conclude.

<p>Recent discussions on global climate change have brought to our attention the largely disruptive influence of human activity on the planet and its inhabitants. Moral philosophers have added to the discourse their concerns about the unprecedented environmental problem of global climate change which threatens, and increasingly so, human welfare and the stability of the planet. The circumstances should be of concern to all, including philosophers who beyond their own endeavours will be affected by climate change. There are good reasons to think that the circumstances surrounding global climate change are morally repugnant and that serious action is required to avert global catastrophe and widespread suffering.</p> <p>Our discussion will draw attention to the ethical dimensions of climate change given present knowledge about the state of the global environment and human welfare across the planet, now and into foreseeable future. My aims in this paper are twofold. First, I will provide a survey of various arguments that fit under the umbrella of climate change ethics as a way to gauge their suitability to address the wider issues that should be of concern to us. Second, by seeking to refute these arguments on a number of theoretical grounds, I will make the case that the climate change problem is best understood through a welfarist lens. Climate change is fundamentally a problem of distributive justice for present and future generations and, as such, it is of great urgency to protect human welfare over the long run.</p> <p>The main argument begins in the first chapter with an overview of climate change against the backdrop of existing realities. We will take a look at the economics and science of climate change to gain a better understanding of issue, namely its origins and implications for the planet across space and time. In subsequent chapters, we defer to a variety of principles of global and intergenerational justice which are thought to offer moral guidance for the successful resolution of the climate change problem. Having concluded in the third chapter that we must focus on considerations of distributive justice, indeed those that are ultimately but not only utilitarian, the final chapter explores the appropriateness of various mechanisms and systems which would constitute a fair global climate regime.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

<p><em>Suffering is often awarded a prominent p</em><em>lace in many conceptions of ethics as a consideration worthy of moral concern. This is done however, without a thorough understanding of what suffering is, or why suffering is morally significant, as full accounts of the nature and moral significance of suffering are few and far between. Our attention in this project is on elucidating what suffering is, and why it is morally significant, as well as understanding suffering’s complex relationship to well-being. Additionally, we also utilize what has been established about suffering to begin to understand and outline what the ramifications of treating suffering as a separate consideration might be for morality.</em><em> </em></p> <p><em> </em></p> <p><em><br /></em></p> / Master of Philosophy (MA)